

Supplementary Online Appendices

Keeping the Public Purse:
An Experiment in Windfalls, Taxes, and the Incentives to Restrain Government

These appendices contain materials, results, and robustness checks that supplement the main text. Additional materials related to the implementation of the experiments can be found on the author's personal website, including: The original memo detailing the sampling and randomization strategy; a summary of the focus group discussions that informed design; the complete field manual for project implementation; and the survey instrument.

Update: This version of the appendix replaces an older version. It fixes broken table and figure references and improves the consistency of some of the analysis. None of these changes have any effect on the interpretation of the results. The older version of the appendix is available upon request.

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A Summary of the main hypotheses

The main hypotheses are summarized in Figure A.1 following the experimental design and using hypothetical data. The 2x2 table shows windfall and tax contexts in both low and high information environments, creating four experimental groups mirrored in the figure. The first three predictions—that taxes cause more monitoring, participation, and sanctioning than windfalls—are captured by a shift upwards of the tax line vis-a-vis the windfall line (as well as the plus signs in the first two rows of the far right column in the table). Hypothesis four, predicting that the impact of (negative) information on political action will be greater in a tax than in a windfall environment, is denoted by the slope of the tax line rising more steeply than the slope of the windfall line (as well as the positive treatment interaction in the bottom right cell of the table).¹

¹The focus here is on the effect of negative information because this fits the empirical setting—few participants found the information positive—and simplifies the predictions. While it is straightforward to predict that negative information about the incumbent should decrease support, it is difficult to predict whether negative information leads to lower or higher levels of monitoring or participation. The $+/-$ in the bottom row indicates this ambiguity without compromising the main prediction that the tax group will still take more action than the windfall group, even if negative information reduces political action.

		Windfall Context (C1)	Tax Context (T1)	Difference (T1-C1)
Low info	(C2)	Group 1	Group 2	+
High info	(T2)	Group 3	Group 4	+
Difference	(T2-C2)	+/-	+/-	+




Figure A.1: Summary of the hypotheses. *The table and figure summarize the four main hypotheses. Taxes are predicted to lead to more monitoring, participation, and sanctioning than windfalls, illustrated by the fact that the tax line is higher than the windfall line (and the plus signs in the first two rows of the far right column in the table). The prediction in H4 that the effect of information on action will be greater in a tax than in a windfall environment is captured by the slope of the tax line rising more steeply than that of the windfall line (as well as the positive treatment interaction in the bottom-right cell of the table).*

B Campaign script and illustrations

Empowering Citizens to Combat the Resource Curse **“Your Voice, Your Opportunity” Campaign**



Empowering Citizens to Combat the Resource Curse **Campaign Roadmap**

		Is paying taxes important?	
		Non-Tax (Income from central Government (Windfall) Paiaak=0)	Pay Tax (Tax = Rp. 4000)
Is information on government performance important?	Empty Information [Control]	Page: 1 • Basic Informations: 1-4 • Income Treatment: 6, 8 • Empty Information: 10 • Campaign Postcard: 11-13	Page: 2 • Basic Informations: 1-4 • Income Treatment: 5, 7 • Empty Information: 10 • Campaign Postcard: 11-13
	APBD Spending Information [Treatment]	Page: 3 • Basic Informations: 1-4 • Income Treatment: 6, 8 • Spending Information: 9a-d • Campaign Postcard: 11-13	Page: 4 • Basic Informations: 1-4 • Income Treatment: 5, 7 • Spending Information: 9a-d • Campaign Postcard: 11-13

Figure B.1: Campaign roadmap. The figure shows the cover illustration for the campaign, the 2x2 table with over-lapping revenue and information experiments (producing four groups), and the list of which illustrations to use for each group.



Halaman	Ilustrasi
1	2


Message: You elect your district leaders, but then what happens?

- Since *reformasi*, ordinary Indonesians like you have been directly electing leaders to the district government. Indonesians now have the **right and opportunity to elect directly the bupati and members of the DPRD**.
- This opportunity is important because the leaders you elect are responsible for the development of Blora. The **district government in Blora**, like in the rest of Indonesia, now has **more power and money than ever before** to make decisions about how to improve the lives of ordinary citizens. It is also the case that district leaders in Indonesia **do not necessarily use their authority and resources in the way that best benefits the people living in their districts**.

[USE ILLUSTRATION]

- How can you and other citizens make sure that your elected leaders are working for **YOU** once they get into office? In order to get into office, **candidates make many promises that sound good**. People then go to the polls and vote on the basis of those promises. But what do they do once they actually win the election? **Are they following through on their promises?** Are they working as hard as they can to make your life better?
- These are important questions to ask. Did you know that Blora is one of the poorest districts in Central Java? [Yes/No]. Indeed, **Blora is one of the poorest of 35 districts in Central Java**. It is important for you as a citizen of Blora to think about why that is, and whether it has to be that way.

Figure B.2: Campaign intro I. *You elect your leaders, but then what happens?*



Halaman	Ilustrasi
2	3

Message: Your leaders' decisions affect your daily life!

- The bupati and members of the DPRD make decisions about local development and public services to ensure a high quality of life for you and your family. **The bupati's role is to develop Blora. The role of the DPRD is to represent YOU** by passing laws that benefit you and also by making sure the bupati is working in your best interest.
- **Together, the bupati and DPRD in Blora are responsible for providing public services.** This includes things like ensuring your children have access to high quality education; building and maintaining roads; making sure there is high quality and accessible health care; and providing irrigation and support to farmers.
- They also are responsible for things like making sure there is enough water for households throughout the year, distributing fertilizer and raskin, and issuing important documents like KTP and birth certificates.

Figure B.3: Campaign intro II. *Your leaders make decisions about services*



Halaman	Ilustrasi
3	4

Message: ... and determine the future of Blora!



- **The decisions that the district government makes are about MORE than providing public services to make your life better now.** They are also about laying the foundation for the future of Blora. Only when these things are improved will Blora be able to attract businesses and create jobs that bring higher income and more stability.
- When you think about what you want Blora to look like five years from now, what comes to mind? How about ten years from now...?

Figure B.4: Campaign intro III. *Think about what you want Blora to be like now and in the future.*



Family Budget Analogy	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> To provide public services and develop Blora, one of the most important things the bupati and DPRD members do is decide how to spend money in the district through the district budget. This is called the APBD process. APBD stands for Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah. Are you familiar with what a budget is? To make things crystal clear, let's think about your personal or your household budget. Let's use the Rp. [10,000 14,000] that you earned as income earlier? [THE RESPONDENT SHOULD TAKE THE MONEY OUT] When you earn income, you get to decide how to allocate your income across your different expenses. Today you earned Rp. [10,000 14,000] for participating in this program. How will you allocate the income you earned today for yourself or your household? Here are 11 cards that represent different categories of expenses. Please first pick the cards that you plan to spend your income on. You can pick up to six cards. Place them on the board and then put the amount of money you plan to spend on each category in the box. 	
[THE RESPONDENT ALLOCATES THE MONEY ACROSS BUDGET CATEGORIES USING THE CARDS AND GAME BOARD]	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> So how did you decide to spend your income? 	

Figure B.5: Campaign intro IV. *The household budget game where participants selected six cards representing household expenditures and used their payment received at the start of the visit to illustrate how they planned to allocate funds across those expenditures.*





Halaman	Ilustrasi
5	6

The district budget includes your taxes

- Thank you for using your income to illustrate what a budget is. There is one kind of expense that was not included among the cards but that oftentimes you have to pay nonetheless. Citizens in Blora like you also **have to allocate money to pay taxes to the district government**. You are required to pay many different kinds of taxes, like income tax, the PBB, and the street light tax.
- **I now have to impose a 4,000 rupiah tax on your income** from today to represent the kinds of taxes you typically pay to the district government from your household budget.
- **What you pay in taxes mostly goes into the APBD**. I will now put the 4,000 rupiah here **[PUT IN BOX ON GAMEBOARD]** to indicate that you have had to pay back 4,000 rupiah to represent the taxes you pay to the district government, and this money goes into the district budget.
- You can put your remaining income back in your pocket.
- **In addition to getting money from taxes, the district government gets income from other sources, like from the central government and from natural resources**. I will now put 6,000 rupiah on the board **[PUT IN BOX]** to represent the income that government gets from other sources. There is now 10,000 rupiah on the board representing income in the APBD.
- Before we continue I would like to ask you a few questions.

[GO TO SURVEY SECTION 3]

Figure B.6: Tax treatment. *The tax treatment in the revenue experiment. The game board has boxes for tax and ‘other’ revenue.*




Halaman	Ilustrasi
6	7

The district government gets its money from the center

- Thank you for using your income to illustrate what a budget is. Now that we are done explaining what a budget is, you can put your income back in your pocket.
- **The district government gets income from several sources, like from the central government and natural resources.** I will now put **8,000 rupiah** on the board [PUT IN BOX] to represent the income the central government contributes to the district budget.
- In addition to getting money from the central government, the district government gets income from other sources, like from investments. I will now put **2,000 rupiah** on the board to represent the income that government gets from other sources. There is now 10,000 rupiah on the board representing income in the APBD.
- Before we continue I would like to ask you a few questions.

[GO TO SURVEY SECTION 3]

Figure B.7: Windfall treatment. *The windfall treatment in the revenue experiment. The game board has boxes for ‘central government’ (including transfers and resource rents) and ‘other’ revenue.*



Halaman	Ilustrasi
7	8

How did the district government spend the money?

- Let's return to the APBD. We left off with 10,000 rupiah on the board, including the **4,000 representing your taxes** and **6,000 from other sources**.
- We can say that this happens for each person in Blora. **You can think of this 10,000 as representing how much the district government gets in income for each person in Blora.**
- The next thing the bupati and DPRD members do is decide how to spend that 10,000 rupiah for each person in Blora. When you elect the bupati and DPRD members, you give them the authority to decide how to spend that 10,000 rupiah. They make decisions about how much of it to spend on education, health, farming and infrastructure. They also decide how much to keep for themselves.

[COMBINE THE MONEY FROM ILLUSTRATION 6 AND PUT IT ON THE GAMEBOARD]


- 10,000 rupiah is not the actual amount**, but we can use it to illustrate how to allocate money across expenditures in the real budget.
- If you were the **decision-maker**, how would you allocate the 10,000 rupiah for each person in Blora?

[LET THEM ALLOCATE AND RECORD ANSWERS IN SURVEY SECTION 4]

- How do you think the bupati and DPRD **actually** allocate the 10,000 rupiah for each person in Blora?
- Maybe there are some differences** between how you think the money should be spent and how you think the district government actually spends it. It is up to you to decide whether you are satisfied with these differences.

[LET THEM ALLOCATE AND RECORD ANSWERS IN SURVEY SECTION 4]

Figure B.8: District budget game. Participants pretended that they were a district leader and used the rupiah on the revenue game board to show their ideal allocation of funds across six spending categories (education, infrastructure, health, farming, 'politicians', and others). They were also asked to illustrate how they thought the district government actually allocated funds.



Halaman	Ilustrasi
9a	8


The truth about how the APBD was spent

- Now I would like to show you how the bupati and DPRD members *really* spent the 10,000 rupiah for each person in Blora. This is real information based on an analysis of the real 2008 district budget that the organizers of this information campaign did.
- Of the 10,000 rupiah for each person in Blora, they spent:**
 - 4700 on education.** This is quite big because the central government provides a lot of money for education in the APBD for the BOS program.
 - 1200 on infrastructure,** which includes projects to build and maintain roads, bridges, irrigation ditches and manage clean water sources.
 - 900 on health,** including on programs like jamkesmas and jamkesda, on the hospitals in Blora and Cepu, and on rural clinics like puskesmas.
 - 200 for agriculture,** including funding for fertilizer and assistance to farmers.
 - 1800 on their personal salaries and benefits, their official work, and administration.**
 - 1200 went to other** expenditures, like forestry, trade and commerce and certificate-making.

	Education	Infrastructure	Health	Farmers	Leaders	Other
	4700	1200	900	200	1800	1200
1000s	3	1	0	0	1	0
500s	2	0	1	0	1	2
200s	3	0	1	0	0	0
100s	1	2	2	2	3	2

Continued next page...

Figure B.9: Information treatment. *The actual share of total budget revenue allocated in 2008 to the six spending categories.*



Halaman	Ilustrasi
9b	8

The truth about how the APBD was spent (cont'd)

Direct/Indirect


- But just because the bupati and DPRD members have allocated the money to categories like education and health, **it does not mean that the money goes directly to each person**. Some of that money goes to the costs of running the government, including things like salaries for PNS, building maintenance and administration.
- This is how much was spent to run the government compared to how much was spent for you.
 - Of the 4700 they spent on **education**, the district government spent **3800** on itself and **900** on you. To represent this, I will now remove 3800 rupiah from the education box on the board.
 - Of the 1200 spent on **infrastructure**, it spent **100** on itself and **1100** on you.
 - Of the 900 spent on **health**, it spent **600** on itself and **300** on you.
 - Of the 200 spent on **farming**, it spent **100** on itself and **100** on you.
 - Of the 1800 spent on allocated to support the **bupati and DPRD**, **1600** went to the costs of running the government
 - Of the **1200** spent on all **other** expenditures, it spent about **600** on itself and **600** on you.

	Education	Infrastructure	Health	Farmers	Leaders	Other
Start	4700	1200	900	200	1800	1200
Take out	3800	100	600	100	1600	600
Left	900	1100	300	100	200	600

- Of the 10,000 originally allocated for each citizen, **6,800 goes back to the government and 3,000 goes to each citizen for public services and assistance**. Some of the money government spends on itself is necessary, but it is also possible that some of this money is not optimal.
- It is up to you** to decide whether you think this is a good division of the money that government spends for each citizen.

Cont'd on the next page...

Figure B.10: Information treatment. *The breakdown of the share of total budget revenue spent, within each category, on routine maintenance versus programs and services for citizens.*



Halaman	Ilustrasi
9c	8


The truth about how the APBD was spent (cont'd)

Corruption/Misuse

- **But not even all of that 3000 reaches you.** Sometimes money gets misused or goes missing along the way.
- **I will now take out 100 from education** to symbolize a recent case in which **funds to build and furnish 250 elementary schools went missing.**
- I will also take **100 from infrastructure** to symbolize the fact that last year government did not fulfill its responsibility to monitor infrastructure projects, which **makes it easier for builders to waste and misuse money.**
- We have now **deducted 200 rupiah from the initial 10,000 to represent misuse and corruption.** The real amount lost to corruption might be bigger or smaller, but it's hard to know because when there's no transparency, it's easy for money to exchange hands in the dark.

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
Figure B.11: Information treatment. *The mention that not all funds allocated to programs for citizens reaches citizens due to corruption.*



Halaman	Ilustrasi
9d	8

The truth about how the APBD was spent (cont'd)
<p>Spending by Leaders, on Leaders</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> And what about the 200 that remains in the box for district leaders? This is the amount that the bupati and DPRD members have allocated for themselves to do their jobs. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 100 of that they have allocated for activities directly related to their work. They budget money for study missions and travel, for meeting with constituents, and for discussing laws. It is up to you to decide whether you think they used this money effectively to communicate with people around Blora and to pass laws that benefit the district, and you. The remaining 100 the bupati and DPRD members have allocated for their personal use. They use this money to fund their salaries, health care, uniforms, cars, and homes for the bupati and DPRD leaders. Each person in Blora contributes this 100 to the bupati and 45 DPRD members, so the real amounts can be big. For instance: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 375 juta was spent for the bupati's salary and healthcare; 1.4 miliar was spent to renovate and maintain the bupati's official home in 2008. 147 juta was spent in salaries and healthcare for each member of the DPRD (on average); 756 juta was spent on homes for the DPRD Chair and Vice Chair. In the end, it is up to you to decide whether you think the bupati and DPRD members have earned their income from the APBD by doing a good job and addressing the needs of the people of Blora. <p>[GO TO SURVEY SECTION 5]</p> <p><i>(Campaigner Note: All information from Blora's 2008 realized budget)</i></p>

Figure B.12: Information treatment. *The breakdown of how politicians allocated funds to themselves and their offices.*



Halaman	Ilustrasi
10	8

Empty Information (Placebo)

Here is some basic information about Blora that district government leaders might consider when deciding how to allocate the APBD:

- Blora is surrounded by the districts of Rembang, Pati, Grobogan, Ngawi, and Bojonegoro.
- The longest distance from west to east is 87 kilometers, and the longest distance from North to South is 58 kilometers.
- There are 16 subdistricts and 295 villages in Blora.
- Of those, 24 are kelurahan and 271 are desas.
- There were 90 days of rain in 2008, with a total of 1336 millimeters of rain. The month with the greatest amount of rainfall is typically February.
- In 2008, 83 percent of the garbage in Blora was organic, and 9 percent was plastic.
- The growth rate of the Blora regional gross domestic product in 2008 was 5.8 percent.
- There is a golf course in Cepu.

(Campaigner note: All information obtained from Blora dalam Angka 2008-2009)

[GO TO SURVEY SECTION 5]

Figure B.13: Information control. *Placebo information drawn from the encyclopedia 'Facts and Figures from Blora in 2008.'*



Halaman	Ilustrasi
11	9

Message: Your Voice, Your Opportunity

[PUT THE MONEY AWAY BEFORE CONTINUING!]

- Now is an **important time in Blora**. The **pilkada** are scheduled for 3 June 2010. Both the bupati and DPRD will be starting **new terms in office**. But your job as citizens does not stop with elections. Citizens should tell their elected leaders what they want and **ordinary citizens should put pressure on their leaders** to bring about change after the elections are over.
- It is vital to do this now because Blora will soon start **getting revenue from oil from the Cepu block**. If citizens do not do more to tell the district government what they want, then Blora's natural resource wealth could be **squandered**.
- This is why LPAW is organizing a **postcard campaign** before the bupati elections. The goal of the campaign is to give citizens like you a chance to express how you feel about the quality of government in Blora.

Figure B.14: Postcard campaign I. *Introducing the postcard campaign.*

SUARA ANDA, KESEMPATAN ANDA

Saya ingin Pemkab Blora melakukan pekerjaannya dengan lebih baik

Saya puas dengan apa yang telah dilakukan oleh Pemkab Blora dan tidak ingin mengubah apapun


➔

Berhenti disini!
Kirim kembali kartupos anda

Jika anda menginginkan pemkab Blora lebih baik, sampaikan pada mereka bagaimana!

	Ingin	Tidak terlalu ingin	Tidak yakin
1. Saya [...] peraturan/hukum yang memastikan adanya kesempatan pada masyarakat untuk berpartisipasi dalam penyusunan keputusan yang diambil oleh Pemerintah Kabupaten.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. Saya [...] jalur informasi yang lebih baik dan lebih mudah tentang apa yang sedang dilakukan oleh Pemerintah Kabupaten.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. Saya [...] Pemerintah Kabupaten meningkatkan anggaran uang APBD untuk pelayanan publik dan pembangunan dibandingkan untuk biaya administrasi kantor.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4. Saya [...] adanya sebuah pusat pengaduan dimana saya dapat mengajukan permasalahan pelayanan publik dengan bebas dan mendapat jawaban dari permasalahan tentang kualitas pelayanan.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5. Saya [...] Bupati dan anggota DPRD dapat berkomunikasi langsung dengan masyarakat dan sebaliknya.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Jika anda menyatakan "SAYA INGIN!" untuk setiap perubahan diatas, silakan tuliskan nomer perubahan yang menurut anda paling penting dalam kotak:



Halaman	Ilustrasi
12	10

Postcard

- Let me describe to you what is on the postcard. If you think might have trouble reading or understanding the postcard, you can **ask a member of your household to help you**.
- First, you can indicate whether you want the district government in Blora to **do a better job**, or whether **you are satisfied** with the district government in Blora and don't want to change anything about how it works. If you pick the second one, then you are ready to return your postcard!
- If you picked the first one**, then we would like you to tell us how. There is a list of five reforms on the postcard. For each reform, put a check for whether you want/don't want that reform. We are asking how you feel about five reforms:
 - I [want/don't really want] a law that guarantees **opportunities for public participation** in district government decisions.
 - I [want/don't really want] **better and easier access to information** on district government programs and policies.
 - I [want/don't really want] the district government to **spend more of the APBD money on public services** and development and less money on administration.
 - I [want/don't really want] a **central location established where I can freely report problems with public services** and get answers to my questions about service quality.
 - I [want/don't really want] the bupati and DPRD members to have **more direct communication with the public**.
- If there is any reform that you don't know about, then that's ok too. Just tic the box in the column on the far right for 'not sure'
- Then at the very bottom under the 'Want' column, it asks you "if you have said 'I want! to any of the reforms above, **please write the number of the reform you most want in the box.**" Here you should pick the **one reform** you think is most important from all those you said that you want.
- If you don't want or don't know about any of the reforms, then just **skip** this box.

Figure B.15: Postcard campaign II. *Explaining the postcard.*



Halaman	Ilustrasi
13	11

Postcard

- LPAW and the researcher will **collect all the postcards** and tabulate the responses. Then two weeks before the election, **LPAW will hold a public meeting with the bupati candidates** to tell them the results. The results will also be **shared with members of the DPRD, heads of Dinas, the media and other citizens** so that your voice will be heard in many corners of Biora.
- **YOUR POST-CARD IS YOUR VOICE, IT IS A WAY FOR YOU TO COMMUNICATE WITH YOUR POLITICAL LEADERS AND TELL THEM HOW YOU FEEL ABOUT GOVERNMENT IN BIORA.**
- Whether you decide to return the postcard is **completely up to you**. The most important and helpful thing to the campaign is for you to make your decision based on your **personal feelings** and your **reaction to the campaign**. Also, **the post-card is like a secret ballot** – whether you return the postcard and what you vote for on the postcard is your secret.
- If you decide to return the postcard, please deposit it in a special mailbox that has been placed at **[LOCATION] BEFORE MAGRHEB TOMORROW, in other words before tomorrow at 18:00.**
- The postcard should reflect how each individual feels. We would like to **ask your help to not discuss the campaign with your neighbors until after we have picked up the mailbox in your dusun.**
- If your neighbor is interested in the campaign and asks you about it, you can suggest **they go to the dusun head since we left a few extra postcards there.**
- Do you have any questions? If there are any questions or concerns about the campaign, **here's a card with our contact information.**
- **Thank you very much for your time today. Sampai Jumpa!**

Figure B.16: Postcard campaign III. *Explaining how to return the postcard.*

C Sequencing of campaign and survey




Figure C.1: Sequencing of campaign and survey. *The figure shows the sequence in which campaign and survey components were conducted during the visit. Red boxes denote the campaign and orange boxes denote survey modules.*

D The postcard

Your Voice, Your Opportunity

I want the district government in Blora to do a better job

I am satisfied with the district government in Blora and don't want to change anything about how it works

➔

Stop here and return your postcard!

↓

If you want the district government in Blora to do better, tell them how!

	Want	Don't really want	Not sure
1. I [...] a law that guarantees opportunities for public participation in district government decisions.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. I [...] better and easier access to information on district government programs and policies.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. I [...] the district government to spend more of the APBD money on public services and development and less money on administration.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4. I [...] a central location established where I can freely report problems with public services and get answers to my questions about service quality.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5. I [...] the bupati and DPRD members to have more direct communication with the public.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

↓

If you said "I WANT!" to any of the reforms above, please write the number of the reform you most want in the box:

Figure D.1: The postcard (English). *The two boxes at the top asked participants whether they ‘want the district government to do a better job’ (a sanction for incumbent performance) versus whether they were ‘satisfied with the district government in Blora’ (a reward for incumbent performance). The remaining questions inquire into support for specific reforms to provide information to the local NGO partners and were not intended for analysis in the paper. The box in the bottom right cell of the postcard contained the randomly assigned respondent ID and connected the postcard to the participant’s survey instrument and treatment assignment.*

E Randomization check and baseline data

	Experimental Groups								p-value oneway ANOVA	n
	Range		Sample mean	1	2	3	4			
	<i>min</i>	<i>max</i>		<i>Windfall,</i> <i>no info</i>	<i>Tax,</i> <i>no info</i>	<i>Windfall,</i> <i>info</i>	<i>Tax,</i> <i>info</i>			
Fk-1, n-1										
Panel A: Demographics										
Age	17	65	41.7	41.7	41.7	41.8	41.5	.06	.980	1,818
Female	0	1	50	51	50	50	50	.04	.989	1,863
Muslim	0	1	99	99	99	100	99	.86	.460	1,863
Married	0	1	90	89	90	92	91	.86	.461	1,862
Completed primary school	0	1	72	71	74	73	70	.78	.506	1,862
Can read a newspaper	0	1	81	80	84	82	79	1.18	.315	1,861
Numeracy quiz (avg. correct)	0	5	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	.03	.993	1,863
Employed full-time	0	1	64	66	62	64	63	.62	.604	1,863
Work in agriculture	0	1	70	71	68	69	71	.45	.716	1,477
Distance from mailbox (min)	0	60	9.8	9.8	9.5	9.7	10.3	.94	.420	1,848
Panel B: Tax Experience										
Household paid a tax	0	1	93	93	92	95	94	1.13	.335	1,863
Personal experience paying a tax ^a	0	1	62	64	61	63	60	.76	.514	1,824
Believe taxes go to district ^b	0	1	67	65	70	66	67	.86	.459	1,608
Panel C: Political Knowledge										
Political awareness quiz (avg. correct)	0	5	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	.11	.956	1,863
Heard about work of district head ^c	0	1	.09	.09	.09	.10	.09	.17	.918	1,847

Notes: Table reports summary statistics and results from a randomization check using baseline data and a oneway ANOVA across the four experimental conditions. The final column reports sample size.

^aDo you personally pay taxes or is another member of your household usually the one to pay? (Personally=1).

^bDo you think taxes primarily go to the central, provincial, district, or subdistrict government? (District=1).

^cHow much would you say you've seen or heard about the work of the district head over the past 12 months? (A lot/some=1).

Table E.1: Randomization Check with Baseline Data

F Summary statistics

		Range		<i>mean</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>n</i>
		min	max			
Panel A: Main Results (Table 2)						
Monitoring (H1)						
1	Willing to monitor the budget	0	1	0.79	0.41	1,863
2	Willing to monitor government	0	1	0.78	0.41	1,862
3	Should pay more attention	0	1	0.91	0.29	1,858
Participation (H2)						
4	Willing to take political action	0	5	1.32	0.98	1,863
5	Turnout (postcard campaign)	0	1	0.78	0.41	1,863
Incumbent Sanctioning (H3)						
6	Sanctioned incumbent (postcard campaign)	-1	1	0.75	0.37	1,857
7	Support for incumbent district head	0	1	0.53	0.50	458
8	Support for challenger (former chairman of the legislature)	0	1	0.09	0.29	458
Panel B: Tax Mechanisms (Table 3)						
Tax Burden						
9	Gamble to win more	0	1	0.49	0.37	1,853
Share of Taxes in Total Revenue						
10	Posteriors on taxes/total revenue	0	1	0.24	0.19	1,836
11	Posteriors on windfalls/total revenue	0	1	0.63	0.24	1,842
Attitudes towards Budget						
12	Citizen ownership over budget	0	1	0.78	0.41	1,830
13	Relevance of budget to daily life	0	1	0.86	0.34	1,850
Attitudes towards Government						
14	Dissatisfaction with management of budget	0	1	0.67	0.46	1,845
15	Distrust district head	0	1	0.55	0.50	1,853
16	Distrust local legislators	0	1	0.61	0.49	1,857
Efficacy						
17	Citizens have power	0	1	0.77	0.42	1,853
Panel C: Supplementary vars						
18	District leaders doing worse (Figure 3, Panel A)	0	1	0.56	0.50	1,851
19	Dissatisfaction with government (general)	0	1	0.67	0.47	1,845
20	Gamble to avoid loss	0	1	0.18	0.27	1,848

Notes: Table reports summary statistics for the main outcome measures from both the survey and postcard campaign. Panel A presents summary statistics for the main effects of taxes (versus windfalls) on monitoring, participation, and incumbent sanctioning, as presented in Table 2 in the main text. Panel B presents summary statistics for the investigation into how the tax treatment worked, as presented in Table 3 in the main text. Panel C presents summary stats for additional variables used in robustness checks. All question wordings are provided in the corresponding tables in the main text.

Table F.1: Summary Statistics for the Main Effects of Taxes vs. Windfalls

G Additional results for how revenue conditions the impact of information

Here I provide additional tables and analysis to accompany the section entitled “Does Revenue Condition the Impact of Information” in the main text:

- Table G.1 provides the table for Figure 3 on how revenue conditions the effect of information on attitudes towards government.
- Table G.2 presents additional results for measures of how revenue conditions the impact of information on dissatisfaction with the district government and distrust in local legislators.
- Table G.3 provides the table for Figure 4 on how revenue conditions the effect of information on willingness to monitor the budget, participation in the postcard campaign, and incumbent sanctioning in the postcard campaign.
- Table G.4 presents additional results for how revenue conditions the impact of information on the other main measures of monitoring and participation.
- Table G.5 presents additional results for how revenue conditions the impact of information on the other main measures of incumbent support.

Panel A: District leaders doing a worse job than expected^a			
	Windfall (C1)	Tax (C1)	Diff (T1-C1)
Low Info (C2)	.34	.34	.01
<i>n/s.e.</i>	(463)	(458)	(.03)
<i>RI p-value</i>			.849
High Info (T2)	.77	.79	.02
<i>n/s.e.</i>	(464)	(466)	(.03)
<i>RI p-value</i>			.530
Diff (T2-C2)	.43***	.45***	.01
<i>s.e.</i>	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)
<i>RI p-value</i>	.000	.000	.746

Panel B: Dissatisfaction with budget management^b			
	Windfall (C1)	Tax (C1)	Diff (T1-C1)
Low Info (C2)	.51	.53	.02
<i>n/s.e.</i>	(452)	(453)	(.03)
<i>RI p-value</i>			.529
High Info (T2)	.86	.86	.00
<i>n/s.e.</i>	(463)	(464)	(.02)
<i>RI p-value</i>			.873
Diff (T2-C2)	.35***	.33***	-.01
<i>s.e.</i>	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)
<i>RI p-value</i>	.000	.000	.736

Panel C: Distrust the district head^c			
	Windfall (C1)	Tax (C1)	Diff (T1-C1)
Low Info (C2)	.42	.39	-.03
<i>n/s.e.</i>	(464)	(464)	(.03)
<i>RI p-value</i>			.338
High Info (T2)	.69	.71	.01
<i>n/s.e.</i>	(462)	(463)	(.03)
<i>RI p-value</i>			.653
Diff (T2-C2)	.27***	.32***	.04
<i>s.e.</i>	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)
<i>RI p-value</i>	.000	.000	.319

Table reports sample means and treatment effects over sample size or Neyman standard errors in parentheses. Randomization inference p-values from a Fisher exact test reported below, where * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, and *** $p < .01$. The intersection of the 'Diff' column and row in the bottom right cell of each panel is the difference-in-difference (interaction) effect of the treatments.

^aElected leaders in the district are doing a worse job (1) or a better job/the same job (0) than you thought they were?

^bHow satisfied are you with the way the district government manages the budget? (dissatisfied=1).

^cHow much do you trust the district head to do the right thing for the people of Blora? (distrust=1).

Table G.1: How revenue conditions the impact of information on attitudes towards government

Dissatisfaction with district government ^a			
	Windfall (C1)	Tax (C1)	Diff (T1-C1)
Low Info (C2)	.49	.51	.03
<i>n/s.e.</i>	(461)	(457)	(.03)
<i>RI p-value</i>			.351
High Info (T2)	.84	.84	.00
<i>n/s.e.</i>	(463)	(464)	(.02)
<i>RI p-value</i>			.935
Diff (T2-C2)	.35***	.33***	-.03
<i>s.e.</i>	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)
<i>RI p-value</i>	.000	.000	.543

Distrust local legislators ^b			
	Windfall (C1)	Tax (C1)	Diff (T1-C1)
Low Info (C2)	.48	.46	-.02
<i>n/s.e.</i>	(465)	(464)	(.03)
<i>RI p-value</i>			.500
High Info (T2)	.76	.76	.00
<i>n/s.e.</i>	(463)	(465)	(.03)
<i>RI p-value</i>			.974
Diff (T2-C2)	.27***	.29***	.02
<i>s.e.</i>	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)
<i>RI p-value</i>	.000	.000	.611

Table reports sample means and treatment effects over sample size or Neyman standard errors in parentheses. Randomization inference p-values from a Fisher exact test reported below, where * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, and *** $p < .01$. The intersection of the 'Diff' column and row in the bottom right cell of each panel is the difference-in-difference (interaction) effect of the treatments.

^aHow satisfied are you with the way the district government in Blora is doing its job overall? (Dissatisfied=1).

^bHow much do you trust local legislators to do the right thing for the people of Blora? (Distrust=1).

Table G.2: How revenue conditions the impact of information on attitudes towards government: Additional Measures

Panel A: Willingness to monitor the budget^a			
	Windfall (C1)	Tax (T1)	Diff (T1-C1)
Low Info (C2)	.73	.77	.04*
<i>n/s.e.</i>	(466)	(465)	(.03)
<i>RI p-value</i>			.065
High Info (T2)	.79	.85	.06**
<i>n/s.e.</i>	(466)	(466)	(.02)
<i>RI p-value</i>			.017
Diff (T2-C2)	.07**	.08***	.01
<i>s.e.</i>	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)
<i>RI p-value</i>	.006	.001	.710

Panel B: Turnout (Postcard Campaign)^b			
	Windfall (C1)	Tax (T1)	Diff (T1-C1)
Low Info (C2)	.77	.78	.01
<i>n/s.e.</i>	(466)	(465)	(.03)
<i>RI p-value</i>			.633
High Info (T2)	.80	.79	-.02
<i>n/s.e.</i>	(466)	(466)	(.03)
<i>RI p-value</i>			.528
Diff (T2-C2)	.03	.00	-.03
<i>s.e.</i>	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)
<i>RI p-value</i>	.192	.830	.414

Panel C: Incumbent Sanctioning (Postcard Campaign)^c			
	Windfall (C1)	Tax (T1)	Diff (T1-C1)
Low Info (C2)	.71	.77	.06**
<i>n/s.e.</i>	(465)	(464)	(.03)
<i>RI p-value</i>			.041
High Info (T2)	.78	.75	-.03
<i>n/s.e.</i>	(463)	(465)	(.03)
<i>RI p-value</i>			.253
Diff (T2-C2)	.07**	-.02	-.09**
<i>s.e.</i>	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)
<i>RI p-value</i>	.014	.480	.023

Table reports sample means and treatment effects over sample size or Neyman standard errors in parentheses. Randomization inference p-values from a Fisher exact test reported below, where *p<.10, ** p<.05, and *** p<.01. The intersection of the 'Diff' column and row in the bottom right cell of each panel is the difference-in-difference (interaction) effect of the treatments.

^aHow interested are you in learning more about how the district government spends money in the budget? (interested=1)

^bReturned postcard (1), abstained (0).

^cReturned postcard and sanctioned incumbent (-1), returned postcard and rewarded incumbent (1), abstained from returning postcard (0).

Table G.3: How revenue conditions the impact of information on political action (H4)

Willing to monitor government ^a			
	Windfall (C1)	Tax (C1)	Diff (T1-C1)
Low Info (C2)	.73	.75	.02
<i>n/s.e.</i>	(466)	(465)	(.03)
<i>RI p-value</i>			.363
High Info (T2)	.80	.84	.04
<i>n/s.e.</i>	(465)	(466)	(.03)
<i>RI p-value</i>			.136
Diff (T2-C2)	.07***	.09***	.01
<i>s.e.</i>	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)
<i>RI p-value</i>	.003	.001	.713

Should pay more attention ^b			
	Windfall (C1)	Tax (C1)	Diff (T1-C1)
Low Info (C2)	.91	.91	.00
<i>n/s.e.</i>	(465)	(464)	(.02)
<i>RI p-value</i>			.970
High Info (T2)	.91	.90	-.01
<i>n/s.e.</i>	(463)	(466)	(.02)
<i>RI p-value</i>			.581
Diff (T2-C2)	.01	.00	-.01
<i>s.e.</i>	(.02)	(.02)	(.03)
<i>RI p-value</i>	.670	.938	.711

Willing to take political action ^c			
	Windfall (C1)	Tax (C1)	Diff (T1-C1)
Low Info (C2)	1.26	1.33	.07
<i>n/s.e.</i>	(466)	(465)	(.06)
<i>RI p-value</i>			.190
High Info (T2)	1.32	1.35	.03
<i>n/s.e.</i>	(466)	(466)	(.07)
<i>RI p-value</i>			.529
Diff (T2-C2)	.06	.03	-.03
<i>s.e.</i>	(.06)	(.07)	(.09)
<i>RI p-value</i>	.249	.624	.631

Table reports sample means and treatment effects over sample size or Neyman standard errors in parentheses. Randomization inference p-values from a Fisher exact test reported below, where * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, and *** $p < .01$. The intersection of the 'Diff' column and row in the bottom right cell of each panel is the difference-in-difference (interaction) effect of the treatments.

^aHow interested are you in learning more about what the government of Blora is doing? (Interested=1).

^bYou should pay more attention to what the district government does. (Agree=1).

^cRegarding a problem or issue that was affecting your daily life or your community, would you in the future: contact a village or subdistrict official, contact the district head, contact a local legislator, contact the media or an NGO, take part in a demonstration? (Average of five).

Table G.4: How revenue conditions the impact of information on attitudes towards government: Additional monitoring and participation measures

Support for the incumbent district head ^a			
	Windfall (C1)	Tax (C1)	Diff (T1-C1)
Low Info (C2)	.48	.51	.04
<i>n/s.e.</i>	(115)	(109)	(.07)
<i>RI p-value</i>			.590
High Info (T2)	.54	.58	.03
<i>n/s.e.</i>	(116)	(118)	(.07)
<i>RI p-value</i>			.667
Diff (T2-C2)	.06	.06	.00
<i>s.e.</i>	(.07)	(.07)	(.09)
<i>RI p-value</i>	.339	.394	.980

Support for the challenger (former leg. Chairman) ^b			
	Windfall (C1)	Tax (C1)	Diff (T1-C1)
Low Info (C2)	.11	.10	-.01
<i>n/s.e.</i>	(115)	(109)	(.04)
<i>RI p-value</i>			.758
High Info (T2)	.10	.06	-.04
<i>n/s.e.</i>	(116)	(118)	(.04)
<i>RI p-value</i>			.323
Diff (T2-C2)	-.01	-.04	-.03
<i>s.e.</i>	(.04)	(.04)	(.05)
<i>RI p-value</i>	.812	.326	.576

Table reports sample means and treatment effects over sample size or Neyman standard errors in parentheses. Randomization inference p-values from a Fisher exact test reported below, where *p<.10, ** p<.05, and *** p<.01. The intersection of the 'Diff' column and row in the bottom right cell of each panel is the difference-in-difference (interaction) effect of the treatments.

^a Which [candidate] would you say has your strongest support at present [in the upcoming district head elections]? (Incumbent=1).

^b Which [candidate] would you say has your strongest support at present [in the upcoming district head elections]? (Challenger and former legislative chairman=1).

Table G.5: How revenue conditions the impact of information on attitudes towards government: Additional sanctioning measures

H Robustness checks for the main effects of taxes vs. windfalls

I present robustness checks for the key results in the paper, including regressions with controls, subdistrict fixed effects, and enumerator fixed effects:

- Table H.1 presents the main effects of taxes versus windfalls on monitoring, participation, and sanctioning, corresponding to Table 2 in the main text.
- Table H.2 presents robustness checks for the analysis of *why* taxes caused more political action, corresponding to Table 3.

	Full Controls	Subdistrict Fixed Effects	Enumerator Fixed Effects
Panel A: Monitoring (H1)			
1 Willing to monitor budget	0.06*** (0.02)	0.05*** (0.02)	0.05*** (0.02)
2 Willing to monitor government	0.03* (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)
3 Should pay more attention	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Panel B: Participation (H2)			
4 Willingness to take political action	0.05 (0.05)	0.05 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)
5 Turnout (postcard campaign)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)
Panel C: Incumbent Sanctioning (H3)			
6 Support for incumbent district head	0.03 (0.05)	0.04 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)
7 Support for challenger (former chairman of the legislature)	-0.05* (0.03)	-0.04 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.03)
8 Sanctioned incumbent (postcard campaign)	0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)

Notes: Table reports robustness checks for main results presented in Table 2 in the main paper, with significance levels denoted by * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, and *** $p < .01$. All question wordings are provided in the main text. Column 1 reports OLS results with controls and Neyman standard errors. The controls include all variables presented in the randomization check except for ‘Muslim’ (low variation) and ‘work in agriculture’ (a lot of item missingness). Column 2 reports results from a regression with subdistrict fixed effects and column 3 reports results with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors are uncorrected in Columns 2-3 as negative intracluster correlation makes clustered standard errors smaller and heteroskedastic robust standard errors are biased in fixed effects regressions.

Table H.1: Do taxes motivate political action: Robustness Checks

	Full Controls	Subdistrict Fixed Effects	Enumerator Fixed Effects
Panel A: Aspects of Taxation			
Tax Burden	0.00	0.00	0.00
1 Gamble for gain	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Share of Taxes in Total Revenue (Fiscal Dependence)			
3 Priors on taxes/total revenue	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
4 Posteriors on taxes/total revenue	0.28*** (0.01)	0.29*** (0.01)	0.29*** (0.01)
5 Posteriors on windfalls/total revenue	-0.33*** (0.01)	-0.34*** (0.01)	-0.34*** (0.01)
Panel B: Change in Attitude			
Attitudes towards budget			
6 Citizen ownership over budget	0.04* (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)
7 Relevance of budget to daily life	0.04*** (0.02)	0.05*** (0.02)	0.05*** (0.02)
Attitudes towards government			
8 Dissatisfaction with management of budget	0.03 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
9 Distrust district head	0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
10 Distrust local legislators	0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)
Efficacy			
11 Citizens have power	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)

Notes: Table reports robustness checks for main results presented in Table 3 in the main paper, with significance levels denoted by * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, and *** $p < .01$. All question wordings are provided in the main text. Column 1 reports OLS results with controls and Neyman standard errors. The controls include all variables presented in the randomization check except for ‘Muslim’ (low variation) and ‘work in agriculture’ (a lot of item missingness). Column 2 reports results from a regression with subdistrict fixed effects and column 3 reports results with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors are uncorrected in Columns 2-3 as negative intracluster correlation makes clustered standard errors smaller and heteroskedastic robust standard errors are biased in fixed effects regressions.

Table H.2: Why taxation motivates political action: Robustness checks

I Multinomial logit for how taxes and information affect incumbent sanctioning

The section entitled “Does Revenue Condition the Impact of Information” reveals an unexpected negative interaction in the effect of taxes on information. Results from a multinomial logistic regression presented below show that the results were primarily driven by a decrease in the use of the postcard to reward the incumbent and a corresponding increase in incumbent sanctioning.

		Main Specification	Full Controls
Panel A: Pr(Sanction)			
Marginal effect of taxes			
1	Low information	0.04 (.03)	0.04 (.03)
2	High information	-0.02 (.03)	-0.03 (.03)
Marginal effect of information			
3	Windfall group	.05* (.03)	.05* (.03)
4	Tax group	-0.01 (.03)	-0.02 (.03)
Panel A: Pr(Reward)			
Marginal effect of taxes			
5	Low information	-.02*** (.01)	-.04*** (.01)
6	High information	0.01 (.01)	0.01 (.01)
Marginal effect of information			
7	Windfall group	-.02** (.01)	-.02** (.01)
8	Tax group	.01* (.01)	.02*** (.01)
Panel A: Pr(Abstain)			
Marginal effect of taxes			
9	Low information	-0.01 (.03)	-0.01 (.03)
10	High information	0.02 (.03)	0.02 (.03)
Marginal effect of information			
11	Windfall group	-0.03 (.03)	-0.03 (.03)
12	Tax group	0.00 (.03)	0.00 (.03)

Notes: Table reports results from a multinomial logistic regression of the effect of taxes and information on incumbent sanctioning in the postcard campaign. The table accompanies Panel C of Figure 4 in the main text and Panel C of Table G.3 in the appendix. Significance levels are denoted by * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, and *** $p < .01$ (robust standard errors). Column 1 reports treatment effects with no controls while Column 2 reports treatment effects with controls. The controls include all variables presented in the randomization check except for ‘Muslim’ (low variation) and ‘work in agriculture’ (a lot of item missingness).

Table I.1: The impact of taxes and information on incumbent sanctioning in the postcard campaign: Multinomial Logit

J Does satisfaction condition the effect of taxes and information on incumbent sanctioning?

There is good reason to believe that initial satisfaction with government performance played a key role in conditioning the effect of both taxes and information on the propensity to use the postcard to sanction the incumbent. Figure J.1 explores this possibility to provide additional clarity on the conditions under which H4 holds (see also Table J.1. Participants are coded as ‘satisfied’ if they responded in the pre-treatment survey that they were satisfied with “the way the district government in Blora is doing its job overall.” Notably, for those who were originally satisfied, taxes caused a 15 percentage point increase in incumbent sanctioning in the postcard campaign in the low information environment (Panel A). Similarly, the information caused a 14 percentage point increase in incumbent sanctioning in the windfall environment among the satisfied (Panel B). Among those who were initially dissatisfied, however, neither taxes nor information had any effect. These results are interesting in that they suggest that the greatest gains to both taxes and information came from those who initially had a positive outlook on government. Additionally, they mirror the results above in that there also appears to be a ceiling to the effect of taxes on incumbent sanctioning among the initially satisfied.

Panel A: Sanctioning (Postcard), Satisfied			
	Windfall (C1)	Tax (C1)	Diff (T1-C1)
Low Info (C2)	.63	.77	.15***
<i>n/s.e.</i>	(206)	(204)	(.05)
High Info (T2)	.77	.76	-.01
<i>n/s.e.</i>	(219)	(226)	(.04)
Diff (T2-C2)	.14***	-.01	-.15**
<i>s.e.</i>	(.05)	(.04)	(.07)

Panel B: Sanctioning (Postcard), Dissatisfied			
	Windfall (C1)	Tax (C1)	Diff (T1-C1)
Low Info (C2)	.77	.75	-.02
<i>n/s.e.</i>	(237)	(234)	(.04)
High Info (T2)	.78	.73	-.06
<i>n/s.e.</i>	(221)	(215)	(.04)
Diff (T2-C2)	.01	-.02	-.04
<i>s.e.</i>	(.04)	(.04)	(.06)

Table reports sample means and treatment effects over sample size or Neyman standard errors in parentheses, where * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, and *** $p < .01$. The intersection of the ‘Diff’ column and row in the bottom right cell of each panel is the difference-in-difference (interaction) effect of the treatments. Satisfied is coded as 0 for all those who said in the pre-treatment survey module that they were satisfied “with the way the district government in Blora is doing its job overall” and 1 for those who were dissatisfied. The net sanctioning effect of the postcard campaign (the outcome) is coded 1 for those who returned the postcard and sanctioned incumbent, -1 for those who returned the postcard and rewarded incumbent, and 0 for those who abstained from returning postcard.

Table J.1: How satisfaction conditions the impact of taxes and information on incumbent sanctioning.




Figure J.1: How satisfaction conditions the impact of taxes and information on incumbent sanctioning. *Figures shows the effect of taxes and information on incumbent sanctioning in the postcard campaign for the initially satisfied (Panel A) and initially dissatisfied (Panel B). Satisfaction is the proportion who said in the pre-treatment survey module that they were satisfied “with the way the district government in Blora is doing its job overall.” Significance is denoted by $*p<.10$, $**p<.05$, and $***p<.01$ based on Neyman standard errors.*

K Validity check: Spillover

Treatment effects are underestimated when there is spillover between the treatment and control groups. In designing the experiment, I took precautions to minimize the likelihood of spillover but also to measure whether it occurred. This was important since a *dusun*, as a sub-village unit, is a small community. There is perhaps only minor cause for concern about spillover for the tax treatment since it is based on a behavioral exercise that would be hard to replicate (although the information could spread). Similarly, the information in the information treatment is rather complicated and would be hard to convey in detail. Canvassers asked respondents not to discuss the campaign with their neighbors until after the program was over in their village. Teams also typically conducted all visits in a dusun in less than two days to minimize the time period during which spillover could occur. Piloting revealed some anecdotal evidence that information about the campaign spread, but this was typically basic information contained in the shared sections of the campaign rather than information specific to any particular treatment.

To assess the extent to which spillover impacts the estimation of treatment effects, I collected additional data on the postcard campaign. In each village, five extra postcards were left with the dusun head. If another community member approached a sampled participant to inquire about the campaign, the sampled participant was asked to refer that person to request a postcard from the dusun head. Sampled participants were asked not to advertise that the dusun head had extra postcards. The dusun head was also instructed not to hand out postcards unless a community member specifically requested one. The assumption is that the extent of spillover of information about the campaign is positively correlated with the number of additional postcards requested from the dusun head.

Figure K.1 shows the number of postcards requested of the dusun head in the 93 villages. The modal outcome is zero additional postcards requested (in 44 percent of the villages). In 15 percent of the villages, however, all five additional postcards were claimed. (There is missing data for two villages where we were unable to collect this data.) I next check whether the tax treatment effect for the main measure of each political action outcome varies depending on this measure of spillover with results presented in Table K.1. Panel A interacts the tax treatment with the continuous measure of spillover (the number of postcards of five claimed from the dusun head). Panel B interacts the tax treatment with a binary measure of spillover (equals 1 if greater than the village-level mean of 2 postcards requested). Panel C is a restricted analysis where I only estimate the treatment effect in villages in which there was no evidence of spillover. The results all provide little indication that spillover affected the main results.




Figure K.1: Spillover. The figure shows the number of postcards (max of 5) picked up from the dusun head in the 93 villages. Zero postcards suggests little probable spillover while five postcards suggests that spillover was more likely.

	Willing to Monitor Budget	Participation Postcard Campaign	Sanction Incumbent Postcard Campaign
Panel A: Spillover (Continuous Measure)			
Tax treatment	.05** (.03)	.01 (.03)	.02 (.03)
Spillover	.01 (.01)	.01 (.01)	.01 (.01)
Treatment*spillover	.00 (.01)	-.01 (.01)	-.01 (.01)
Panel B: Spillover (Binary measure)			
Tax treatment	.05** (.02)	.01 (.02)	.02 (.02)
Spillover	.05 (.04)	.02 (.04)	.00 (.05)
Treatment*spillover	.00 (.05)	-.05 (.05)	-.03 (.06)
Panel C: Spillover (Only no spillover villages)			
Tax treatment	.06* (.03)	-0.01 (.03)	0.01 (.03)

Notes: Table reports validity checks for main results, with significance levels denoted by * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, and *** $p < .01$. All question wordings are provided in the Table 2 in the main text, where Column 1 is the main measure of monitoring, Column 2 the main measure of participation, and Column 3 the main measure of incumbent sanctioning. Panel A interacts the tax treatment with the continuous measure of spillover (the number of postcards of five claimed from the dusun head). Panel B interacts the tax treatment with a binary measure of spillover (equals 1 if greater than the village-level of mean of 2 postcards requested). Panel C is a restricted analysis where the treatment effect is estimated only in villages in which there was no evidence of spillover (no additional postcards were picked up from the dusun head)

Table K.1: Validity check of the main results: Spillover

L Did the tax payment prime real tax experience?

The results discussed in the section entitled “Does Revenue Condition the Impact of Information” in the main text suggest that participants responded not to the tax payment in the treatment but rather to the shift in the perceived share of taxes in total revenue. There are, however, difficulties associated with measuring the pain of an out-of-pocket loss using survey measures of tolerance for risky monetary gambles. To dig deeper into how the tax treatment worked—and specifically to look for additional evidence that participants reacted to the tax payment—I exploit the fact that the tax payment could have worked in two ways. First, it could have primed previous real-world experience paying taxes. If this were the case, we would expect to see that the effect of the tax treatment on political action outcomes would be bigger for those with more previous experience with taxation or bigger actual tax burdens. Second, it could have effectively simulated a tax payment *regardless* of previous tax experience.

I explore the former by assessing whether the effect of the tax treatment on three of the main outcomes of interest varied depending on previous experience with taxation. Table L.1 presents the effect of the tax treatment on three of the main outcomes of interest, conditional on four different measures of real world tax experience. The measures include whether: (1) the household had paid at least one tax in the previous 12 months; (2) the participant had personally ever paid a tax; (3) annual household taxes in the previous 12 months were high (greater than the mean); and (4) the household was poor (implying the 4,000 rupiah tax from the 14,000 rupiah income would matter more the participant). There is no evidence that any of these factors conditioned the effect of the tax treatment on monitoring, participation, or sanctioning. These results provide additional evidence that the tax payment did not operate by priming previous tax experience.

	Willing to Monitor Budget	Participation Postcard Campaign	Sanction Incumbent Postcard Campaign
Panel A: Household paid a tax^a			
Tax treatment	-.05 (.08)	-.03 (.08)	-.09 (.09)
Paid taxes	-.04 (.05)	.01 (.06)	-.04 (.06)
Treatment*paid taxes	.10 (.08)	.03 (.08)	.11 (.09)
Panel B: Paid taxes personally^b			
Tax treatment	.02 (.03)	-.02 (.03)	.00 (.03)
Participant paid	-.03 (.03)	-.01 (.03)	-.03 (.03)
Treatment*participant paid	.05 (.04)	.03 (.04)	.02 (.04)
Panel C: Annual taxes high^c			
Tax treatment	.04 (.03)	.00 (.02)	.02 (.03)
Annual tax high	.03 (.03)	-.04 (.03)	-.04 (.03)
Treatment*annual tax high	.03 (.04)	-.02 (.04)	-.01 (.04)
Panel D: Poor^d			
Tax treatment	.08*** (.02)	-.01 (.03)	.00 (.03)
Poor	-.02 (.03)	.06** (.03)	.05 (.03)
Treatment*Poor	-.05 (.04)	.01 (.04)	.04 (.04)

Table reports additional analysis for Table 2 in the main paper, with significance levels denoted by * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, and *** $p < .01$. All question wordings for main outcome measures are provided in the main text.

^aHousehold paid at least one tax in the previous 12 months.

^bYou mentioned that you pay taxes. Do you personally pay taxes or is another member of your household usually the one to pay? (Personally=1)

^cAnnual household taxes are greater than the mean=1.

^dI would like you to think of your village in terms of three levels of poverty/wealth. Imagine that each level has about the same number of households in it. In your opinion, relative to other households in your village, which level is your household on? (Lowest level=1)

Table L.1: Did the tax payment prime real tax experience?