

Appendix to Shy Women Voters

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A Design Overview

Figure A.1 presents an overview of the research design, which began with screening/recruitment and ended with the behavioral outcome measure. Note that all participants were recruited through CloudResearch Connect, which is an online survey marketplace (similar to M-Turk, Lucid, Prolific) with a large pool of actively vetted adult participants who complete tasks for modest monetary compensation. Researchers can specify eligibility criteria and compensation levels, and recruit survey respondents for online studies.




Figure A.1: Empirical Strategy Overview

B Summary Statistics

B.1 Pre-Treatment Variables

Table B.1: Summary Statistics


| | Min | Max | Mean | Std.Dev |
|--|-----|-----|------|---------|
| I. Demographics | | | | |
| Age (Yrs) | 18 | 97 | 47.5 | 15.02 |
| Marital Status (Married, Partnered, In Relationship) | 0 | 1 | 0.54 | 0.5 |
| College Educated | 0 | 1 | 0.19 | 0.39 |
| Race: White Non-Hispanic | 0 | 1 | 0.82 | 0.38 |
| Religion: Christian | 0 | 1 | 0.6 | 0.49 |
| Employed (Fulltime, Parttime, Self) | 0 | 1 | 0.5 | 0.5 |
| Income Quantile | 1 | 5 | 2.92 | 1.44 |
| II. Region | | | | |
| Northeast | 0 | 1 | 0.15 | 0.36 |
| Midwest | 0 | 1 | 0.27 | 0.44 |
| South | 0 | 1 | 0.45 | 0.5 |
| West | 0 | 1 | 0.13 | 0.33 |
| III. Partisanship | | | | |
| Party ID (1-7) | 2 | 7 | 5.47 | 1.37 |
| Weak Democrat | 0 | 1 | 0.01 | 0.1 |
| Lean Democrat | 0 | 1 | 0.04 | 0.19 |
| Independent | 0 | 1 | 0.27 | 0.44 |
| Lean Republican | 0 | 1 | 0.21 | 0.4 |
| Weak Republican | 0 | 1 | 0.11 | 0.31 |
| Strong Republican | 0 | 1 | 0.37 | 0.48 |
| IV. Attitudes | | | | |
| Reproductive rights in top 3 issues | 0 | 1 | 0.27 | 0.44 |
| Likelihood of voting in 2024 | 1 | 5 | 1.92 | 1.37 |
| Certainty about vote choice | 1 | 4 | 1.57 | 0.97 |
| Likelihood of voting for Trump | 1 | 5 | 2.02 | 1.54 |
| Think friends and family will mostly vote Trump | 0 | 1 | 0.6 | 0.49 |
| Think significant other likely to vote Trump | 0 | 1 | 0.4 | 0.49 |
| Comfort with others' disapproval | 1 | 4 | 2.24 | 0.98 |
| N=2049 | | | | |

Notes: Distribution of responses across survey response categories to attitudinal questions is reported in Table B.2

Our descriptive statistics indicate that, even in the final days before the election, there remained a nontrivial group of women whose vote choices were uncertain and could have been influenced by persuasive messaging. Figure B.1 displays the self-reported likelihood of voting for Trump, disaggregated by respondents' social environments. We categorize respondents as embedded in pro-Trump social environments if they reported that their family, friends, and/or partners supported Trump (right bar). Respondents whose close ties did not support Trump are shown on the left. These descriptive patterns yield several key insights.

First, across the full sample, roughly 80 percent of respondents were firmly decided, indicating

Figure B.1: Respondent Likelihood of Voting for Trump, by Social Environment



Notes: Respondents' reported likelihood of voting for Trump, by social environment. The right bar shows voting preferences for women whose family, friends, and/or partners supported Trump; the left bar shows voting preferences for women whose social environments were not pro-Trump. Respondents are coded as either 'very likely' to vote Trump, 'very unlikely' to vote Trump, or in between.

they were either 'very likely' or 'very unlikely' to vote for Trump. This leaves a meaningful minority—about 20 percent—who expressed uncertainty ('somewhat likely,' 'somewhat unlikely,' or 'undecided'), and who therefore represent a potential pool of persuadable voters.

Second, Trump support was widespread in respondents' social environments. Overall, sixty-nine percent of our sample reported that either their family and friends and/or partners supported Trump (Figure B.1, right bar). We characterize such women as being embedded in pro-Trump social environments. Specifically, we code women as having pro-Trump partners if they were in a relationship and reported that their partner supported Trump. Women without partners or with non-Trump-supporting partners were coded as 0.

Third, even among women embedded in pro-Trump social environments, 11 percent still expressed uncertainty or reluctance to support Trump. Although a small proportion of our respondent pool, these women—embedded in a pro-Trump social environment but personally hesitant—were the explicit target of the ad and may have been especially responsive to a shift in perceived norms of acceptable behavior.

B.2 Post-Treatment Variables

Table B.2: Distribution of Responses to Attitudinal Questions

| Measure and Response Categories | N(%) |
|---|---------------|
| Likely of voting in 2024 | |
| 1: Very likely | 1,260 (61.5%) |
| 2: Somewhat likely | 247 (12.1%) |
| 3: Undecided | 218 (10.6%) |
| 4: Not too likely | 102 (5.0%) |
| 5: Not likely at all | 222 (10.8%) |
| Certainty about vote choice | |
| 1: Very certain | 1,395 (68.1%) |
| 2: Somewhat certain | 319 (15.6%) |
| 3: Not too certain | 147 (7.2%) |
| 4: Not certain at all | 188 (9.2%) |
| Likelihood of voting for Trump | |
| 1: Very likely | 1,285 (62.7%) |
| 2: Somewhat likely | 201 (9.8%) |
| 3: Undecided | 143 (7.0%) |
| 4: Not too likely | 74 (3.6%) |
| 5: Not likely at all | 346 (16.9%) |
| What most friends/family are likely to do | |
| 1: Mostly vote for Trump | 1,231 (60.1%) |
| 0: Mostly vote for Harris | 231 (11.3%) |
| 0: Split between candidates | 409 (20.0%) |
| 0: Mostly not vote | 133 (6.5%) |
| 0: Mostly vote for another candidate [Write in] | 11 (0.5%) |
| 0: Other [Write in] | 34 (1.7%) |
| Comfortable doing something people you spend time with disapprove of | |
| 1: Very comfortable | 543 (26.5%) |
| 2: Somewhat comfortable | 717 (35.0%) |
| 3: Not too comfortable | 537 (26.2%) |
| 4: Not comfortable at all | 252 (12.3%) |
| N | 2,049 |
| What significant other is most likely to do | |
| 1: Vote for Donald Trump (Republican Party) | 824 (74.9%) |
| 0: Vote for Kamala Harris (Democratic Party) | 121 (11.0%) |
| 0: Vote for Jill Stein (Green Party) | 11 (1.0%) |
| 0: Vote for Chase Oliver (Libertarian Party) | 5 (0.5%) |
| 0: Vote for other [Write in] | 11 (1.0%) |
| 0: Not vote | 128 (11.6%) |
| Likelihood that people close to you will learn who you vote for | |
| 1: Very likely | 510 (46.4%) |
| 2: Somewhat likely | 314 (28.5%) |
| 3: Not too likely | 140 (12.7%) |
| 4: Not likely at all | 136 (12.4%) |
| N | 1,100 |

Notes: The question "How likely or unlikely is it that people close to you will learn who you vote for?" was asked post exposure to the video treatment, and is therefore not used as a control in any analyses. The following questions "If the election were held today, what would your significant other be most likely to do" and "How likely or unlikely is it that people close to you will learn who you vote for" only asked of respondents who are married, in a relationship, or partnered (N=1,100).

Table B.3: Distribution of Responses to Outcome Measure Questions

| Measure and Response Categories | N(%) |
|--|---------------|
| Opinion of Kamala Harris | |
| 5: Very favorable | 172 (8.4%) |
| 4: Somewhat favorable | 244 (11.9%) |
| 3: Neutral | 173 (8.4%) |
| 2: Somewhat unfavorable | 274 (13.4%) |
| 1: Very unfavorable | 1,186 (57.9%) |
| Opinion of Donald Trump | |
| 5: Very favorable | 1,043 (50.9%) |
| 4: Somewhat favorable | 402 (19.6%) |
| 3: Neutral | 135 (6.6%) |
| 2: Somewhat unfavorable | 144 (7.0%) |
| 1: Very unfavorable | 325 (15.9%) |
| If the election were held today, what would you be most likely to do? | |
| Vote for Donald Trump | 1,429 (69.7%) |
| Vote for Kamala Harris | 337 (16.4%) |
| Vote for Jill Stein | 25 (1.2%) |
| Vote for Chase Oliver | 23 (1.1%) |
| Other (Write-in) | 23 (1.1%) |
| Not vote | 212 (10.3%) |
| Clicked to donate to Harris | |
| 0: No | 2,025 (98.8%) |
| 1: Yes | 24 (1.2%) |
| Clicked to donate to Trump | |
| 0: No | 1,983 (96.8%) |
| 1: Yes | 66 (3.2%) |
| N | 2,049 |

C The Virtual Enumerator Experiment

The top panel in Figure C.1 shows the three female and three male virtual enumerator images. All respondents were assigned to one of the six images with equal probability. The middle panel in Figure C.1 shows screen grabs of how the virtual enumerator treatment was introduced on the survey. Participants were randomized to see one of six images (three female or three male) and the party ID of the virtual enumerator matched the party ID of the respondent. The bottom panel in Figure C.1 shows how the enumerator image appeared above the survey question in the public condition. Individuals assigned to the private condition only saw the survey question with no enumerator image.




Figure C.1: Top panel shows the six images used in the virtual enumerator experiment. Middle panel shows how the virtual enumerators were introduced. Bottom panel shows an example survey question with the virtual enumerator image.

D Balance

Table D.1: Experiment Design

| | | Campaign Experiment | | |
|----------------|---------------------------|---------------------|-----------|-------|
| | | Control | Treatment | Total |
| Virtual | Private | 518 | 475 | 993 |
| | Public | 558 | 498 | 1056 |
| | <i>Female enumerator:</i> | (263) | (247) | (510) |
| | <i>Male enumerator:</i> | (295) | (251) | (546) |
| Total | | 1076 | 973 | 2049 |

Notes: Table shows the 2x2 factorial design for the campaign and virtual enumerator experiments. Realized sample sizes in cells.

Table D.2: Balance on Campaign Ad Video Treatment

| VARIABLE | (1) | (2) | t-test |
|---------------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|---------|
| | No Video | Video | p-value |
| Age in Years | 48.047 [0.461] | 46.891 [0.478] | 0.082* |
| Married, Partnered or in Relationship | 0.525 [0.015] | 0.550 [0.016] | 0.262 |
| College Educated | 0.193 [0.012] | 0.187 [0.013] | 0.719 |
| Race: White, non-Hispanic | 0.828 [0.012] | 0.818 [0.012] | 0.554 |
| Religion: Christian | 0.615 [0.015] | 0.578 [0.016] | 0.083* |
| Employed | 0.488 [0.015] | 0.510 [0.016] | 0.324 |
| Income Quintile | 2.889 [0.044] | 2.955 [0.046] | 0.306 |
| Party ID | | | |
| Democrat | 0.044 [0.006] | 0.049 [0.007] | 0.544 |
| Independent | 0.267 [0.013] | 0.275 [0.014] | 0.658 |
| Republican | 0.690 [0.014] | 0.675 [0.015] | 0.486 |
| Region | | | |
| Northeast | 0.148 [0.011] | 0.152 [0.012] | 0.784 |
| Midwest | 0.278 [0.014] | 0.259 [0.014] | 0.336 |
| South | 0.448 [0.015] | 0.458 [0.016] | 0.636 |
| West | 0.126 [0.010] | 0.131 [0.011] | 0.780 |
| N | 1076 | 973 | |
| F-test of joint significance (F-stat) | | 0.696 | |
| F-test, number of observations | | 2049 | |

Notes: The value displayed for t-tests are p-values; The value displayed for F-tests are the F-statistics; ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical level.

Table D.3: Balance on Campaign Ad Video Treatment (Extended List)

| Variable | Mean/SE | Mean/SE | t-test | |
|--|-------------------|-------------------|----------------|--------------------------------|
| | | | (1) Control | (2) Video Treat- ment |
| (1)-(2) | | | | |
| Age in Years | 47.838 [0.652] | 46.606 [0.676] | 0.190 | |
| Married, Partnered or in Relationship | 0.517 [0.022] | 0.600 [0.023] | 0.009*** | |
| College Educated | 0.168 [0.016] | 0.194 [0.018] | 0.293 | |
| Race: White, non-Hispanic | 0.822 [0.017] | 0.832 [0.017] | 0.703 | |
| Religion: Christian | 0.616 [0.021] | 0.577 [0.023] | 0.211 | |
| Employed | 0.485 [0.022] | 0.514 [0.023] | 0.360 | |
| Income Quintile | 2.842 [0.064] | 2.945 [0.066] | 0.260 | |
| Party ID | | | | |
| Democrat | 0.033 [0.008] | 0.053 [0.010] | 0.121 | |
| Independent | 0.290 [0.020] | 0.303 [0.021] | 0.640 | |
| Republican | 0.678 [0.021] | 0.644 [0.022] | 0.267 | |
| Region | | | | |
| Northeast | 0.145 [0.015] | 0.149 [0.016] | 0.835 | |
| Midwest | 0.286 [0.020] | 0.265 [0.020] | 0.472 | |
| South | 0.417 [0.022] | 0.465 [0.023] | 0.126 | |
| West | 0.153 [0.016] | 0.120 [0.015] | 0.137 | |
| Reproductive Rights is Top 3 Issue | 0.266 [0.019] | 0.293 [0.021] | 0.358 | |
| Political Attitudes | | | | |
| Likelihood of Voting (1-5) | 1.967 [0.062] | 1.941 [0.064] | 0.770 | |
| Certainty of Vote Choice (1-4) | 1.631 [0.046] | 1.613 [0.046] | 0.777 | |
| Likelihood of Voting Trump (1-5) | 1.959 [0.066] | 2.124 [0.073] | 0.092* | |
| Network Likely Voting Trump | 0.639 [0.021] | 0.592 [0.023] | 0.125 | |
| Significant Other Likely Voting Trump | 0.392 [0.021] | 0.425 [0.023] | 0.286 | |
| Comfort with Network Disapproval (1-4) | 2.218 [0.044] | 2.263 [0.045] | 0.476 | |
| N | 518 | 475 | | |
| F-test of joint significance (F-stat) | | | 1.230 | |
| F-test, number of observations | | | 993 | |

Notes: The value displayed for t-tests are p-values; The value displayed for F-tests are the F-statistics; ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical level. The extended list is tested only on ad treatment and control in the private condition because it includes measures that are post-treatment to assignment in the virtual enumerator experiment.

Table D.4: Balance on Enumerator Treatment

| VARIABLE | (1) Private | (2) Female | (3) Male | t-test p-value | t-test p-value |
|---------------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | Mean/SE | Mean/SE | Mean/SE | (1)-(2) | (1)-(3) |
| Age in Years | 47.249 [0.469] | 47.761 [0.648] | 47.707 [0.676] | 0.524 | 0.570 |
| Married, Partnered or in Relationship | 0.557 [0.016] | 0.557 [0.022] | 0.482 [0.021] | 0.999 | 0.005*** |
| College Educated | 0.180 [0.012] | 0.178 [0.017] | 0.220 [0.018] | 0.930 | 0.061* |
| Race: White, non-Hispanic | 0.827 [0.012] | 0.814 [0.017] | 0.826 [0.016] | 0.531 | 0.969 |
| Religion: Christian | 0.597 [0.016] | 0.586 [0.022] | 0.608 [0.021] | 0.684 | 0.677 |
| Employed | 0.498 [0.016] | 0.502 [0.022] | 0.495 [0.021] | 0.899 | 0.881 |
| Income Quintile | 2.891 [0.046] | 2.935 [0.064] | 2.960 [0.062] | 0.576 | 0.374 |
| Party ID | | | | | |
| Democrat | 0.042 [0.006] | 0.045 [0.009] | 0.055 [0.010] | 0.801 | 0.261 |
| Independent | 0.296 [0.014] | 0.253 [0.019] | 0.242 [0.018] | 0.078* | 0.023** |
| Republican | 0.662 [0.015] | 0.702 [0.020] | 0.703 [0.020] | 0.114 | 0.095* |
| Region | | | | | |
| Northeast | 0.147 [0.011] | 0.145 [0.016] | 0.159 [0.016] | 0.920 | 0.519 |
| Midwest | 0.276 [0.014] | 0.261 [0.019] | 0.264 [0.019] | 0.532 | 0.607 |
| South | 0.440 [0.016] | 0.482 [0.022] | 0.449 [0.021] | 0.119 | 0.744 |
| West | 0.137 [0.011] | 0.112 [0.014] | 0.128 [0.014] | 0.167 | 0.630 |
| N | 993 | 510 | 546 | | |
| F-test of joint significance (F-stat) | | | | 0.732 | 1.819** |
| F-test, number of observations | | | | 1503 | 1539 |

Notes: The value displayed for t-tests are p-values; The value displayed for F-tests are the F-statistics;
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical level.

E Treatment Checks

Table E.1 presents treatment checks based on assignment to the campaign ad treatment and control groups. Most notably 86 percent in the control group correctly indicated that they did not see a video while about 72 percent in the treatment group correctly indicated that the ad featured two women. The checks also indicate that 88 percent of respondents had not seen the campaign ad previously and almost all watched the ad alone.

Table E.2 presents treatment checks based on assignment to the private and public conditions in the enumerator experiment. For those assigned to the private condition about 71 percent correctly indicated that they did not have an enumerator or they did not know the sex of their virtual enumerator. Respondents assigned to a public condition correctly reported their enumerator sex at high rates: about 93 (87) percent of those assigned to a female (male) enumerator correctly recalled their enumerator’s sex. A smaller proportion in the public condition correctly recalled the party ID of the virtual enumerator.

We also check whether the enumerator treatment distracted respondents from the ad treatment, which could have caused the null results in the public condition. If the enumerator caused distraction from the ad, we would expect lower correctness in the enumerator condition(s). The ad treatment check asked respondents how many women appeared in the video. We evaluate this measure in two ways. In the first coding, “I didn’t watch a video” is coded as correct for control respondents and “2 women” as correct for treated respondents. Under this coding, correctness appears somewhat lower in the female-enumerator condition, which could suggest distraction. However, in the second coding, we allow “1 woman” to be considered correct for respondents in the ad-control condition or in the female enumerator condition, to account for the possibility that respondents were referring to the single woman shown in the enumerator image rather than the video. Using this coding, which we believe is reasonable, we find no differences in correctness across conditions.

We also find no evidence that the public condition reduced engagement. Respondents assigned to the female enumerator condition spent slightly more time on the survey—0.77 minutes (about 46 seconds) longer on average—but this difference is small and statistically indistinguishable from the private condition ($p = 0.201$). Taken together, these results indicate that distraction from the enumerator is unlikely to explain the null effect on public expression.

Table E.1: Treatment Checks – Video Ad Treatment

| | Control (No Video) | Treatment (Video Ad) |
|---|--------------------|----------------------|
| Number of women featured in the video that you watched | | |
| I didn't see a video | 926 (86.1%) | 21 (2.2%) |
| One | 89 (8.3%) | 98 (10.1%) |
| Two | 21 (2.0%) | 700 (71.9%) |
| Three | 21 (2.0%) | 99 (10.2%) |
| Four | 5 (0.5%) | 27 (2.8%) |
| Five | 3 (0.3%) | 16 (1.6%) |
| Other (Write In) | 11 (1.0%) | 12 (1.2%) |
| Have you seen this video before? | | |
| Yes | . | 95 (9.8%) |
| Maybe | . | 21 (2.2%) |
| No | . | 857 (88.1%) |
| Viewing experience | | |
| Watched alone | . | 836 (85.9%) |
| With others around, but they did not see or hear it | . | 96 (9.9%) |
| With people around, and they saw or heard it | . | 41 (4.2%) |
| Overall experience with survey | | |
| Very positive | 487 (46.6%) | 346 (36.5%) |
| Somewhat positive | 284 (27.2%) | 245 (25.8%) |
| Neither positive nor negative | 258 (24.7%) | 271 (28.6%) |
| Somewhat negative | 14 (1.3%) | 51 (5.4%) |
| Very negative | 2 (0.2%) | 36 (3.8%) |
| N | 1,076 (52.5%) | 973 (47.5%) |

Notes: Table presents treatment checks by assignment to the campaign ad treatment and control groups. Cell values in **bold** indicate correct response for the assigned treatment status

Table E.2: Treatment Checks – Virtual Enumerator Treatment

| | Private (No Enumerator) | Female Enumerator | Male Enumerator |
|---|-------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| ENUMERATOR TREATMENT | | | |
| Sex of virtual interviewer | | | |
| I didn't have a virtual interviewer | 604 (60.8%) | 21 (4.1%) | 23 (4.2%) |
| Male | 48 (4.8%) | 6 (1.2%) | 475 (87.0%) |
| Female | 232 (23.4%) | 472 (92.5%) | 38 (7.0%) |
| Don't know | 109 (11.0%) | 11 (2.2%) | 10 (1.8%) |
| Partisanship of virtual enumerator | | | |
| Correct | 665 (67.0%) | 262 (51.4%) | 294 (53.8%) |
| VIDEO TREATMENT | | | |
| Number of women in video | | | |
| Measure 1: Correct | 817 (82.3%) | 354 (69.4%) | 455 (83.3%) |
| Measure 2: Correct | 817 (82.3%) | 426 (83.5%) | 455 (83.3%) |
| SURVEY | | | |
| Duration (mins) | | | |
| | 11.06 (10.09) | 11.84 (11.55) | 11.20 (9.24) |
| Overall experience with survey | | | |
| Very positive | 346 (35.7%) | 237 (47.9%) | 250 (47.1%) |
| Somewhat positive | 243 (25.1%) | 145 (29.3%) | 141 (26.6%) |
| Neither positive nor negative | 302 (31.2%) | 105 (21.2%) | 122 (23.0%) |
| Somewhat negative | 48 (5.0%) | 5 (1.0%) | 12 (2.3%) |
| Very negative | 29 (3.0%) | 3 (0.6%) | 6 (1.1%) |
| N | 993 (48.5%) | 510 (24.9%) | 546 (26.6%) |

Notes: Table presents treatment checks by assignment to the private and public conditions in the virtual enumerator experiment. Cell values in **bold** indicate correct response for the assigned treatment status.

F Main Outcomes

Our post-treatment survey contained three main outcome measures of candidate support, which we aggregate into indices of support for each candidate and also analyze separately. First, the survey measured *favorability* by asking: “How favorable or unfavorable is your opinion of [CANDIDATE] as a presidential candidate?” In addition to asking all questions with reference to Harris and Trump, we asked with reference to Jill Stein (Green Party) and Chase Oliver (Libertarian Party) to investigate whether the ad shifted support towards third party candidates. Second, it measured *vote choice* with the question: “If the election were held today, what would you be most likely to do?” where response options included vote for Trump, vote for Harris, vote for Stein/Oliver, and not vote at all.

Finally, we obtained a behavioral measure of candidate support by giving respondents an opportunity to donate to one of the presidential campaigns at the end of the survey. The behavioral outcome measure was introduced on the final screen of the survey, where respondents saw the text: “*Thank you for participating in this study. Election Day is Tuesday, November 5. This could be one of your last chances to donate to the candidate of your choice. Remember, you can donate as little as \$1 and every bit will help your candidate. Also remember any donation you make can be kept private.*” Respondents were then given the option to donate to one of the four presidential candidates (by clicking through to their campaign pages) or to exit the survey. We record clicks on the donate page as the behavioral outcome.

G Pre-Registered Hypotheses and Estimation

Table G.1 paraphrases the main pre-specified hypotheses, along with the tables or figures where results can be found.

Table G.1: Pre-registered hypotheses

| No. | Hypothesis | Main Paper | Appendix |
|---|--|------------|-----------------------|
| Panel A: Pre-registered hypotheses | | | |
| H3 | The ad will increase respondents' support for Harris. | | Table G.1 |
| H4 | The ad will reduce respondents' support for Trump. | | Table G.1 |
| H5a | The ad will increase respondents' estimates of proportions of R/Ind/D women who will vote for Harris. | | Table I.1 |
| H5b | The ad will not change respondents' estimates of proportions of R/Ind/D men who will vote for Harris. | | Table I.2 |
| H6 | The ad will increase Harris support in the private condition. | Fig 1 | Table G.2, H.1 |
| H7 | The ad will reduce Trump support in the private condition. | Fig 1 | Table G.2, H.1 |
| H8 | The ad will have a bigger effect on increasing Harris support in the private vs. public condition. | | Table H.1 |
| H9 | The ad will have a bigger effect on reducing Trump support in the private vs. public condition. | | Table H.1 |
| H10 | The ad will have a bigger effect on increasing Harris support in the public female vs. male enumerator condition. | | Figure H.1, Table H.1 |
| H11 | The ad will have a bigger effect on reducing Trump support in the public female vs. male enumerator condition. | | Figure H.1, Table H.1 |
| Panel B: Exploratory hypotheses for the interaction of Ad*Pub | | | |
| | The effect of the ad on Harris support will be bigger/smaller/the same in the private vs. public female enumerator conditions. | Fig 1 | Table H.1 |
| | The effect of the ad on Trump support will be bigger/smaller/the same in the private vs. public female enumerator conditions. | Fig 1 | Table H.1 |

We test the above hypothesis using regression analysis, as pre-registered and specified below. We test $H3 - H4$ by estimating a regression of the following form in the full sample:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \delta Ad_i + X_i' \psi + \mu_j + \epsilon_i \quad (1)$$

where Y_{ij} is the outcome of interest for individual i and $Ad_i \in \{0, 1\}$ is a treatment assignment

indicator that equals one (1) if assigned to view the campaign ad and zero (0) if assigned to the control. The main coefficient of interest is δ where $\delta > 0$ would indicate increased support for Harris and $\delta < 0$ reduced support for Trump.

Also included in the regression are a vector of pre-specified controls, $X'_i\psi$. All regressions include a set of pre-specified demographic controls, which we refer to as ‘set 1’ controls. These controls are listed in Panels I-III of Appendix Table B.1 and include age, partisan ID, marital status, education, race, religion, employment status, income, and region. These controls were measured prior to the ad experiment but following the enumerator experiment (party ID was measured before the enumerator experiment). Because these are demographic variables that should be unaffected by the enumerator experiment, we use them in all regressions. Finally, all regressions control for implementation day fixed effects (μ_j); ϵ_i is the individual error term.

We test $H6 - H9$ using a regression of the form

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 Ad_i + \beta_2 Pub_i + \beta_3 (Ad_i * Pub_i) + X'_i\psi + \mu_j + \epsilon_i \quad (2)$$

where everything is the same above plus $Pub_i \in \{0, 1\}$ is a treatment assignment indicator that equals one (1) if assigned to the public condition in the virtual enumerator experiment and zero (0) if assigned to the private condition. In this regression, β_1 gives us the effect of the campaign ad on candidate support in the private condition, such that $\beta_1 > 0$ would be interpreted as increased private support for Harris and $\beta_1 < 0$ would indicate reduced private support for Trump. β_3 is the effect of the campaign ad on public expression relative to private support. $H8$ predicts $\beta_3 < 0$, that increased support for Harris will be smaller in the public relative to private condition. $H9$ predicts $\beta_3 > 0$ because we expect the treatment to have a bigger effect on reducing support for Trump in private relative to public such that support for Trump will be higher in public than in private.

We note that in some of the robustness checks (see e.g. Tables H.2) we expand the vector of controls $X'_i\psi$ to include the ‘Set 1’ controls plus additional political controls listed in Panel IV of Appendix Table B.1). We refer to the expanded set of controls as ‘Set 2’ controls. While these political controls were measured prior to the ad experiment they were measured following the enumerator experiment and could have been affected by that treatment. We thus only use these controls when estimating the effects in the private condition only, where responses were unaffected by the presence of a virtual enumerator.

Finally, to test the effects of the campaign ad in private versus public female (and public male), we use the following pre-registered regression.

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 Ad_i + \beta_2 Pub_Fem_i + \beta_3 Pub_Male_i + \beta_4 (Ad_i * Pub_Fem_i) + \beta_5 (Ad_i * Pub_Male_i) + X'_i\psi + \mu_j + \epsilon_i \quad (3)$$

where all is the same as above but now $Pub_Fem_i \in \{0, 1\}$ is an indicator of assignment to the female enumerator in the public treatment and $Pub_Male_i \in \{0, 1\}$ is an indicator of assign-

ment to the male enumerator in the public treatment. To test $H10 - H11$ we test $\beta_4 - \beta_5$, which captures the differential effect of treatment under a female versus male enumerator, where a positive difference would indicate evidence for $H10$ (indicating that respondents reported more support for Harris to a female vs. male virtual enumerator) and a negative difference as evidence for $H11$ (indicating that respondents reported less support for Trump to a female vs. male virtual enumerator).

However, the main exploratory analysis in the paper focuses on β_1 , β_2 , and β_4 . Specifically, β_1 gives us the effect of the ad in the private condition, $\beta_2 + \beta_4$ the effect of the ad in the public condition, and β_4 the effect of the ad in private relative to the public female enumerator condition. With respect to Harris outcomes, $\beta_1 > 0$, $\beta_4 = 0$ would indicate the campaign ad had similar effects in private and the public female enumerator condition while $\beta_4 < 0$ would indicate the ad had bigger effects on increased Harris support in private relative to the public female enumerator condition. With respect to our Trump outcomes, $\beta_1 < 0$ would indicate the campaign ad reduced support for Trump. We are thus interested in exploring whether $\beta_4 = 0$, which would indicate an equivalent reduction in Trump support in private and the public female enumerator condition or whether $\beta_4 > 0$, which would indicate a greater reduction in Trump support in private relative to the public female enumerator condition.

In the results below, we report pre-registered one-sided p-values for hypothesis tests in the main text and two-sided p-values for all exploratory analysis. All appendix tables report corresponding two-sided p-values, and all confidence intervals shown in figures are based on two-sided tests.

H Additional Results: Candidate Support

This section reports results and robustness checks for the effects of the ad on candidate support.

Table H.1 presents the average treatment effect of the campaign ad in the full sample, corresponding to H3 and H4 (see Appendix Table G.1). It presents all outcome measures described in Appendix F. It reports pre-registered one-sided p-values for hypothesis tests along with conventional two-sided p-values. Overall, we see that the campaign ad had no real average treatment effects.

Table H.2 presents the main tests of H6-H7: the effects of the campaign ad on candidate support in the private condition. The bolded results indicate the main pre-registered results; the table also presents robustness checks with no controls and ‘set 2’ controls as described in Appendix G.

Figure H.1 and Table H.3 present the effects of the ad on support for Harrison and Trump in the private condition, disaggregated by respondent partisan ID. The main takeaway is that the reduced support for Trump is primarily driven by respondents who self-identify as Independents.

Table H.1: Average Treatment Effect of Campaign Ad (Full Sample)

| | Index support v1 (three variables) | | | | Index support v2 (two variables) | | | | Favorability (1=unfav, 5=fave) | | Vote for [...] (0=no, 1=yes) | | Donate to (0=no, 1=yes) | | Don't Vote (0=no, 1=yes) | | |
|----------------------------|---------------------------------------|--------|----------|--------|-------------------------------------|--------|----------|--------|-----------------------------------|----------|---------------------------------|----------|----------------------------|----------|-----------------------------|----------|--|
| | Main | | Robust 1 | | Main | | Robust 1 | | Main | Robust 1 | Main | Robust 1 | Main | Robust 1 | Main | Robust 1 | |
| | TREAT | -0.01 | 0.00 | 0.05 | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.08 | 0.02 | 0.02 | -0.01 | -0.01 | | | | | | |
| s.e. | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.06) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.00) | (0.00) | | | | | | | |
| one-sided p-val | 0.368 | 0.458 | 0.090 | 0.083 | 0.108 | 0.086 | 0.115 | 0.119 | 0.067 | 0.078 | | | | | | | |
| two-sided p-val | 0.735 | 0.916 | 0.179 | 0.166 | 0.216 | 0.173 | 0.230 | 0.239 | 0.135 | 0.157 | | | | | | | |
| Control (mean) | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.03 | -0.03 | 1.96 | 1.96 | 0.16 | 0.16 | 0.02 | 0.02 | | | | | | | |
| Panel B: Support for Trump | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| TREAT | -0.04 | -0.04 | -0.03 | -0.04 | -0.05 | -0.06 | -0.01 | -0.02 | 0.00 | 0.00 | | | | | | | |
| s.e. | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.07) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.01) | | | | | | | |
| one-sided p-val | 0.166 | 0.189 | 0.182 | 0.165 | 0.169 | 0.170 | 0.230 | 0.185 | 0.281 | 0.363 | | | | | | | |
| two-sided p-val | 0.332 | 0.379 | 0.365 | 0.331 | 0.338 | 0.340 | 0.461 | 0.370 | 0.563 | 0.727 | | | | | | | |
| Control (mean) | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 3.86 | 3.86 | 0.71 | 0.71 | 0.03 | 0.03 | | | | | | | |
| Panel C: Support Other | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| TREAT | | | | | | | | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.02 | -0.02 | | | | |
| s.e. | | | | | | | | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.01) | (0.01) | | | | |
| one-sided p-val | | | | | | | | 0.046 | 0.040 | 0.135 | 0.131 | 0.066 | 0.119 | | | | |
| two-sided p-val | | | | | | | | 0.093 | 0.081 | 0.270 | 0.262 | 0.132 | 0.239 | | | | |
| Control (mean) | | | | | | | | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.11 | 0.11 | | | | |
| N (estimation sample) | 2049 | 2049 | 2049 | 2049 | 2049 | 2049 | 2049 | 2049 | 2049 | 2049 | 2049 | 2049 | 2049 | 2049 | 2049 | 2049 | |
| Controls | Set 1 | No | Set 1 | No | Set 1 | No | Set 1 | No | Set 1 | No | Set 1 | No | Set 1 | No | Set 1 | No | |
| Day FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | |

Notes: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01.

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Table H.2: Effect of Campaign Ad on Candidate Support (Private Sample Only)

| | Index support v1 (three variables) | | | | Index support v2 (two variables) | | | | Favorability (1= very unfav., 5= very fav.) | | | Vote for [...] (0=no, 1=yes) | | Donate to (0=no, 1=yes) | | Don't Vote (0=no, 1=yes) | | |
|-----------------------------|---------------------------------------|--------|----------|---------------|-------------------------------------|--------|---------------|-------------|--|---------------|-------------|---------------------------------|---------------|----------------------------|----------|-----------------------------|----------|----------|
| | Main | | Robust 1 | | Main | | Robust 1 | | Main | | Robust 1 | Robust 2 | Main | Robust 1 | Robust 2 | Main | Robust 1 | Robust 2 |
| | TREAT | -0.02 | 0.01 | -0.06 | 0.06 | 0.09 | -0.01 | 0.06 | 0.11 | -0.01 | 0.03 | 0.04 | 0.00 | -0.01 | -0.01 | -0.01 | -0.01 | |
| s.e. | (0.05) | (0.06) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.06) | (0.03) | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.06) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | |
| one-sided p-val | 0.391 | 0.421 | 0.093 | 0.128 | 0.061 | 0.426 | 0.199 | 0.100 | 0.414 | 0.108 | 0.055 | 0.479 | 0.100 | 0.122 | 0.070 | | | |
| two-sided p-val | 0.781 | 0.842 | 0.187 | 0.256 | 0.123 | 0.852 | 0.398 | 0.200 | 0.828 | 0.217 | 0.111 | 0.958 | 0.200 | 0.243 | 0.139 | | | |
| Control (mean) | -0.03 | -0.03 | -0.03 | -0.06 | -0.06 | -0.06 | 1.95 | 1.95 | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | |
| Panel A: Support for Harris | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| TREAT | -0.07 | -0.09 | -0.03 | -0.10 | -0.14 | -0.04 | -0.16 | -0.21 | -0.07 | -0.04 | -0.05 | -0.02 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | |
| s.e. | (0.05) | (0.06) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.06) | (0.02) | (0.07) | (0.09) | (0.05) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | |
| one-sided p-val | 0.094 | 0.084 | 0.275 | 0.022 | 0.014 | 0.047 | 0.017 | 0.011 | 0.060 | 0.051 | 0.028 | 0.134 | 0.426 | 0.468 | 0.498 | | | |
| two-sided p-val | 0.188 | 0.169 | 0.549 | 0.044 | 0.028 | 0.094 | 0.033 | 0.021 | 0.121 | 0.102 | 0.056 | 0.267 | 0.852 | 0.937 | 0.997 | | | |
| Control (mean) | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.07 | 3.94 | 3.94 | 3.94 | 0.72 | 0.72 | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.03 | |
| Panel B: Support for Trump | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| TREAT | -0.07 | -0.09 | -0.03 | -0.10 | -0.14 | -0.04 | -0.16 | -0.21 | -0.07 | -0.04 | -0.05 | -0.02 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | |
| s.e. | (0.05) | (0.06) | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.06) | (0.02) | (0.07) | (0.09) | (0.05) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | |
| one-sided p-val | 0.094 | 0.084 | 0.275 | 0.022 | 0.014 | 0.047 | 0.017 | 0.011 | 0.060 | 0.051 | 0.028 | 0.134 | 0.426 | 0.468 | 0.498 | | | |
| two-sided p-val | 0.188 | 0.169 | 0.549 | 0.044 | 0.028 | 0.094 | 0.033 | 0.021 | 0.121 | 0.102 | 0.056 | 0.267 | 0.852 | 0.937 | 0.997 | | | |
| Control (mean) | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.07 | 3.94 | 3.94 | 3.94 | 0.72 | 0.72 | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.03 | |
| Panel C: Support Other | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| TREAT | | | | | | | | | | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | -0.01 | -0.01 | -0.01 |
| s.e. | | | | | | | | | | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.00) | (0.00) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) |
| one-sided p-val | | | | | | | | | | 0.009 | 0.009 | 0.009 | 0.250 | 0.264 | 0.242 | 0.227 | 0.339 | 0.258 |
| two-sided p-val | | | | | | | | | | 0.019 | 0.018 | 0.018 | 0.499 | 0.529 | 0.484 | 0.454 | 0.679 | 0.516 |
| Control (mean) | | | | | | | | | | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.13 |
| N (estimation sample) | 2049 | 2049 | 2049 | 2049 | 2049 | 2049 | 2049 | 2049 | 2049 | 2049 | 2049 | 2049 | 2049 | 2049 | 2049 | 2049 | 2049 | |
| N (private sample) | 993 | 993 | 993 | 993 | 993 | 993 | 993 | 993 | 993 | 993 | 993 | 993 | 993 | 993 | 993 | 993 | 993 | 993 |
| Controls | Set 1 | No | Set 2 | Set 1 | No | Set 2 | Set 1 | No | Set 2 | Set 1 | No | Set 2 | Set 1 | No | Set 2 | Set 1 | No | Set 2 |
| Day FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |

Notes: Bolded results correspond to results in Figure 2 in main text.




Figure H.1: Effect of Campaign Ad on Candidate Support, by Party (Private Sample Only)

Table H.3: Effect of Campaign Ad on Candidate Support, by Party (Private Sample Only)

| | Harris | | | Trump | | | Other | | |
|---|-----------|--------------|-------------|-----------|--------------|-------------|-----------|--------------|-------------|
| | Democrats | Independents | Republicans | Democrats | Independents | Republicans | Democrats | Independents | Republicans |
| Candidate support (index 2 vars, z-score) | | | | | | | | | |
| TREAT | 0.01 | 0.09 | 0.04 | -0.25 | -0.23 | -0.03 | | | |
| s.e. | -0.24 | -0.12 | -0.05 | (0.18) | (0.11) | (0.05) | | | |
| one-sided p-val | 0.477 | 0.213 | 0.216 | 0.084 | 0.020 | 0.254 | | | |
| two-sided p-val | 0.954 | 0.427 | 0.433 | 0.169 | 0.040 | 0.508 | | | |
| Control (mean) | -0.06 | -0.06 | -0.06 | 0.066 | 0.066 | 0.066 | | | |
| Favorability (1=v. unfavorable, 5=v. favorable) | | | | | | | | | |
| TREAT | -0.13 | 0.07 | 0.07 | -0.57 | -0.42 | -0.02 | | | |
| s.e. | (0.28) | (0.16) | (0.08) | (0.34) | (0.17) | (0.08) | | | |
| one-sided p-val | 0.321 | 0.337 | 0.186 | 0.048 | 0.007 | 0.381 | | | |
| two-sided p-val | 0.641 | 0.674 | 0.371 | 0.096 | 0.013 | 0.762 | | | |
| Control (mean) | 1.95 | 1.95 | 1.95 | 3.94 | 3.94 | 3.94 | | | |
| Vote for (0=no, 1=yes) | | | | | | | | | |
| TREAT | 0.06 | 0.05 | 0.01 | -0.06 | -0.08 | -0.02 | 0.03 | 0.05 | 0.02 |
| s.e. | (0.11) | (0.05) | (0.02) | (0.08) | (0.05) | (0.02) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.01) |
| one-sided p-val | 0.294 | 0.146 | 0.342 | 0.239 | 0.078 | 0.193 | 0.224 | 0.048 | 0.037 |
| two-sided p-val | 0.588 | 0.291 | 0.684 | 0.478 | 0.157 | 0.386 | 0.449 | 0.095 | 0.073 |
| Control (mean) | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.72 | 0.72 | 0.72 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.02 |
| N (estimation sample) | 2049 | 2049 | 2049 | 2049 | 2049 | 2049 | 2049 | 2049 | 2049 |
| N (private sample) | 993 | 993 | 993 | 993 | 993 | 993 | 993 | 993 | 993 |
| N (subgroup sample) | 42 | 294 | 657 | 42 | 294 | 657 | 42 | 294 | 657 |
| Controls | Set 1 | Set 1 | Set 1 | Set 1 | Set 1 | Set 1 | Set 1 | Set 1 | Set 1 |
| Day FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |

Notes:

I Additional Results: Public Expression


I.1 Female vs. Male Virtual Enumerators

Table I.1: Effect of Campaign Ad on Private Support and Public Expression

| PAP hypotheses: | H6-H7 | | H8-H9 | | Exploratory | | Exploratory | | Exploratory | | H10-H11 | | | | | | | | | |
|------------------------------------|----------------|---------------|----------|---------------|--------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|-----------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------------|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| | Private (A) | Public (B) | Any Enum | | Fem Public C | Enum Diff (C-A) | Male Public D | Enum Diff (D-A) | Public (C-D) | Fem-Male Public (C-D) | Fem-Male Diff (C-A)-(D-A) | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | Public | Diff (B-A) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Panel A: Support for Harris | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Index Support | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| coeff | 0.06 | 0.04 | -0.02 | -0.03 | -0.09 | 0.11 | 0.05 | -0.14 | -0.14 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| se | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.09) | (0.07) | (0.09) | (0.11) | (0.11) | | | | | | | | | | | |
| two-sided p-val | 0.256 | 0.428 | 0.824 | 0.711 | 0.347 | 0.135 | 0.559 | 0.192 | 0.190 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| one-sided p-val | 0.128 | 0.214 | 0.412 | — | — | — | — | — | — | 0.096 | | | | | | | | | | |
| Constant | -0.06 | -0.06 | -0.06 | -0.06 | -0.06 | -0.06 | -0.06 | -0.06 | -0.06 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Favorability | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| coeff | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.00 | -0.01 | -0.07 | 0.14 | 0.08 | -0.15 | -0.15 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| se | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.13) | (0.10) | (0.12) | (0.14) | (0.14) | | | | | | | | | | | |
| two-sided p-val | 0.398 | 0.365 | 0.968 | 0.913 | 0.569 | 0.161 | 0.517 | 0.294 | 0.290 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| one-sided p-val | 0.199 | 0.182 | 0.484 | — | — | — | — | — | — | 0.147 | | | | | | | | | | |
| Constant | 1.95 | 1.95 | 1.95 | 1.95 | 1.95 | 1.95 | 1.95 | 1.95 | 1.95 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Vote Choice | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| coeff | 0.03 | 0.01 | -0.01 | -0.02 | -0.04 | 0.04 | 0.01 | -0.06 | -0.06 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| se | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | | | | | | | | | | | |
| two-sided p-val | 0.217 | 0.611 | 0.609 | 0.517 | 0.215 | 0.184 | 0.703 | 0.163 | 0.160 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| one-sided p-val | 0.108 | 0.305 | 0.305 | — | — | — | — | — | — | 0.081 | | | | | | | | | | |
| Constant | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.13 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Panel B: Support for Trump | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Index Support | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| coeff | -0.10 | 0.03 | 0.13 | 0.07 | 0.17 | 0.00 | 0.09 | 0.07 | 0.07 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| se | (0.05) | (0.05) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.10) | (0.10) | | | | | | | | | | | |
| two-sided p-val | 0.044 | 0.512 | 0.059 | 0.318 | 0.049 | 0.949 | 0.258 | 0.444 | 0.440 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| one-sided p-val | 0.022 | 0.256 | 0.029 | — | — | — | — | — | — | 0.222 | | | | | | | | | | |
| Constant | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.07 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Favorability | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| coeff | -0.16 | 0.05 | 0.21 | 0.13 | 0.28 | -0.02 | 0.14 | 0.15 | 0.15 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| se | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.10) | (0.11) | (0.13) | (0.10) | (0.12) | (0.15) | (0.15) | | | | | | | | | | | |
| two-sided p-val | 0.033 | 0.492 | 0.047 | 0.242 | 0.031 | 0.826 | 0.277 | 0.312 | 0.310 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| one-sided p-val | 0.017 | 0.246 | 0.023 | — | — | — | — | — | — | 0.156 | | | | | | | | | | |
| Constant | 3.94 | 3.94 | 3.94 | 3.94 | 3.94 | 3.94 | 3.94 | 3.94 | 3.94 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Vote Choice | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| coeff | -0.04 | 0.01 | 0.05 | 0.02 | 0.06 | 0.00 | 0.04 | 0.02 | 0.02 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| se | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.05) | | | | | | | | | | | |
| two-sided p-val | 0.102 | 0.589 | 0.122 | 0.479 | 0.128 | 0.951 | 0.312 | 0.643 | 0.640 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| one-sided p-val | 0.051 | 0.294 | 0.061 | — | — | — | — | — | — | 0.321 | | | | | | | | | | |
| Constant | 0.72 | 0.72 | 0.72 | 0.72 | 0.72 | 0.72 | 0.72 | 0.72 | 0.72 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| N (estimation sample) | 2049 | 2049 | 2049 | 2049 | 2049 | 2049 | 2049 | 2049 | 2049 | 2049 | | | | | | | | | | |
| N (relevant sample) | 993 | 1056 | 2049 | 510 | 1503 | 546 | 1539 | 1056 | 2049 | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Controls | Set 1 | Set 1 | Set 1 | Set 1 | Set 1 | Set 1 | Set 1 | Set 1 | Set 1 | Set 1 | | | | | | | | | | |
| Day FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | | | | | | | | | | |

Notes: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. Column A shows the effect of the campaign ad on candidate support outcomes in the private condition, corresponding to Figure 1. Columns 2-3 show the effect of the campaign ad in the 'public' condition (any enumerator) and the test of the public/private difference. Columns 4-5 show the effect of the campaign ad in the public female enumerator condition and the test of the private/female enumerator difference, corresponding to Figure 1. Columns 6-7 show the effect of the campaign ad in the public male enumerator condition and the test of the private/male enumerator difference. Column 8 shows the test of the effect of the campaign ad in the female vs male enumerator conditions (restricted to the public condition) Column 9 is the difference-in-difference test of the effect of the campaign ad in private/public female versus private/public male. The top row of the table indicates whether hypotheses are exploratory or correspond to PAP hypotheses. Results that are **bolded** correspond to results presented in Figures in the main paper.

Figure I.1: Effect of campaign ad in ‘private’ vs. ‘public’ female and male enumerator conditions



Notes: Corresponds to exploratory results in Table I.1

I.2 Heterogeneous Effects by Race

We also examine whether public expression to the virtual female enumerator varies by respondent race. This analysis is important because all virtual enumerators were white. We made this design choice anticipating that our sample—Republican and Independent women—would be predominantly white, which the data confirm. Of 2,049 respondents, 82 percent identify as white (non-Hispanic), 5 percent as Black, 5 percent as Latina, and the remaining 7 percent as other racial or ethnic minorities.

Although the number of non-white respondents is small, we test for heterogeneous treatment effects because racial identification with the enumerator could help explain the null results in the public condition. Specifically, weaker identification with white enumerators among non-white respondents could attenuate treatment effects. Conversely, if gender identification dominates racial identification, effects may be similar across groups. It is also possible that effects are stronger among non-white respondents if interactions with white enumerators heighten social


costs or signaling pressures.

As shown in Figure I.2, the results exhibit nearly identical patterns across racial groups. In the private conditions, both non-white (Panel A) and white (Panel D) respondents show reduced support for Trump in response to the treatment. In contrast, under the public female enumerator condition, coefficients are positive for both non-white (Panel B) and white (Panel E) respondents, yielding a similar interaction pattern across groups.

This analysis also helps assess whether the campaign ad's message—portrayed through two white women—resonated differently with non-white women. If non-white women did not connect with the characters in the ad because of racial differences, we would expect weaker effects on their private attitudes. However, Panels A and D show the opposite pattern: the ad produced a suggestively larger increase in support for Harris among non-white women than among white women, and the reduction in private support for Trump is similar across both groups.

The patterns in the public condition also suggest that the social norms component of the ad failed to resonate for both white and non-white women. If the norms message had been effective for white women but not for non-white women, we would expect: (1) white women to show similar private and public effects (yielding a null interaction), and (2) non-white women to show an effect in private but not in public (yielding a positive interaction). Instead, we observe similarly positive interaction effects for both groups, reflecting the fact that the ad shifted private preferences but not public expression for both white and non-white women.

Figure I.2: Effect of campaign ad in 'private' vs. 'public' female enumerator conditions by respondent race



J Investigating the Mechanisms

With respect to the theorized mechanisms, we find little evidence that the ad reduced partner costs but some indication that shifted perceived social norms, especially among Independent voters.

Partner costs. The campaign ad had no apparent effect on reducing the perceived costs of supporting a candidate that deviated from the preferences of one's partner. We measured the effect of the campaign ad on the perceived likelihood that 'people close to them' would know who they voted for. This question was asked only of women in relationships in our sample. Interestingly, 75 percent of respondents in our control group felt it was 'somewhat' or 'very' likely that people close to them would know who they voted for and the ad had no effect on reducing this likelihood despite its privacy message. This strongly suggests that the ad had no effect on increasing the perceived privacy of a woman's vote choice.

Moreover, the open-ended comments measuring reactions to the ad generally do not indicate that there were a large pool of women who wanted to support Harris or oppose Trump but were afraid to deviate from the preferences of their partners. Importantly, the theme of women voting differently from their partners and concealing their choice came up in several responses, suggesting that it *was* a key message that women picked up on. Yet, among these responses, we observe three distinct patterns. First, some respondents indicate that they were not afraid to vote differently from their husbands in the first place, suggesting low *ex ante* partner costs. For example, one respondent stated: "I think most women can tell their husbands who they vote for without the need to hide it. I know absolutely nobody who would need to do that."

Second, some respondents indicated no desire to deviate from their partners. As one respondent put it: "Being married is a team effort you need to be on the same page with a lot of things especially on who to vote for." Such convergence could be due to genuine intra-household political agreement, which is unsurprising given growing evidence that individuals select into relationships with people who share their political views (Pew 2020). Alternatively, it could be a sign of internalized conformity pressure to avoid intra-household conflict. Regardless, it suggests that partner costs are not a factor for these women because there is no deviation from their preferences and their partner's preferences in the first place.


Finally, some women in our sample did agree that deviation could be costly and that concealing preferences could be a strategy to avoid those costs. As one respondent put it: "I feel the same as to keep my political views to myself [...] to keep harmony within my home or without argument or debate I shouldn't have to explain." Similarly: "I thought the concept of the video was surprising, but I can see it being truthful in how a lot of women might vote. Why argue with your husband when you do not have to." All in all, while partner costs do likely constrain the vote choices of some women, it is unlikely that reducing these was a major factor given that the number of women who acknowledged these costs as low and many felt they would not actually be able to keep their vote choice secret, despite the privacy message of the campaign.

Social norms. The data provides suggestive evidence that the ad shifted perceived social

norms in a way that could have reduced the psychological cost of private support for Harris (or opposition to Trump) and the tangible social costs of public expression of that support. As shown in Appendix Figure J.1 and Appendix Table J.1, the ad increased the perceived proportion of Democratic and Independent, but not Republican, women voting for Harris. Moreover, among Independent women—the group most induced by the campaign ad to reduce support for Trump—the treatment caused a .29 unit increase in the perceived share of other Independent women supporting Harris (one-sided p-value=.081). This suggests that the campaign ad may have led women, especially Independents, to increase their private support for Harris in order to align with the new norm. Alternatively, for those already inclined to support Harris, the norm shift likely reduced the psychological cost of doing so by providing reassurance that their preference was not a deviation from the group norm.

While the results in Table J.1 and Figure J.1 largely support $H5_a$, we also predicted in $H5_b$ that the treatment would have no effect on the perceived proportion of Republican, Independent, and Democratic men who would vote for Harris. Yet, the results in Table J.2 suggest the ad also increased the perceived proportion of men who would vote Harris, driven by increases in the perceived proportion of Democratic and Independent men. This overall result is mirrored in the private sample, where we primarily see an increase in the perceived proportion of Independent men voting Harris.

Figure J.1: Effect of campaign on perceived proportion of women voting Harris, by party ('private' sample only)



Notes: Figure shows the effects of the campaign ad treatment on perceived proportion of women voting Harris, by party. Perceived % of women voting Harris was measured on an 8-point scale where 1=none and 8=all. One-sided p-values, as pre-registered, are reported on the right.

Alternative explanation. We also consider an alternative explanation for the null results in the public condition: women internalized the general privacy message and generalized it to all forms of public expression. To address this, we can test whether the campaign ad shifted privacy expectations using a question that was asked only of partnered respondents: “How likely or unlikely is it that people close to you will learn who you vote for?” The ad had no detectable effects on responses to this question (private condition: $b = .02$, $p = .833$; public condition: $b = .11$, $p = .195$, interaction: $b = .09$, $p = .443$), suggesting this alternative explanation is unlikely.

Table J.1: Effect of Campaign Ad on Perceived Proportion of Women Voting Harris

| | Full Sample | Private sample | Private sample | | |
|--|-------------|----------------|----------------|--------------|--------------|
| | | | Democrats | Independents | Republicans |
| Panel A: Perceived proportion of women voting Harris (index) | | | | | |
| TREAT | 0.15 | 0.14 | 0.20 | 0.17 | 0.09 |
| s.e. | (0.06) | (0.08) | (0.26) | (0.12) | (0.12) |
| one-sided p-val | 0.004 | 0.043 | 0.221 | 0.079 | 0.222 |
| two-sided p-val | 0.008 | 0.085 | 0.442 | 0.159 | 0.444 |
| Control (mean) | -0.065 | -0.13 | -0.13 | -0.13 | -0.13 |
| Panel B: Perceived proportion of Democratic women voting Harris | | | | | |
| TREAT | 0.35 | 0.30 | 0.75 | 0.40 | 0.09 |
| s.e. | (0.11) | (0.17) | (0.55) | (0.24) | (0.26) |
| one-sided p-val | 0.001 | 0.035 | 0.087 | 0.046 | 0.358 |
| two-sided p-val | 0.002 | 0.071 | 0.174 | 0.093 | 0.716 |
| Control (mean) | 4.60 | 4.47 | 4.47 | 4.47 | 4.47 |
| Panel C: Perceived proportion of Independent women voting Harris | | | | | |
| TREAT | 0.14 | 0.22 | 0.38 | 0.29 | 0.18 |
| s.e. | (0.07) | (0.10) | (0.47) | (0.20) | (0.12) |
| one-sided p-val | 0.024 | 0.013 | 0.210 | 0.081 | 0.057 |
| two-sided p-val | 0.047 | 0.025 | 0.420 | 0.161 | 0.115 |
| Control (mean) | 3.34 | 3.21 | 3.21 | 3.21 | 3.21 |
| Panel D: Perceived proportion of Republican women voting Harris | | | | | |
| TREAT | 0.08 | 0.11 | -0.20 | 0.11 | 0.13 |
| s.e. | (0.07) | (0.10) | (0.49) | (0.19) | (0.12) |
| one-sided p-val | 0.128 | 0.125 | 0.340 | 0.284 | 0.133 |
| two-sided p-val | 0.257 | 0.249 | 0.679 | 0.569 | 0.266 |
| Control (mean) | 2.58 | 2.50 | 2.50 | 2.50 | 2.50 |
| N (estimation sample) | 2049 | 2049 | 2049 | 2049 | 2049 |
| N (restricted sample) | 2049 | 993 | 42 | 294 | 657 |
| Controls | Set 1 | Set 1 | Set 1 | Set 1 | Set 1 |
| Day FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |

Notes: * $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. Table shows the effect of the campaign ad on perceived proportion of women voting Harris in the full sample, the private sample, and the private sample disaggregated by respondent party. Perceived % of women voting Harris was measured on an 8-point scale where 1=none and 8=all. Bolded results correspond to results in Figure J.1.

Table J.2: Effect of Campaign Ad on Perceived Proportion of Men Voting Harris

| | Full Sample | Private sample | Democrats | Independents | Republicans |
|--|-------------|----------------|-----------|--------------|-------------|
| Panel A: Perceived proportion of men voting Harris (index) | | | | | |
| TREAT | 0.13 | 0.12 | 0.33 | 0.13 | 0.05 |
| s.e. | (0.06) | (0.08) | (0.34) | (0.12) | (0.12) |
| one-sided p-val | 0.013 | 0.083 | 0.162 | 0.146 | 0.331 |
| two-sided p-val | 0.025 | 0.166 | 0.325 | 0.292 | 0.662 |
| Control (mean) | -0.06 | -0.09 | -0.09 | -0.09 | -0.09 |
| Panel B: Perceived proportion of Democratic men voting Harris | | | | | |
| TREAT | 0.24 | 0.13 | 0.63 | 0.23 | -0.10 |
| s.e. | (0.11) | (0.16) | (0.58) | (0.23) | (0.25) |
| one-sided p-val | 0.015 | 0.216 | 0.138 | 0.166 | 0.341 |
| two-sided p-val | 0.029 | 0.431 | 0.276 | 0.332 | 0.681 |
| Control (mean) | 4.01 | 3.97 | 3.97 | 3.97 | 3.97 |
| Panel C: Perceived proportion of Independent men voting Harris | | | | | |
| TREAT | 0.12 | 0.18 | 0.86 | 0.21 | 0.12 |
| s.e. | (0.06) | (0.09) | (0.49) | (0.17) | (0.10) |
| one-sided p-val | 0.024 | 0.017 | 0.038 | 0.113 | 0.109 |
| two-sided p-val | 0.048 | 0.035 | 0.075 | 0.226 | 0.218 |
| Control (mean) | 2.78 | 2.67 | 2.67 | 2.67 | 2.67 |
| Panel D: Perceived proportion of Republican men voting Harris | | | | | |
| TREAT | 0.00 | 0.09 | 0.10 | 0.10 | 0.07 |
| s.e. | (0.07) | (0.10) | (0.47) | (0.17) | (0.12) |
| one-sided p-val | 0.496 | 0.185 | 0.419 | 0.279 | 0.279 |
| two-sided p-val | 0.992 | 0.370 | 0.839 | 0.558 | 0.559 |
| Control (mean) | 2.30 | 2.23 | 2.23 | 2.23 | 2.23 |
| N (estimation sample) | 2049 | 2049 | 2049 | 2049 | 2049 |
| N (restricted sample) | 2049 | 993 | 42 | 294 | 657 |
| Controls | Set 1 | Set 1 | Set 1 | Set 1 | Set 1 |
| Day FE | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |

Notes: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. Table shows the effect of the campaign ad on perceived proportion of men voting Harris in the full sample, the private sample, and the private sample disaggregated by respondent party. Perceived % of women voting Harris was measured on an 8-point scale where 1=none and 8=all.

K Multiple Hypothesis Correction

Tables K.1 and K.2 report sharpened false discovery rate (FDR) q-values from Anderson (2008) to correct for multiple hypothesis testing. In Table K.1 we present corrections for tests of $H5a - H5b$ and $H6 - H7$ on the effects of the campaign ad in the private condition. In Table K.2 We correct separately for the effects of the campaign ad in private and in the private vs public (female enumerator) conditions.

We do not apply multiple testing correction to hypotheses $H3 - H4$, $H8 - H9$, or $H10 - H11$, as these analyses yielded no statistically significant results and represent distinct conceptual families from our main pre-registered hypotheses. Following standard practice, we apply FDR corrections only within outcome sets used to test the same theoretical construct and from which we draw substantive conclusions.

Table K.1: Multiple Hypothesis Correction for Main Results–Private Sample Only

| | Correction–MAIN one-sided pvalues | | Alternate correction v1 two-sided pvalues | | Alternate correction v2 one-sided pvalues | | Alternate correction v3 two-sided pvalues | |
|------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------|--|------------------|--|------------------|--|------------------|
| | Uncorrected (1) | Corrected (2) | Uncorrected (3) | Corrected (4) | Uncorrected (5) | Corrected (6) | Uncorrected (7) | Corrected (8) |
| Harris support index (2 variables) | 0.128 | 0.095 | 0.256 | 0.205 | | | | |
| Trump support index (2 variables) | 0.022 | 0.059 | 0.044 | 0.124 | | | | |
| Harris support index (3 variables) | | | | | 0.391 | 0.165 | 0.781 | 0.375 |
| Trump support index (3 variables) | | | | | 0.094 | 0.134 | 0.188 | 0.294 |
| Vote other | 0.009 | 0.058 | 0.009 | 0.058 | 0.009 | 0.058 | 0.009 | 0.058 |
| Not vote | 0.227 | 0.129 | 0.227 | 0.205 | 0.227 | 0.165 | 0.227 | 0.294 |
| % women vote Harris | 0.043 | 0.071 | 0.085 | 0.153 | 0.043 | 0.121 | 0.085 | 0.270 |
| % men vote Harris | 0.083 | 0.091 | 0.166 | 0.200 | 0.083 | 0.134 | 0.166 | 0.294 |

Notes: Table reports sharpened false discovery rate (FDR) q-values to correct for multiple hypothesis testing, using code from Anderson (2008). We implement four correction strategies that vary by whether p-values are one- or two-sided and whether the Harris and Trump support indices include two or three component variables. Each correction adjusts for six tests within the private condition. Uncorrected p-values are drawn from the corresponding regression results reported in Tables A11, A14, and A15.

Table K.2: Multiple Hypothesis Correction for Private/Public results

| | one-sided for B1, two-sided for B4 | | two-sided for B1 and B4 | |
|--|------------------------------------|-----------|-------------------------|-----------|
| | Uncorrected | Corrected | Uncorrected | Corrected |
| Harris support (2 variables) (private condition, B1) | 0.128 | 0.109 | 0.256 | 0.206 |
| Trump support (2 variables) (private condition, B1) | 0.022 | 0.097 | 0.044 | 0.109 |
| Harris support (2 variables) (diff, pub-priv, B4) | 0.347 | 0.206 | 0.347 | 0.210 |
| Trump support (2 variables) (diff, pub-priv, B4) | 0.049 | 0.097 | 0.049 | 0.109 |

Notes: Table reports uncorrected and FDR-corrected p-values for the effects of the campaign ad on support for Harris and Trump. Coefficients correspond to those estimated in Equation 3: β_1 captures effects in the private condition (H6-H7), while β_4 captures the difference between the private and public (female enumerator) condition (exploratory hypotheses). The first correction uses pre-registered one-sided p-values for β_1 and two-sided p-values for exploratory β_4 effects. The second approach applies a more conservative two-sided correction across all four outcomes.

L Deviations from the PAP

The manuscript closely follows the pre-analysis plans. We test all pre-registered and exploratory hypotheses, using our pre-registered estimation strategy, as summarized in Appendix G. We note the following minor deviations from the PAP:

- We expanded our sampling frame halfway through our four day implementation to include Independent and weak/leaning Democratic women in order to better align with the ad's

target audience and reduce the proportion of strong Republican women in the sample, who we expected would not be responsive to treatment. This change was registered in an updated OSF plan on November 3, 2024.

- We added an exploratory analysis comparing private and public expression to the female enumerator. While we pre-registered the female and male enumerator analysis as shown in Equation 3 in Appendix G, we originally pre-specified focusing on the effects of the ad on reporting to the female vs. male enumerator ($H10 - H11$), not on the effects of the female enumerator vs the private condition. This change was theoretically motivated. For completeness, we report the pre-registered tests of $H10 - H11$ in Table I.1. While one-sided p-values are used for pre-registered outcomes, we use two-sided p-values for all exploratory tests and apply multiple testing corrections across mixed p-values where appropriate.
- Due to extremely low uptake, we exclude the donation variable from our preferred candidate support indices, though we report results with and without this measure.
- The original pre-analysis plan included hypotheses for the effects of the enumerator treatment on pre-ad preferences ($H1 - H2$). We do not report those tests in this paper because our focus here is on the effects of the campaign ad. Those hypotheses will be tested in a separate paper.

M Pre-Analysis Plan (Anonymized)

A link to an anonymized version of the PAP has been uploaded to Google Docs here:

<https://drive.google.com/file/d/1DzEYCm2Lpw1Uc2psYDkQcZrqTiBEvoEF/view?usp=sharing>