

Private Preferences, Public Expression, and Campaign Persuasion: Experimental Evidence from the 2024 U.S. Presidential Election

Laura Paler* Sarah Khan†

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Abstract

Electoral persuasion may shape not only what voters privately believe but also what they are willing to express publicly, yet campaign research rarely studies these outcomes jointly. We argue that understanding campaign persuasion requires examining effects on private preferences, public expression, and the relationship between them—namely, whether persuasion brings them into closer alignment or causes one to outpace the other. We combine a campaign ad experiment with a virtual enumerator experiment in a pre-election survey of 2,056 primarily Independent and Republican women to examine how a real campaign ad affected private preferences and public expression of candidate support. We find that public opposition to Trump exceeded private opposition at baseline, a pattern driven by Independent women. The ad reduced private support for Trump without shifting public expression, bringing private preferences into closer alignment with views already being expressed publicly. These findings show that private preferences and public expression are distinct outcomes of persuasion that can change independently, making it essential to study both to understand whether and how campaign persuasion contributes to political change.

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**Corresponding Author.* Provost Associate Professor, Department of Government, School of Public Affairs, American University, Washington, D.C. email: lpaler@american.edu, tel: 917-364-6383.

†Assistant Professor, Department of Politics, Governance and Economics, School of International Service, American University, Washington, D.C. email: skhan@american.edu.

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1 Introduction

During elections, it is often difficult to determine whether citizens’ public expressions accurately reflect their private political preferences for candidates, parties, or policies. Public expressions of support may accurately reveal what citizens privately believe, but a large literature suggests that public expressions can diverge from privately held preferences (Kuran, 1995; Tourangeau and Yan, 2007; Blair, Coppock and Moor, 2020). In some settings, individuals anticipate social costs from publicly expressing their true preferences and therefore understate their private support (Noelle-Neumann, 1974; Valentim, 2024; Bursztyn, Egorov and Fiorin, 2020; Van Duyn, 2018). In others, individuals publicly express support because doing so provides social benefits, overstating preferences they do not fully hold privately (Blinder, Ford and Iversflaten, 2013).

This potential gap between private preferences and public expression raises a central question about campaign persuasion: Does persuasion change what people privately believe, what they are willing to express publicly, or both? Research on campaign persuasion typically focuses on changes in voters’ preferences, attitudes, candidate evaluations, or vote intentions (Hewitt et al., 2024; Coppock, Hill and Vavreck, 2020; Druckman, 2022; Kalla and Broockman, 2018; Broockman and Kalla, 2023)—outcomes often interpreted as reflecting underlying private political views. Yet campaign ads may also influence what individuals are willing to express publicly. By depicting co-partisans, community members, or other ingroup figures supporting a candidate, they may convey information about which political views are socially acceptable, common, or expected.¹ If such messages alter perceptions of prevailing norms, they may shift the social costs and benefits associated with public expression independently of any change in what individuals privately believe (Tankard and Paluck, 2016). Conceptually, campaign persuasion can produce four distinct patterns: it can change private preferences without changing

¹During the 2024 election, for instance, the Trump campaign aired an ad featuring several Black women proclaiming “I’m not #WithHer” to express opposition to Harris and challenge a perceived norm of support for Democratic candidates among Black women voters.

public expression, change public expression without changing private preferences, change both, or change neither. Jointly measuring private preferences and public expression makes it possible to determine which pattern has occurred.

However, understanding campaign persuasion also requires considering a second question: How does persuasion reshape the relationship between private preferences and public expression? This question arises because the two may not fully align prior to persuasion. When a gap already exists between what people privately believe and what they publicly express, the consequences of a campaign ad depend not only on which domain it changes, but also on how those changes affect the existing relationship between them. When an ad changes only private preferences or only public expression, it can reshape that relationship by reducing, reinforcing, or creating preference falsification ([Kuran, 1995](#)). Understanding persuasion therefore requires considering not only which domain changes, but also how changes in that domain reshape the relationship between private preferences and public expression.

We examine these questions in the context of campaign persuasion targeting Republican and Independent women during the 2024 U.S. presidential election, a setting in which commentators and campaign strategists openly speculated about divergences between women’s private political preferences and public expression ([Washington Post, 2024](#); [CNN, 2024](#)). Some observers argued that there existed a group of “shy” women voters—women privately opposed to Trump but reluctant to express those views publicly within their households, social networks, or partisan communities ([NPR, 2024](#)). Conversely, the heightened salience of gender-related issues in the 2024 election may have increased the social rewards of publicly expressing opposition to Trump even among women whose private preferences were less opposed to Trump ([The New York Times, 2024](#)). These competing possibilities make the 2024 election a useful setting for studying how campaign persuasion affects private preferences, public expression, and the relationship between them.

Answering these questions requires a research design that separately measures private preferences and public expression. Our pre-registered study combines a campaign ad experiment

with a cross-randomized virtual enumerator experiment. To examine campaign persuasion, we use a real-world ad that aired during the final days of the 2024 U.S. presidential election and targeted Republican and Independent women, encouraging defection from Donald Trump and support for Kamala Harris. The ad had the potential to influence both private preferences and public expression. Beyond making direct persuasive appeals that could shift privately held views, it depicted women signaling support for Harris and opposition to Trump to one another, potentially conveying the prevalence and social acceptability of these views and thereby altering the perceived costs and benefits of expressing them publicly. We embedded the ad experiment in an online survey of 2,056 primarily Republican and Independent women conducted just prior to the election.

To distinguish between private preferences and public expression, we paired the ad experiment with a virtual enumerator experiment in which respondents in the private condition reported their views anonymously, while those in the public condition reported to a virtual co-partisan female or male enumerator. By experimentally varying whether responses were reported anonymously or to an apparent audience, this design leverages the logic of social desirability bias and enumerator effects (Huddy et al., 1997; Blair, Coppock and Moor, 2020; Bursztyn et al., 2025) to distinguish empirically between private preferences and public expression. Comparing responses across conditions allows us to establish the baseline relationship between private preferences and public expression, determine how the campaign ad affected each domain, and ultimately whether it widened, narrowed, or left unchanged their relationship.

We find substantial divergence between private preferences and public expression at baseline. Contrary to speculation about “shy” women voters who privately opposed Trump but were reluctant to express those views publicly, we find no such divergence among Republican women, mirroring the lack of evidence for shy Trump voters in the 2016 election (Coppock, 2017). Among Independent women, however, we observe the opposite pattern: support for Trump was significantly lower when expressed to a virtual female co-partisan enumerator than

in the private condition, suggesting that publicly expressed opposition to Trump exceeded underlying private preferences prior to the ad. We further find that the ad reduced Independent women’s private support for Trump while leaving publicly expressed support unchanged. As a result, persuasion shifted private preferences toward positions that were already being expressed publicly, narrowing a preexisting divergence between private preferences and public expression.

These results illustrate why distinguishing between private preferences and public expression changes how campaign persuasion is understood. Prior to treatment, public expression among Independent women suggested greater opposition to Trump than underlying private preferences would imply. As a result, publicly expressed opposition to Trump may have overstated the extent of underlying opposition prior to the campaign ad. By increasing private opposition to Trump, the ad brought underlying attitudes—and potentially subsequent political behavior—closer to an already-existing pattern of publicly expressed opposition. Neither this baseline divergence nor the consequences of the treatment effect would have been visible without jointly measuring both domains.

Taken together, these findings demonstrate the importance of jointly studying private preferences and public expression both to deepen understanding of how persuasion contributes to political change and to improve inference about campaign persuasion. Our findings suggest that campaign persuasion can affect private preferences and public expression in different ways. These outcomes occupy distinct roles in theories of political change. Private preferences may shape vote choice and other political behaviors insofar as they are perceived as private (Druckman, 2022; Gerber et al., 2013). Public expression, in contrast, plays a central role in theories of social signaling, social cascades, norm change, and political mobilization (Granovetter, 1973; Lohmann, 1994; Bursztyn, Egorov and Fiorin, 2020; de Mesquita, Shadmehr et al., 2023; Larson and Lewis, 2025), and can amplify the effects of campaign persuasion by fostering political discussion, interpersonal persuasion, social media sharing, and other forms of public political action that generate political momentum (Druckman, Levendusky and McLain, 2018; Bond et al., 2012). Campaign ads may affect both domains, but changes in one should not

be assumed to imply corresponding changes in the other. Jointly studying both provides a more complete understanding of how campaign persuasion operates and how it contributes to political change.

Moreover, our findings show that the consequences of campaign persuasion for political change depend on the baseline relationship between private preferences and public expression. In our case, an ad that shifted private preferences but not public expression narrowed a preexisting divergence between the two. Had private preferences and public expression instead been aligned at baseline, the same treatment effect could have opened a gap between them, leaving changes in private preferences publicly unexpressed and thereby limiting their capacity to generate the social signaling, norm change, and political momentum associated with public expression (Kuran, 1995; Bicchieri, 2005; Bursztyn, González and Yanagizawa-Drott, 2020). The same treatment effect would therefore have implied very different possibilities—and limits—for how campaign persuasion contributes to political change.

Finally, we show how these substantive distinctions can be identified empirically by leveraging social desirability pressure as a source of insight rather than treating it solely as a source of measurement error. Prior work has used public-private variation to identify social desirability bias and socially sensitive attitudes and behaviors (Pew Research Center, 2017; Lindsey, 2023; Paler, Marshall and Atallah, 2018; White, Laird and Allen, 2014; Bursztyn, Egorov and Fiorin, 2020). More recently, scholars have emphasized how social desirability bias can distort estimates of treatment effects (Bursztyn et al., 2025) and self-reported measures of candidate support (Krupnikov, Piston and Bauer, 2016). By experimentally varying the perceived visibility of respondents’ views, we demonstrate how social desirability pressure can distinguish between private preferences and public expression, making it possible to identify how campaign persuasion affects each domain and the relationship between them. In doing so, we build on Krysan and Couper (2003, 375) in treating social desirability pressure as a “social microscope” that reveals the social norms and expectations underlying divergence between private preferences and public expression.

2 Campaign Effects on Private Preferences and Public Expression

We examine campaign effects on both private preferences and public expression using a real-world campaign ad targeting Republican and Independent women that aired during the final days of the 2024 U.S. presidential election. Produced by Vote Common Good and narrated by Julia Roberts, the ad depicted two women at a polling place on Election Day deciding not to vote for Trump and instead vote for Harris, openly signaling this choice to one another while concealing it from their husbands (Vote Common Good, 2025a,b).² It aired amid widespread speculation that some Republican and Independent women disillusioned with Trump might quietly defect to Harris (ABC News, 2024). The ad is analytically useful because it plausibly contains features capable of influencing both private preferences and public expression: direct persuasive appeals targeted to women voters alongside social cues about women’s political choices.

Effects on Private Preferences

The ad included several common persuasive appeals that had the potential to shift women’s private preferences. It emphasized a salient issue for the group (reproductive rights) and the personal stakes of the election—a common tactic in campaign advertising (Hewitt et al., 2024). It also repeatedly emphasized the secrecy of the ballot, reminding women that their vote choice remained private even from their husbands. In doing so, the ad may have reduced psychological barriers to privately defecting from Trump among women conflicted about their vote choice (Afifi et al., 2020).

Whether such appeals can shift privately held preferences, however, remains an open empirical question. Campaigns increasingly target women by emphasizing shared identity, salient issues, or cues about what similar voters are likely to do (Erfort, 2023; Hersh and Schaffner,

²The ad can be viewed here: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FaCPck2qDhk>.

2013). Although such appeals can activate gender identity and increase support among women voters (Holman, Schneider and Pondel, 2015), partisan identity often outweighs gender identity in shaping political behavior (Huddy, Cassese and Lizotte, 2008), and targeted appeals can backfire by activating countervailing partisan identities (Klar, 2018). Moreover, women in the United States rarely cross party lines on the basis of shared gender identity alone (Junn and Masuoka, 2024).

These competing forces were especially salient during the 2024 presidential election. The heightened salience of abortion and reproductive rights led many analysts to speculate about a historic gender gap, with women defecting from Trump in unusually large numbers (The New York Times, 2024).³ Yet these same dynamics may also have strengthened partisan attachments and heightened resistance to cross-party persuasion. We therefore test whether a women-targeted ad delivered in the final days of a highly salient election could overcome these barriers and shift private preferences among Republican and Independent women.

Effects on Public Expression

The ad also had the potential to affect public expression independently of private preferences. Although it reassured women that dissenting vote choices could remain hidden from their husbands, it simultaneously depicted Republican and Independent women openly signaling switched support to one another. In doing so, the ad suggested that opposition to Trump among co-partisan women was neither isolated nor socially unacceptable. Consistent with evidence that information about one’s in-group can shift perceived norms and behavior (Bursztyn, González and Yanagizawa-Drott, 2020), such messaging may have changed perceptions of what was socially acceptable or desirable among co-partisan women, reducing the perceived costs—or

³This salience was mirrored in candidate identities, positions, and rhetoric: Harris was the first Black and South Asian woman nominated for president by a major party, while Trump had faced multiple allegations of sexual misconduct involving women and frequently employed explicitly masculine rhetoric in campaign outreach (Deckman and Cassese, 2021).

increasing the perceived benefits—of publicly expressing opposition to Trump or support for Harris.

Whether campaign ads can shift perceived social norms and thereby alter public expression, however, remains an open empirical question. A large literature shows that social norms, social costs, and social benefits shape public expression, political participation, and voting behavior (Bicchieri, 2005; Bursztyn, Egorov and Fiorin, 2020; Gerber and Rogers, 2009; DellaVigna et al., 2016). Yet comparatively little attention has been devoted to the possibility that campaign ads may affect public expression independently of changes in private preferences.

Understanding whether campaign ads can reshape perceived social norms is especially important in contexts where social pressures are thought to influence political expression. In the 2024 U.S. presidential election, media narratives frequently invoked the idea of “shy” women voters—women who privately opposed Trump or supported Harris but hesitated to express those preferences publicly due to anticipated costs within households, friendships, or partisan communities (NPR, 2024). Consistent with this speculation, we anticipated that public expression of opposition to Trump would lag behind private preferences at baseline. If such pressures were widespread, the ad’s social signal may have reduced those costs and facilitated greater public expression of anti-Trump sentiment. At the same time, the post-*Dobbs* environment may have already made anti-Trump sentiment highly visible and socially rewarded in many women’s social networks, such that public expression of opposition to Trump matched—or even exceeded—private preferences at baseline.

These competing expectations illustrate the two questions motivating our analysis. The ad may affect private preferences, public expression, both, or neither, and the implications of any treatment effect depend on the baseline relationship between the two. Our experimental design allows us to distinguish among these possibilities.

Empirical Strategy

This study combines a campaign ad experiment with a cross-cutting virtual enumerator experiment. Figure 1 summarizes the study design and participant flow; additional design details are provided in Appendix A. The study was approved by the authors’ institutional review board (Appendix I) and pre-registered.⁴

The sample

To test the effects of the ad on private preferences and public expression, we conducted an online survey during the final days of the 2024 U.S. presidential election, from October 31 to November 3, 2024. Participants were eligible if they were voting-age U.S. citizens, identified as women, and had not yet voted. Recruitment initially focused on Republican women and was later expanded to include Independent women and weak or leaning Democratic women, reflecting the broader pool of voters not already very likely to support Harris.⁵ Overall, 2,056 respondents participated in the study: 37 percent identified as strong Republicans, 31 percent as weak or leaning Republicans, 27 percent as Independents, and 5 percent as weak or leaning Democrats.


The experiments

The study combines two overlapping experiments embedded within an online survey using a 2×2 factorial design that cross-randomized exposure to the campaign ad with a novel virtual enumerator experiment varying the perceived social visibility of respondents’ answers. Together, these experiments allow us to establish the baseline relationship between private preferences and public expression, estimate campaign effects on each domain, and assess how persuasion

⁴The anonymized pre-registration is available [here](#); Appendix J documents correspondence between the manuscript and the pre-registration plan.

⁵The pre-analysis plan was updated accordingly (Appendix J).

Figure 1: Overview of the Empirical Strategy



reshapes the relationship between them. A total of 2,056 respondents were randomized with equal probability across conditions, producing balanced treatment groups (Appendix C). Pre-ad analyses use the full sample of 2,056 respondents. Consistent with our pre-analysis plan, post-ad analyses exclude seven respondents who failed an immediate pre-ad attention check, yielding an analytic sample of 2,049 respondents. We find no evidence that attention-check failure differed across enumerator conditions (Appendix Table C.1).

The virtual enumerator experiment

The virtual enumerator experiment was designed to distinguish between private preferences and public expression by experimentally varying the perceived visibility of survey responses. Prior to the pre-treatment survey and exposure to the campaign ad, respondents were randomly assigned to either a *private* or *public* condition. Respondents in the *private* condition completed the survey anonymously online, whereas respondents in the *public* condition reported their views to a virtual co-partisan enumerator. To vary enumerator gender while minimizing the influence of idiosyncratic enumerator characteristics, respondents in the public condition were further assigned to one of six virtual enumerators (three female, three male; Appendix A). Our primary comparison is between the private condition and the female enumerator condition, which we view as the most substantively relevant operationalization of public expression given that the campaign ad depicts women signaling support to one another. The male enumerator condition allows us to assess whether observed patterns depend on enumerator gender.

The enumerator prime consisted of an image of the virtual enumerator accompanied by a brief self-introduction displayed in chat-bubble format at the beginning of the survey (Appendix A). Although enumerator gender varied across conditions, each enumerator introduced themselves as a co-partisan. This increased the likelihood that respondents perceived the audience as a socially relevant ingroup while standardizing audience identity across respondents. To maintain salience, the enumerator image remained visible throughout the survey.

We interpret the private condition as providing a setting in which respondents can express their political views under conditions of privacy and anonymity. This interpretation is grounded in a large literature showing that greater survey privacy—including anonymous online surveys—reduces social desirability pressures and generally yields responses that more closely approximate respondents’ underlying attitudes and behaviors (Tourangeau and Yan, 2007; Holbrook and Krosnick, 2010; Krumpal, 2013; Bursztyn et al., 2025). We do not assume that responses in the private condition perfectly reveal respondents’ underlying private attitudes, as all survey responses are shaped to some extent by their social context (Lindsey, 2023;

Krupnikov, Piston and Bauer, 2016). Rather, we interpret the private condition as reducing the salience of audience-induced social pressures and therefore providing our closest observable approximation of respondents’ privately held political preferences.

In contrast, we interpret the public condition as capturing expression under greater perceived social visibility and exposure to social incentives. A large literature on social desirability bias shows that survey responses are shaped by perceived audiences and respondents’ expectations about how their views will be observed and evaluated by others (Blair, Coppock and Moor, 2020; Bursztyn et al., 2025), including in electoral contexts (Stout, Baker and Baker, 2021). Our design experimentally varies one particularly salient social referent—the audience to whom responses are perceived to be reported—by using a virtual enumerator. In doing so, it builds on evidence that virtual enumerators generate social desirability effects similar to those produced by real enumerators (Krysan and Couper, 2003).

By varying the enumerator’s gender while holding partisan identity constant, we also draw on research showing that interviewer characteristics can shape survey responses (Catania et al., 1996; Huddy et al., 1997; Adida et al., 2016). Treatment checks indicate that respondents registered the virtual enumerator manipulation, although they more accurately identified the enumerator’s gender than partisan affiliation (Appendix D). We therefore interpret the public condition primarily as capturing expression to a female (or male) audience, while recognizing that the co-partisan cue may also have shaped respondents’ perceptions of that audience. Because all enumerators were co-partisan, comparisons between the female and male enumerator conditions isolate the role of audience gender while holding partisan affiliation constant.

The virtual enumerator represents a socially meaningful yet unfamiliar audience. We do not claim that expression to a virtual enumerator is equivalent to expression within respondents’ everyday social networks. Rather, our goal is to experimentally vary a theoretically central feature of public expression: reporting one’s political views to a socially relevant audience capable of social evaluation. Our interest is therefore not in respondents’ reactions to this particular enumerator, but in what expression under these conditions reveals about prevailing

social norms among other women, particularly co-partisan women. If the ad altered perceptions of which political views were socially acceptable or widely shared, respondents should become more willing to express those views even to an unfamiliar woman. Expression in respondents’ real-world social networks may differ in magnitude because those settings involve stronger relationships and greater reputational stakes, but the design isolates the audience-induced social pressures that theories of public expression emphasize. We return to these questions of external validity in the conclusion.

The virtual enumerator experiment serves two purposes. Comparisons across conditions on pre-treatment measures establish the baseline relationship between private preferences and public expression. Comparisons of campaign ad effects across conditions then allow us to distinguish campaign effects on private preferences from those on public expression and assess how persuasion reshapes the relationship between them.

The campaign ad experiment

In the campaign ad experiment, respondents assigned to treatment watched the 30-second ad and answered several reaction questions before completing the post-ad treatment survey. Respondents assigned to the pure control condition proceeded directly to the post-treatment survey without viewing the ad or answering the reaction questions.⁶ Eighty-eight percent of women in the treatment group reported not having previously seen the ad, and 72 percent correctly answered a post-treatment attention check (Appendix D).

Using an actual campaign ad trades experimental control over specific features—such as message content, narrator, visuals, and tone—for ecological validity, an approach common in studies of real political advertising (Clinton and Lapinski, 2004; Kalla and Broockman,

⁶The ad had already been publicly released and widely discussed in the media at the time of the study (Newsweek, 2024; Washington Post, 2024). Given the study’s relatively small scale and nationwide recruitment strategy, participation was unlikely to have influenced electoral outcomes (Slough, 2024).

2018; Coppock, Hill and Vavreck, 2020; Hewitt et al., 2024). Our goal is not to isolate which component drives persuasion, but rather to investigate how campaign persuasion affects private preferences and public expression.

Outcome measures and estimation

We examine the effect of the ad on private and publicly expressed support for Trump and Harris. Our main pre-registered outcomes are candidate support indices combining candidate favorability and intended vote choice. We also report the individual components and a behavioral measure of willingness to make a private donation, which is discussed primarily in Appendix G. Details on outcome measurement and index construction are provided in Appendix E.

Treatment effects are estimated using the pre-registered specifications described in Appendix F. Our main specification estimates the effect of the ad in the private condition and its interactions with the female and male enumerator conditions. In the main text, we focus on comparisons between the private and female enumerator conditions because expression to a woman provides the most theoretically relevant operationalization of the ad’s depiction of women signaling opposition to Trump to one another.⁷ We also present results separately for Independent and Republican respondents, consistent with our pre-registered exploratory analyses and the substantial heterogeneity observed across partisan groups.⁸ Detailed results, including all pre-registered analyses and multiple-hypothesis corrections, are reported in Appendices G

⁷Our pre-registered specification includes the interaction between the ad treatment and the female enumerator condition, but we did not pre-register hypotheses about this parameter. We pre-registered hypotheses comparing the female and male enumerator conditions. We therefore treat the private-versus-female-enumerator comparison as exploratory while noting that it follows directly from the pre-registered design (Appendix J).

⁸Subgroup analyses, particularly among Independents ($n = 555$), have reduced statistical power. We report exact p-values and treat results significant at the 90–95 percent confidence level as suggestive.

and [H](#).

3 Main Results

Appendix [B](#) reports descriptive statistics using respondents in the private condition. The results suggest meaningful scope for persuasion even in the final days of the campaign, particularly among Independent women: only 24 percent of Independents reported being very likely to vote for Trump (versus 93 percent of strong Republicans), and Independents expressed greater uncertainty about their vote choice. They also appeared embedded in more politically mixed social environments, potentially creating greater uncertainty about prevailing norms—and greater scope for the ad to shift perceptions of the costs and benefits of public expression. These differences suggest that campaign persuasion may operate differently across partisan groups. We therefore present both pooled results and results separately for Independent and Republican respondents.


Baseline relationship between private and public preferences

We next examine the relationship between private preferences and public expression prior to exposure to the ad. This baseline relationship is important because the implications of any treatment effect depend on whether private preferences and public expression were already aligned before treatment. We compare responses across conditions on self-reported intent to vote for Trump, the importance of reproductive rights as an election issue, certainty about vote choice, and likelihood of voting.

Figure [2](#) reports differences in pre-treatment political preferences between respondents assigned to a female virtual enumerator and those assigned to the private condition for the full sample and separately for Republican and Independent women. Appendix Table [G.1](#) presents the corresponding regression results, together with estimates for assignment to a male enumerator.

We find little evidence of baseline divergence in the full sample. This aggregate pattern,

Figure 2: Baseline Divergence in Private vs. Public (Female Enumerator) Conditions



Note: Figure presents estimated differences between the female virtual enumerator and private conditions among the full sample of women as well as disaggregated by Independent and Republican respondents. Estimates are obtained from regressions controlling for respondent characteristics, region, and survey day fixed effects. Outcome variables are standardized using the mean and standard deviation of the pure control group (private condition, no ad). Points represent coefficient estimates and horizontal bars denote 95 percent (thin) and 90 percent (thick) confidence intervals. Positive values indicate higher levels of the outcome relative to the private condition. See Appendix Table G.1 for corresponding results in tabular form.

however, masks important heterogeneity across partisan groups. Among Republican women, we find little evidence of divergence in expressed support for Trump.

Among Independent women, by contrast, we find little evidence for the pattern anticipated by the “shy” women voters narrative. Rather than concealing opposition to Trump, Independent women expressed greater opposition—and greater concern about reproductive rights—when communicating with another woman. Assignment to a female virtual enumerator reduced expressed likelihood of voting for Trump by 0.38 points on a 1–5 scale ($p = .028$) and increased the probability of naming reproductive rights as a top-three issue by 10 percentage points ($p = .057$; Appendix Table G.1 reports outcomes in their original scales).

Importantly, we observe no comparable shifts in vote certainty or likelihood of voting, suggesting that the manipulation did not simply induce greater expression of general political engagement. Nor do we observe comparable shifts in expressed Trump support or the salience of

reproductive rights when respondents were assigned to a male co-partisan enumerator, increasing confidence that the observed divergence reflects female audience-specific social incentives rather than a generalized enumerator effect (Appendix Table G.1).


Ad effects on private vs. public preferences

We next examine the effects of the ad on private preferences and public expression. The ad reduced private support for Trump while leaving public expression unchanged. These differences were concentrated among Independent women. Figure 3 reports standardized treatment effects for the full sample and separately for Independent and Republican respondents. Corresponding regression estimates are reported in Appendix Table G.5 and Appendix Tables G.7–G.8.

In the private condition, the campaign ad reduced Trump support in the full sample, producing a 0.10 standard deviation decline in the Trump support index ($p = .044$; Figure 3, left column Panel A), driven primarily by declines in favorability toward Trump. The ad also reduced intended vote for Trump by four percentage points, though this estimate does not reach conventional significance ($p = .102$; Appendix Table G.5). These private effects disappear in the public condition (Figure 3, left column, Panel B): the ad had no detectable effect on public expression overall. Consequently, treatment effects differed significantly across the private and public conditions, with a 0.17 standard deviation difference in the Trump support index ($p = .049$; Figure 3, Panel C; Appendix Table G.5).

This pattern was concentrated among Independent women. The ad reduced their private Trump support index by 0.22 standard deviations ($p = .049$; Appendix Table G.7) and reduced private donations to Trump by three percentage points ($p = .033$), a behavioral counterpart to the private attitudinal change. We find no significant effects among Republicans in either domain. This concentration is consistent with the descriptive evidence that Independents had greater scope for persuasion (Appendix B), their distinctive baseline relationship between private preferences and public expression, and prior evidence that Independents are more persuadable than self-identified partisans, a point we return to in the conclusion.

Figure 3: Effects of Campaign Ad in Private vs. Public (Female Enumerator) Conditions



Note: Figure shows the effects of the campaign ad on support for Harris and Trump in the private and public (female virtual enumerator) conditions for the full sample and separately for Independents and Republicans (results for the small sample of Democrats are not shown). Confidence intervals reflect two-sided tests at the 90 and 95 percent confidence levels. Outcome indices and components are standardized using the mean and standard deviation of the pure control group (private condition, no ad).

How the ad altered the public–private preference relationship

As discussed in the introduction, the implications of an ad’s effects depend not only on whether it changes private preferences, public expression, or both, but also on the baseline relationship between these outcomes. We initially expected to find less support for Trump in public than in private, consistent with speculation about “shy” women voters. Instead, the baseline results suggest that Independent women expressed greater opposition to Trump in public than they privately held. Because the ad shifted private preferences without altering public expression, it narrowed rather than widened this divergence, bringing private preferences and public

expression into closer alignment.


Figure 4 illustrates this pattern by plotting mean levels of the post-ad Trump support index across the four main treatment conditions for Independent and Republican women. Among Independent women in the private condition, mean Trump support fell from -0.69 in the control group to -0.89 following exposure to the ad, corresponding to the statistically significant private treatment effect reported above. By contrast, women in the public condition already expressed substantially lower support for Trump in the absence of the ad (-0.98), a level nearly identical to that observed following exposure to the ad in both the private (-0.89) and public (-0.87) treatment conditions. Consequently, exposure to the ad produced little additional change in public expression, not because the ad failed to shift attitudes or because public expression had reached a ceiling, but because respondents in the public condition already expressed approximately the level of opposition to Trump observed after exposure to the ad. The ad’s principal effect was therefore to shift private preferences toward a pattern of opposition that was already being expressed publicly, bringing private preferences and public expression into closer alignment.

The social norms results, reported in Appendix G.5, help illuminate why the ad affected Independent women but not Republican women and why its effects were concentrated in the private rather than public domain. Because the ad’s social signal was expected to operate by altering perceptions of prevailing norms, one possible explanation for the null effects on public expression is that it failed to shift those perceptions.⁹ To assess this possibility, we examine respondents’ beliefs about descriptive norms—specifically, whether they believed that at least half of Democratic, Republican, and Independent men and women would vote for Harris.

The norms results closely parallel those for candidate support. Among Republican women, we find no evidence that the ad shifted perceptions of how other Republican women would vote (Appendix Table G.9), consistent with the broader null effects on both private preferences and public expression. Among Independent women, however, the ad suggestively increased the

⁹We examine and rule out other alternative explanations in Appendix G.6.

Figure 4: Mean Levels of Trump Support by Ad and Public Female Enumerator Treatment Conditions



Note: Bars report raw mean values of the Trump support index by treatment condition separately for Independent and Republican women. The private condition measures preferences reported directly in the survey, while the public condition measures preferences reported to a female virtual co-partisan enumerator. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Reported p-values are from regression models corresponding to Appendix Table G.7.

share of respondents in the private condition who believed that at least half of Independent women would vote for Harris by approximately 10 percentage points ($p = .054$). At the same time, assignment to the female enumerator independently increased this belief by nearly 19 percentage points ($p = .005$). This pattern indicates that Independent women were not only

more likely to express opposition to Trump when reporting to another woman; they were also more likely to report that such opposition was common among other Independent women. Thus, as with candidate support, publicly expressed beliefs about the prevailing norm were already elevated prior to treatment, leaving comparatively little room for the ad to produce additional changes in public expression (see also Appendix Figure G.3).

Taken together, these findings suggest that the ad did shift perceived social norms among Independent women. The specificity of this pattern is particularly noteworthy. As shown in Appendix Table G.9, we find no comparable effects on perceptions of how Republican women or Independent men would vote; the effects are concentrated on Independent women’s beliefs about other Independent women. Yet these norm effects appear only in the private condition. Because publicly expressed beliefs about anti-Trump norms—like publicly expressed opposition to Trump—were already elevated in the female-enumerator condition, the ad had little marginal effect on public expression. The close correspondence between the norms and candidate support results reinforces our central interpretation: in both cases, the ad primarily shifted private beliefs toward patterns that were already being expressed publicly.

4 Conclusion

This paper shows that campaign advertisements can affect private preferences and public expression in different ways. In principle, persuasion may change private preferences without changing public expression, change public expression without changing private preferences, affect both simultaneously, or affect neither. Our main findings are most consistent with the first pattern. Among Independent women, the advertisement reduced private support for Trump and shifted private perceptions of social norms, yet produced little detectable change in public expression. Importantly, these effects occurred in a context where public opposition to Trump among Independent women already exceeded private opposition—a pattern that runs counter to the “shy” women voter narrative, which anticipated greater private than public opposition to Trump. Consequently, the advertisement’s primary effect was not to create new public opposi-

tion to Trump, but to reduce a preexisting gap between privately held preferences and publicly expressed views.

By jointly examining private preferences and public expression, this study advances our understanding of whether and how campaign persuasion works. The persuasion literature has long focused on whether campaign messages change attitudes, candidate evaluations, vote intentions, and behavior, as well as on how attitudinal change translates into behavior ([Druckman, 2022](#)). Our findings suggest that understanding persuasion requires not only examining the relationship between attitudes and behaviors but also the relationship between privately held and publicly expressed attitudes. As a result, studies that observe only one domain may mischaracterize both the magnitude and nature of persuasion effects. In our case, each single-domain view would have misled in a different direction: observing only public expression would have suggested the ad had little effect, while observing only private preferences would have obscured how persuasion reshaped the relationship between the two. Distinguishing between private preferences and public expression therefore changes not only whether persuasion effects are detected, but also how they are interpreted and what they imply for political change.

Our findings suggest that the relationship between private preferences, public expression, and persuasion is likely to vary systematically across subgroups and contexts. The contrast between Independent and Republican women is instructive. Independent women entered the study with weaker partisan attachments, greater uncertainty about their vote choice, and more politically heterogeneous social environments—all conditions that expand the scope for persuasion. Consistent with evidence that Independents are more persuadable than self-identified partisans ([Klar and Krupnikov, 2016](#)), and that Independent women may be especially receptive to gender-based appeals ([Kam, Archer and Geer, 2017](#)), the ad’s effects were concentrated among Independent women and absent among Republicans. Independent women also exhibited meaningful divergence between private preferences and public expression at baseline, whereas Republican women did not. The broader lesson for generalizability is that different groups may enter campaigns with different relationships between private preferences and public expression,

creating distinct opportunities and constraints for persuasion. As a result, the same campaign message may generate different patterns of persuasion across groups and carry different implications for political change. In our study, persuasion narrowed a preexisting gap between private preferences and public expression. In other contexts, however, the same treatment effect could create or widen such a gap, with very different implications for political behavior, social norms, and the visibility of political change.

Just as the relationship between private preferences and public expression is likely to vary across groups, it is also likely to vary across the social contexts in which public expression occurs. Here, public expression was captured by what respondents were willing to report to an unfamiliar virtual enumerator. Our findings show that meaningful divergence between private preferences and public expression can emerge even in this relatively low-stakes social setting. Real-world social environments involve richer relationships, repeated interactions, and greater reputational stakes (McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook, 2001). These environments may generate not only stronger social incentives—and thus larger effects on public expression—but also incentives that operate in different directions. In our study, public expression among Independent women appeared to reward opposition to Trump rather than discourage it. In other social environments, publicly expressing the same views may instead carry social costs. More broadly, these findings suggest that one important feature of social context is the baseline relationship between private preferences and public expression. Because the consequences of persuasion depend on that baseline relationship, understanding campaign persuasion requires studying not only persuasive messages but also the relationship between private preferences and public expression before persuasion occurs.

Our findings provide a snapshot of how campaign persuasion can reshape the relationship between private preferences and public expression. Future research should examine the longer-run consequences of these shifts. We show that campaign persuasion can affect private preferences, public expression, or both, and that the implications of these effects depend on the preexisting relationship between them. Whether such changes ultimately alter voting behavior, reshape

social norms, or influence broader trajectories of public opinion remains an open question. Answering these questions would help clarify not only how campaign persuasion changes private preferences and public expression, but also when those changes contribute to broader processes of political and social change.

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Appendix

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A Empirical Strategy

Screening, Recruitment, Consent. All participants were recruited through CloudResearch Connect, which maintains a large pool of actively vetted adult participants who complete tasks for modest monetary compensation. Respondents were recruited over four days from October 31-November 3. Overall, $n = 2,056$ respondents met the eligibility criteria (women aged 18 or older, U.S. citizens, had not already voted, and not strong Democrats) and consented to participate.

The Virtual Enumerator Experiment. All respondents who met the eligibility criteria and consented to participate were randomly assigned with equal probability to either the public or private condition. Respondents assigned to the public condition were further randomized with equal probability to one of six virtual enumerators (three female, three male). Panel A of Figure A.1 displays the six enumerator images. Panel B illustrates how the virtual enumerator treatment was introduced. All enumerators introduced themselves as co-partisans. Holding partisan affiliation constant facilitates comparisons between the female and male enumerator conditions by isolating the effect of audience gender from the effect of reporting views to a co-partisan. In the public condition, the enumerator image remained visible above subsequent survey questions, as shown in Panel C. Respondents assigned to the private condition completed the same survey without an enumerator image. All virtual enumerators were White, reflecting the anticipated racial composition of the sample; Appendix G.6 shows that treatment effects did not differ systematically by respondent race.

Pre-treatment survey. Following the introduction of the virtual enumerator, all participants completed a brief pre-treatment survey (see Appendix B). A link to the complete survey instrument is available [here](#). An attention check was administered at the end of the pre-treatment survey, prior to exposure to the campaign ad.

The Campaign Ad Experiment. All participants were randomly assigned with equal probability to the campaign ad treatment or control condition. Table A.1 summarizes the 2×2 factorial design, illustrating the overlap between the campaign ad and virtual enumerator experiments, as well as the disaggregation of the public condition into assignment to a virtual female or male enumerator, together with the realized number of observations in each cell. Consistent with our pre-analysis plan, seven participants who failed the attention check were excluded from analyses of post-ad outcomes, yielding an analytic sample of 2,049 respondents.

Table A.1: Experiment Design

		Campaign Experiment		
		Control	Treatment	Total
Virtual Enumerator Experiment	Private	518	475	993
	Public	558	498	1056
	<i>Female enumerator:</i>	<i>(263)</i>	<i>(247)</i>	<i>(510)</i>
	<i>Male enumerator:</i>	<i>(295)</i>	<i>(251)</i>	<i>(546)</i>
	Total	1076	973	2049

Notes: Table shows the 2×2 factorial design for the campaign and virtual enumerator experiments. Realized sample sizes in cells.


Post Treatment Survey and Behavioral Outcome. Post-treatment included a survey and behavioral outcome as described in Appendix E. For those assigned to the public condition in the enumerator experiment, enumerator image continued throughout the post-treatment survey.

Figure A.1: Virtual Enumerator Experimental Interface


Panel A: Virtual Female and Male Enumerator Images



Panel B: Example of Virtual Enumerator Introduction



Panel C: Example of Virtually Enumerated Survey Question



Note: Screenshots illustrate components of the virtual enumerator interface used in the experiment.

B Summary and Descriptive Statistics

Summary statistics. Table B.1 presents summary statistics for all pre-treatment variables. The pre-treatment survey included two types of measures. The first, shown in Panels I–III, consists of demographic and background variables used as controls and to assess balance (see Appendix C). The second, shown in Panel IV, consists of attitudinal measures that could themselves be sensitive to the enumerator manipulation. We use the items in Panel IV to evaluate effects of reporting to the virtual enumerator prior to the ad treatment exposure (see Section 3 and Appendix G.1).

Table B.1: Summary Statistics for Pre-Treatment Measures

	Min	Max	Mean	Std.Dev
I. Demographics				
Age (Yrs)	18	97	47.46	15.02
Marital Status (Married/Partnered/In Relationship)	0	1	0.54	0.50
College Educated	0	1	0.19	0.39
Race: White Non-Hispanic	0	1	0.82	0.38
Religion: Christian	0	1	0.60	0.49
Employed (Fulltime/Parttime/Self)	0	1	0.50	0.50
Income Quantile	1	5	2.92	1.44
II. Region				
Northeast	0	1	0.15	0.36
Midwest	0	1	0.27	0.44
South	0	1	0.45	0.50
West	0	1	0.13	0.33
III. Partisanship				
Party ID (1-7)	2	7	5.48	1.37
Weak Democrat	0	1	0.01	0.10
Lean Democrat	0	1	0.04	0.19
Independent	0	1	0.27	0.44
Lean Republican	0	1	0.21	0.40
Weak Republican	0	1	0.11	0.31
Strong Republican	0	1	0.37	0.48
Reproductive rights in top 3 issues	0	1	0.27	0.44
IV. Attitudes				
Likelihood of voting in 2024	1	5	1.92	1.37
Certainty about vote choice	1	4	1.57	0.97
Likelihood of voting for Trump	1	5	2.02	1.54
Think friends and family will mostly vote Trump	0	1	0.60	0.49
Think significant other likely to vote Trump	0	1	0.40	0.49
Comfort with others' disapproval	1	4	2.24	0.98
N=2056				

Descriptive statistics. Figure B.1 presents descriptive statistics for pre-treatment measures. All estimates are calculated using respondents in the private condition only to minimize pressures associated


with public expression. The top-left panel shows the composition of the sample: 37 percent identify as strong Republicans, 31 percent as weak or leaning Republicans, 27 percent as Independents, and 5 percent as weak or leaning Democrats. Because of the small number of Democrats, we do not focus on this group in the analyses below.

The remaining panels reveal a clear pattern across partisan groups. Strong Republicans exhibit the highest levels of vote certainty, likelihood of voting, support for Trump, and exposure to pro-Trump social environments. These levels decline among weak or leaning Republicans and decline further among Independents. In contrast to Republicans, Independents display substantial political uncertainty: only 38 percent report being very certain about their vote choice, and only 24 percent report being very likely to vote for Trump.

Figures [B.2](#) further highlight differences in respondents' social environments. Republicans are embedded in relatively homogeneous networks, with 85 percent reporting that most friends and family support Trump and 94 percent reporting that their significant other is likely to vote for Trump. Independents, by contrast, appear embedded in considerably more heterogeneous environments. Only 34 percent report that most friends and family support Trump, and only 41 percent report that their significant other is likely to vote for Trump. Moreover, Independents vary substantially in both their own support for Trump and the political composition of their social networks, with some reporting heavily pro-Trump environments, others reporting pro-Harris environments, and many reporting mixed networks.


Taken together, these patterns suggest greater scope for persuasion among Independents than among Republicans. They also suggest greater uncertainty among Independents about prevailing social norms and the social consequences of political expression. Whereas Republicans are likely to encounter relatively consistent pro-Trump signals in their immediate social environments, Independents are exposed to more heterogeneous political information, potentially creating greater scope for campaign messages to shape both political preferences and perceptions of prevailing norms. Consistent with our pre-analysis plan, we therefore present both overall results and results disaggregated by party identification.

Figure B.1: Descriptive Statistics (Private Condition)



Note: Figure presents descriptive statistics for pre-treatment measures. All estimates are calculated using respondents in the private condition only ($n = 993$), which minimizes public expression pressures. “Significant Other Voting Trump” is further restricted to respondents who report being married, in a relationship, or in a domestic partnership ($n = 553$).

Figure B.2: Descriptive Statistics by Party Identification (Private Condition)



Note: Figures present descriptive statistics for pre-treatment measures. All estimates are calculated using respondents in the private condition only, which minimizes public expression pressures. “Significant Other Voting Trump” is further restricted to respondents who report being married, in a relationship, or in a domestic partnership.

C Balance Checks

Balance checks come from screening and pre-treatment survey demographic questions that should have been unaffected by the enumerator (Table B.1, Panels I-III). These are also the core variables used as controls in the entire study.

Table C.1: Balance on Enumerator Treatment

Variable	(1) Private Mean/SE	(2) Female Enumerator Mean/SE	(3) Male Enumerator Mean/SE	t-test p-value (1)-(2)	t-test p-value (1)-(3)
Age in Years	47.238 [0.468]	47.713 [0.647]	47.628 [0.676]	0.553	0.629
Married, Partnered or in Relationship	0.557 [0.016]	0.557 [0.022]	0.484 [0.021]	0.983	0.006***
College Educated	0.180 [0.012]	0.178 [0.017]	0.221 [0.018]	0.924	0.051*
Race: White, non-Hispanic	0.827 [0.012]	0.812 [0.017]	0.823 [0.016]	0.477	0.831
Religion: Christian	0.596 [0.016]	0.586 [0.022]	0.608 [0.021]	0.696	0.665
Employed	0.499 [0.016]	0.502 [0.022]	0.496 [0.021]	0.913	0.921
Income Quintile	2.890 [0.046]	2.936 [0.064]	2.953 [0.062]	0.558	0.413
Party ID					
Democrat	0.042 [0.006]	0.045 [0.009]	0.055 [0.010]	0.803	0.262
Independent	0.296 [0.014]	0.252 [0.019]	0.241 [0.018]	0.070*	0.020**
Republican	0.662 [0.015]	0.703 [0.020]	0.704 [0.020]	0.103	0.086*
Region					
Northeast	0.147 [0.011]	0.145 [0.016]	0.161 [0.016]	0.915	0.463
Midwest	0.276 [0.014]	0.262 [0.019]	0.263 [0.019]	0.552	0.573
South	0.441 [0.016]	0.480 [0.022]	0.449 [0.021]	0.143	0.758
West	0.137 [0.011]	0.113 [0.014]	0.128 [0.014]	0.202	0.626
Passed Attn Check	0.997 [0.002]	0.996 [0.003]	0.996 [0.003]	0.775	0.833
N	996	512	548		
F-test of joint significance (F-stat)				0.727	1.837**
F-test, number of observations				1508	1544

Notes: The value displayed for t-tests are p-values; The value displayed for F-tests are the F-statistics;
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical level.

Table C.2: Balance on Campaign Ad Video Treatment

Variable	(1) Control Mean/SE	(2) Ad Treatment Mean/SE	t-test p-value (1)-(2)
Age in Years	47.983 [0.461]	46.881 [0.476]	0.097*
Married, Partnered or in Relationship	0.526 [0.015]	0.550 [0.016]	0.270
College Educated	0.194 [0.012]	0.186 [0.012]	0.685
Race: White, non-Hispanic	0.826 [0.012]	0.819 [0.012]	0.666
Religion: Christian	0.615 [0.015]	0.577 [0.016]	0.080*
Employed	0.489 [0.015]	0.510 [0.016]	0.334
Income Quintile	2.886 [0.044]	2.953 [0.046]	0.296
Party ID			
Democrat	0.044 [0.006]	0.049 [0.007]	0.542
Independent	0.266 [0.013]	0.276 [0.014]	0.615
Republican	0.691 [0.014]	0.675 [0.015]	0.450
Region			
Region: Northeast	0.148 [0.011]	0.152 [0.011]	0.825
Region: Midwest	0.278 [0.014]	0.259 [0.014]	0.344
Region: South	0.447 [0.015]	0.459 [0.016]	0.592
Region: West	0.127 [0.010]	0.130 [0.011]	0.825
N	1080	976	
F-test of joint significance (F-stat)			0.692
F-test, number of observations			2056

Notes: The value displayed for t-tests are p-values; The value displayed for F-tests are the F-statistics; ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical level.

D Treatment Checks

Virtual enumerator experiment. Table D.1 presents treatment checks for the virtual enumerator experiment. For those assigned to the private condition about 71 percent correctly indicated that they did not have an enumerator or they did not know the sex of their virtual enumerator. Respondents assigned to a public condition correctly reported their enumerator sex at high rates: about 93 (87) percent of those assigned to a female (male) enumerator correctly recalled their enumerator’s sex. By contrast, 51 (54) percent of respondents assigned to the female (male) enumerator condition correctly recalled the virtual enumerator’s partisanship. This implies that gender may have been a more salient cue than co-partisanship, implying that responses to the virtual enumerator may have been shaped more strongly by gender-based than partisan considerations.

Table D.1: Treatment Checks: Virtual Enumerator Experiment

	Private (No Enumerator)	Female Enumerator	Male Enumerator
ENUMERATOR TREATMENT			
Sex of virtual interviewer			
I didn’t have a virtual interviewer	604 (60.8%)	21 (4.1%)	23 (4.2%)
Male	48 (4.8%)	6 (1.2%)	475 (87.0%)
Female	232 (23.4%)	472 (92.5%)	38 (7.0%)
Don’t know	109 (11.0%)	11 (2.2%)	10 (1.8%)
Partisanship of virtual enumerator			
Correct	665 (67.0%)	262 (51.4%)	294 (53.8%)
VIDEO TREATMENT			
Number of women in video			
Measure 1: Correct	817 (82.3%)	354 (69.4%)	455 (83.3%)
Measure 2: Correct	817 (82.3%)	426 (83.5%)	455 (83.3%)
SURVEY			
Duration (mins)	11.06 (10.09)	11.84 (11.55)	11.20 (9.24)
Overall experience with survey			
Very positive	346 (35.7%)	237 (47.9%)	250 (47.1%)
Somewhat positive	243 (25.1%)	145 (29.3%)	141 (26.6%)
Neither positive nor negative	302 (31.2%)	105 (21.2%)	122 (23.0%)
Somewhat negative	48 (5.0%)	5 (1.0%)	12 (2.3%)
Very negative	29 (3.0%)	3 (0.6%)	6 (1.1%)
N	993 (48.5%)	510 (24.9%)	546 (26.6%)

Notes: Table presents treatment checks by assignment to the private and public conditions in the virtual enumerator experiment. Cell values in **bold** indicate correct response for the assigned treatment status.

Campaign ad experiment. Table D.2 presents treatment checks for the campaign ad experiment. In response to a treatment check question asking how many women were featured in the video, 72 percent in the control correctly stated two and 86 percent in treatment correctly stated they did not see a video. The checks also indicate that 88 percent of respondents had not seen the campaign ad previously and almost all watched the ad alone.

Table D.2: Treatment Checks: Campaign Ad Experiment

	Control (No Video)	Treatment (Video Ad)
Number of women featured in the video that you watched		
I didn't see a video	926 (86.1%)	21 (2.2%)
One	89 (8.3%)	98 (10.1%)
Two	21 (2.0%)	700 (71.9%)
Three	21 (2.0%)	99 (10.2%)
Four	5 (0.5%)	27 (2.8%)
Five	3 (0.3%)	16 (1.6%)
Other (Write In)	11 (1.0%)	12 (1.2%)
Have you seen this video before?		
Yes	.	95 (9.8%)
Maybe	.	21 (2.2%)
No	.	857 (88.1%)
Viewing experience		
Watched alone	.	836 (85.9%)
With others around, but they did not see or hear it	.	96 (9.9%)
With people around, and they saw or heard it	.	41 (4.2%)
Overall experience with survey		
Very positive	487 (46.6%)	346 (36.5%)
Somewhat positive	284 (27.2%)	245 (25.8%)
Neither positive nor negative	258 (24.7%)	271 (28.6%)
Somewhat negative	14 (1.3%)	51 (5.4%)
Very negative	2 (0.2%)	36 (3.8%)
N	1,076 (52.5%)	973 (47.5%)

Notes: Table presents treatment checks by assignment to the campaign ad treatment and and control groups. Cell values in **bold** indicate correct response for the assigned treatment status

E Outcome Measures

Table E.1 reports summary statistics for all outcome measures by experimental condition.

Main attitudinal outcomes. Our main outcomes are attitudinal measures of candidate support. The primary pre-registered outcomes for the private-public contrasts are candidate-specific indices of support for Harris and Trump. In the results we also present individual index components—candidate favorability and intended vote choice—for insights into what is driving the index changes. Candidate favorability is measured on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = very unfavorable to 5 = very favorable. Intended vote choice is measured using the question: “If the election were held today, what would you be most likely to do?” Response options included vote Harris, vote Trump, vote Stein, vote Oliver, vote other, and not vote. From these responses, we constructed binary indicators for likely vote Trump and likely vote Harris. For exploratory purposes and to help interpret underlying patterns of defection from Trump support, we also constructed indicators for likely vote third party, likely vote third party or Harris, and likely not vote.

Behavioral outcome. We obtained a behavioral measure of candidate support by giving respondents an opportunity to donate to one of the presidential campaigns at the end of the survey. This behavioral measure was introduced on the final screen of the survey, where respondents saw the following text: *“Thank you for participating in this study. Election Day is Tuesday, November 5. This could be one of your last chances to donate to the candidate of your choice. Remember, you can donate as little as \$1 and every bit will help your candidate. Also remember any donation you make can be kept private.”* Respondents were then given the option to donate to one of the four presidential candidates by clicking through to the candidate’s campaign donation page or to exit the survey. We record clicks on the donation links as the behavioral outcome measure. Importantly, the prompt explicitly emphasized that donation decisions would remain private. As pre-registered, we treat this measure primarily as a behavioral indicator of private candidate support. Accordingly, we include donations in the overall index of candidate support when estimating average treatment effects of the campaign ad (Table G.3), but analyze donation behavior separately only within the private condition.

Perceived social norms. To assess whether the ad shifts perceived social norms—a key theorized mechanism—we measured respondents’ beliefs about candidate support across partisan and gender groups. Specifically, we elicited perceived support for Harris among Democratic, Independent, and Republican men and women using six items of the form: “To the best of your knowledge, of all [GROUP; e.g., Republican women], how many do you think will vote for Harris?” Responses were recorded on an eight-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (“none”) to 8 (“all”), with 4 corresponding to “about half.” For ease of interpretation, we also construct a binary measure coded 1 if respondents believed that a majority of the group would vote for Harris (responses 5–8) and 0 otherwise (responses 1–4).

Coding. As pre-registered, prior to analysis, all outcome and mechanism variables were recoded so that higher values correspond to more favorable outcomes (e.g., greater favorability). Variables were analyzed using their original scales. For items pre-registered as measuring the same construct, we constructed indices using inverse covariance weighting following Anderson (2008), implemented using code produced by Cyrus Samii.¹

¹ <https://cyrussamii.com/?p=2656>.

Table E.1: Summary Statistics for Outcome Measures, by Experimental Condition

	Ad Control			Ad Treatment		
	Private	Female Enum	Male Enum	Private	Female Enum	Male Enum
Measure	mean (sd)					
Support Indices (Standardized)						
Support for Harris (Index v1)	-0.03 (1.03)	0.04 (1.13)	0.02 (1.10)	-0.01 (0.85)	-0.08 (0.78)	0.09 (1.14)
Support for Harris (Index v2)	-0.06 (0.93)	0.02 (1.05)	-0.02 (0.99)	0.04 (1.00)	-0.05 (0.99)	0.11 (1.10)
Support for Trump (Index v1)	0.05 (0.98)	-0.04 (1.01)	0.02 (1.04)	-0.04 (1.04)	0.03 (0.94)	-0.03 (0.97)
Support for Trump (Index v2)	0.07 (0.96)	-0.05 (1.02)	0.01 (1.01)	-0.07 (1.03)	0.07 (0.96)	-0.02 (1.02)
Candidate Favorability (5pt Scale; 1: Very Unfavorable - 5: Very Favorable)						
Favorability: Trump	3.94 (1.43)	3.73 (1.58)	3.83 (1.50)	3.72 (1.55)	3.94 (1.44)	3.79 (1.54)
Favorability: Harris	1.95 (1.33)	1.99 (1.40)	1.94 (1.34)	2.06 (1.39)	1.91 (1.36)	2.12 (1.48)
Favorability: Stein	2.64 (0.85)	2.71 (0.81)	2.64 (0.85)	2.60 (0.86)	2.63 (0.83)	2.75 (0.76)
Favorability: Oliver	2.64 (0.85)	2.74 (0.73)	2.69 (0.83)	2.61 (0.84)	2.69 (0.78)	2.72 (0.76)
Stated Vote Preference (Binary, =1 if Prefer to vote for [Candidate])						
Vote Preference: Harris	0.13 (0.34)	0.19 (0.39)	0.17 (0.37)	0.17 (0.38)	0.15 (0.36)	0.21 (0.41)
Vote Preference: Trump	0.72 (0.45)	0.68 (0.47)	0.70 (0.46)	0.67 (0.47)	0.72 (0.45)	0.69 (0.46)
Vote Preference: Other	0.02 (0.14)	0.02 (0.15)	0.05 (0.21)	0.05 (0.21)	0.03 (0.18)	0.04 (0.21)
Vote Preference: Would Not Vote	0.13 (0.33)	0.11 (0.31)	0.08 (0.28)	0.12 (0.32)	0.09 (0.29)	0.06 (0.23)
Clicked to Donate (Binary, =1 if Clicked to donate to [Candidate])						
Donation: Trump	0.03 (0.18)	0.03 (0.17)	0.04 (0.19)	0.03 (0.18)	0.03 (0.17)	0.03 (0.16)
Donation: Harris	0.01 (0.12)	0.02 (0.12)	0.02 (0.13)	0.01 (0.08)	0.00 (0.06)	0.02 (0.13)
Donation: Other	0.00 (0.04)	0.00 (0.06)	0.00 (0.06)	0.00 (0.06)	0.00 (0.06)	0.01 (0.11)
Perception of Others' Vote for Harris (8 pt Scale; 1: None - 8: All)						
Perceived Harris Vote: Republican Women	2.50 (1.62)	2.59 (1.50)	2.70 (1.72)	2.61 (1.56)	2.67 (1.57)	2.69 (1.59)
Perceived Harris Vote: Republican Men	2.23 (1.50)	2.33 (1.55)	2.37 (1.61)	2.32 (1.56)	2.30 (1.50)	2.22 (1.41)
Perceived Harris Vote: Independent Women	3.21 (1.56)	3.41 (1.61)	3.50 (1.67)	3.44 (1.69)	3.36 (1.53)	3.67 (1.61)
Perceived Harris Vote: Independent Men	2.67 (1.36)	2.92 (1.44)	2.85 (1.44)	2.86 (1.42)	2.87 (1.31)	3.00 (1.38)
N	518	263	295	475	247	251
Perceived Harris Vote: Democratic Women	4.47 (2.07)	4.67 (2.10)	4.77 (1.85)	4.78 (2.02)	4.91 (1.91)	5.23 (1.75)
Perceived Harris Vote: Democratic Men	3.97 (1.97)	4.05 (2.07)	4.05 (1.72)	4.15 (2.00)	4.31 (1.84)	4.44 (1.85)
N	299	157	149	282	143	141
Other Beliefs about Voting (4pt Scale: 1:Very Unlikely - 4: Very Likely)						
Believe Vote Choice Known to Close Ppl	3.12 (1.03)	3.08 (0.99)	3.18 (0.98)	3.07 (1.08)	2.99 (1.10)	3.09 (1.02)
N	268	142	155	285	142	108
Conflict Over Vote Choice (5pt Scale: 1:Strongly Disagree - 5: Strongly Agree)						
Feel Conflicted About Vote Choice	2.23 (1.48)	2.22 (1.43)	2.14 (1.46)	2.35 (1.51)	2.11 (1.37)	2.10 (1.45)
N	518	263	295	475	247	251

Notes: Differences in sample size reflect variation in the analytic samples across measures. The survey question "To the best of your knowledge, of all Republican/Independent/Democratic (wo)men, how many do you think will vote for Harris?" was only asked about Democrat men and women after the expansion of the sample to include Democrat and weakly leaning Democrat survey respondents in the second wave of implementation. The survey question "How likely or unlikely is it that people close to you will learn who you vote for?" was only asked of married or partnered respondents.

F Pre-Registered Hypotheses and Estimation

Table F.1 summarizes all pre-registered hypotheses.

Table F.1: Pre-registered hypotheses

Virtual enumerator treatment hypotheses (baseline)	
H1	At baseline, certainty about vote choice and support for Trump will be higher in the public relative to private conditions.
H2	(Exploratory) At baseline, certainty about vote choice and support for Trump will be lower in the female versus male enumerator conditions.
Campaign ad average treatment effect hypotheses	
H3	The ad will increase Harris support.
H4	The ad will reduce Trump support.
H5a	The ad will increase the perceived proportion of women supporting Harris.
H5b	The ad will have no effect on the perceived proportion of men supporting Harris.
Main public-private hypotheses	
H6	The ad will increase Harris support in the private condition.
H7	The ad will reduce Trump support in the private condition.
H8	The effect of the ad on increasing Harris support will be larger in the private than public condition.
H8_E	The effect of the ad on increasing Harris support will be larger in private than in the public female enumerator condition.
H9	The effect of the ad on reducing Trump support will be larger in the private than public condition.
H9_E	The effect of the ad on reducing Trump support will be larger in private than in the public female enumerator condition.
Additional public-private hypotheses	
H10	The effect of the ad on increasing Harris support will be larger in the female than male enumerator conditions.
H11	The effect of the ad on reducing Trump support will be larger in the female than male enumerator conditions.

The table reports all pre-registered hypotheses. $H8 - E$ and $H9 - E$ denote exploratory versions of $H8$ and $H9$ that focus specifically on the preferred comparisons between the private condition and the female-enumerator condition.

We test the hypotheses using the regression specifications below. Because the hypotheses make directional predictions, we pre-specified one-sided tests for all non-exploratory hypotheses. In the text, however, we report conventional two-sided p-values, which are more conservative.

Virtual Enumerator Tests using Pre-Treatment Data

We test $H1 - H2$ by estimating regressions of the form:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \delta Pub_i + X_i' \psi + \mu_j + \epsilon_i \quad (1)$$

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 Pub_Fem_i + \beta_2 Pub_Male_i + X_i' \psi + \mu_j + \epsilon_i \quad (2)$$

where Y_i is the outcome of interest for individual i . $Pub_i \in \{0, 1\}$ is a treatment assignment indicator equal to one if the respondent was assigned to the public condition in the virtual enumerator experiment and zero otherwise. Similarly, in Equation 2, $Pub_Fem_i \in \{0, 1\}$ indicates assignment to a female virtual enumerator and $Pub_Male_i \in \{0, 1\}$ indicates assignment to a male virtual enumerator. The regressions also include a vector of pre-specified controls ($X_i' \psi$) and implementation-day fixed effects to account for potential news developments;² ϵ_i is the individual error term. For H1, “certain about vote choice” is coded such that higher values indicate greater certainty, implying an expected effect of $\delta < 0$. Likewise, for “likely to vote Trump” the outcome is coded such that higher values indicate greater likelihood, again implying $\delta < 0$. H2 is pre-registered as exploratory but we anticipated $\beta_1 < \beta < 2$.

² Respondents were recruited over four days from October 31–November 3, 2024.

Average Treatment Effect Tests

We test *H3 – H5b* by estimating a regression of the following form in the full sample:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \delta Ad_i + X_i' \psi + \mu_j + \epsilon_i \quad (3)$$

where Y_i is the outcome of interest for individual i and $Ad_i \in 0, 1$ is a treatment assignment indicator equal to one if the respondent was assigned to view the campaign ad and zero if assigned to the control condition. The main coefficient of interest is δ : $\delta > 0$ indicates increased support for Harris, while $\delta < 0$ indicates reduced support for Trump. The regressions also include a vector of pre-specified controls, $X_i' \psi$, shown in Panels I–III of Table B.1. These controls include age, partisan identification, marital status, education, race, religion, employment status, income, and region. Although these variables were measured after the enumerator experiment (with the exception of party identification, which was measured beforehand), they are demographic characteristics that should not be affected by treatment assignment and are therefore included in all specifications. All regressions include implementation-day fixed effects (μ_j) and the individual error term (ϵ_i) as discussed above.

Public-Private Hypotheses Tests

We test *H6 – H9* using a regression of the form:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 Ad_i + \beta_2 Pub_i + \beta_3 (Ad_i \times Pub_i) + X_i' \psi + \mu_j + \epsilon_i \quad (4)$$

where all treatment terms are defined as above. We interpret the following coefficient signs as support for our hypotheses:

In this specification, β_1 captures the effect of the ad in the private condition, while β_3 captures the difference in the ad’s effect between the public and private conditions. We additionally calculate and report the marginal effect of the ad in the public condition, given by $(\beta_1 + \beta_3)$. Thus to evaluate hypotheses we have:

- H6: $\beta_1 > 0$ (increased Harris support in private)
- H7: $\beta_1 < 0$ (reduced Trump support in private)
- H8: $\beta_3 < 0$ (bigger increase in Harris support in private vs. public)
- H9: $\beta_3 > 0$ (bigger decrease in Trump support in private vs. public)

Additionally, we test $H8_E$, $H9_E$, and $H10$ – $H11$ using the following pre-registered regression. We note that in testing $H8_E$ and $H9_E$ we focus on interpreting specific coefficients within this pre-registered regression for substantive reasons discussed in the main text.

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 Ad_i + \beta_2 (Ad_i \times Pub_Fem_i) + \beta_3 Pub_Fem_i + \beta_4 (Ad_i \times Pub_Male_i) + \beta_5 Pub_Male_i + X_i' \psi + \mu_j + \epsilon_i \quad (5)$$

We interpret the following results as support for our hypotheses:

- H6: $\beta_1 > 0$ (increased Harris support in private)

- H7: $\beta_1 < 0$ (reduced Trump support in private)
- H8_E: $\beta_2 < 0$ (bigger increase in Harris support in private vs. public (female enumerator))
- H9_E: $\beta_2 > 0$ (bigger decrease in Trump support in private vs. public (female enumerator))

We note that support for H6–H9 can be assessed directly from the regression coefficients. In the main results, we also report the calculated marginal effect of the ad in the public female enumerator condition ($\beta_1 + \beta_2$) and the public male enumerator condition ($\beta_1 + \beta_2$). We also note that β_3 and β_5 capture the effects of the female and male enumerators, respectively, in the control (no-ad) condition. We use these coefficients to examine the sensitivity of reported attitudes to the virtual enumerator manipulation (see Section 3 and Appendix G.1).

Finally, we use Equation 5 to evaluate H10 and H11 through tests of the difference between these two marginal effects. We report these comparisons for completeness and consistency with our pre-analysis plan. However, our primary theoretical focus is on differences between the private and female enumerator conditions. The male enumerator conditions were included primarily as a benchmark, and we therefore place less emphasis on direct comparisons between the female and male enumerator treatment effects.

- H10: $\beta_2 > \beta_4$ (the ad has a larger effect on increasing Harris support in the female than in the male enumerator condition).
- H11: $\beta_2 < \beta_4$ (the ad has a larger effect on reducing Trump support in the female than in the male enumerator condition).

G Detailed Results

G.1 Baseline Divergence

Table G.1 corresponds to Figure 2 in the main text and presents the effect of enumerator assignment on political preferences in the pre ad experiment data (H1–H2). These estimates capture the effects of assignment to the public female or male enumerator conditions on pre-treatment measures and therefore isolate public expression or socially desirable responding dynamics associated with reporting attitudes to a virtual co-partisan enumerator independent of exposure to the ad.

Among Independent women, reporting to the female virtual enumerator produced a substantially larger reduction in expressed Trump support than the male virtual enumerator (column 1), suggesting that Independent women were particularly reluctant to express support for Trump to another woman. We observe suggestive evidence of a similar dynamic in the “Rights” outcome, where the female enumerator made Independent women approximately 10 percentage points more likely to report reproductive rights as one of their top three issues ($p = .057$) (column 2). In contrast, Independent women reported a greater likelihood of voting to the male enumerator and greater certainty about their vote choice to both the female and male enumerators, suggesting broader pressure to present themselves as politically engaged regardless of enumerator gender. Interestingly, there is also suggestive evidence that Republican women reported lower support for reproductive rights to the virtual female enumerator, consistent with the possibility that the female enumerator induced socially desirable responding in the expected ideological direction (column 6).

Overall, the results suggest that expressive sensitivity to the female enumerator was more pronounced among Independents than Republicans and was substantially attenuated in the pooled full sample. These pre-treatment results help contextualize the post-treatment findings. Because the female-enumerator control condition already exhibited lower expressed Trump support absent the ad, the incremental treatment contrast within the female-enumerator condition was attenuated relative to the private condition, even though the public ad-treatment distribution remained broadly similar to the private ad-treatment distribution.

Table G.1: Female and Male Enumerator Effects (Pre-Treatment)

	Independents				Republicans				Full Sample			
	Vote Trump	Rights	Likely vote	Certain vote	Vote Trump	Rights	Likely vote	Certain vote	Vote Trump	Rights	Likely vote	Certain vote
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Panel A: Enumerator Gender Effects (Pre-Treatment)												
(1) Female enumerator (vs. private)	-0.38**	0.10*	0.02	0.22*	0.03	-0.04*	0.00	-0.01	0.01	-0.02	0.05	0.10**
<i>s.e.</i>	(0.17)	(0.05)	(0.16)	(0.12)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.05)
<i>pval</i>	[0.028]	[0.057]	[0.892]	[0.072]	[0.591]	[0.083]	[0.957]	[0.845]	[0.864]	[0.479]	[0.507]	[0.047]
(2) Male enumerator (vs. private)	0.04	0.00	0.48***	0.35***	0.00	-0.02	-0.13*	-0.07	0.04	-0.02	0.05	0.07
<i>s.e.</i>	(0.17)	(0.05)	(0.15)	(0.12)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.05)
<i>pval</i>	[0.836]	[0.972]	[0.002]	[0.004]	[0.949]	[0.352]	[0.090]	[0.134]	[0.623]	[0.510]	[0.438]	[0.181]
Panel B: Overall Enumerator Effect (Pre-Treatment)												
(3) Any Enumerator	-0.18	0.05	0.25**	0.28***	0.02	-0.03	-0.06	-0.04	0.03	-0.02	0.05	0.08**
<i>s.e.</i>	(0.14)	(0.04)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.04)
<i>pval</i>	[0.210]	[0.243]	[0.050]	[0.004]	[0.723]	[0.113]	[0.293]	[0.290]	[0.686]	[0.407]	[0.384]	[0.048]
Control mean	2.83	0.38	3.26	2.67	4.62	0.22	4.38	3.69	3.96	0.28	4.04	3.38
N	556	556	556	556	1405	1405	1405	1405	2056	2056	2056	2056

Notes: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 based on two-sided p-values. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and two-sided p-values in brackets. Full sample includes small group of democrats. "Rights" is coded 1 if reproductive rights were a top three issue and 0 otherwise. Bolded results correspond to results presented in Figure 2 in the main text.

Table G.2: Female and Male Enumerator Effects (Pre-Treatment), All Controls

	Independents		Republicans		Full Sample	
	Vote Trump	Rights	Vote Trump	Rights	Vote Trump	Rights
Female Enumerator	-0.38** (0.17)	0.10* (0.05)	0.03 (0.06)	-0.04* (0.03)	0.01 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.02)
Male Enumerator	0.04 (0.17)	0.00 (0.05)	0.00 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.04 (0.08)	-0.02 (0.02)
Age in years	0.01 (0.05)	-0.06*** (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.05*** (0.01)	0.04 (0.03)	-0.06*** (0.01)
Married/partnered	0.31** (0.15)	-0.06 (0.04)	0.10* (0.05)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.23*** (0.07)	-0.03* (0.02)
College educated	-0.17 (0.21)	-0.08 (0.06)	-0.14* (0.07)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.23** (0.09)	-0.02 (0.02)
White, non-hispanic	0.39*** (0.15)	-0.01 (0.05)	0.12 (0.08)	0.00 (0.03)	0.70*** (0.09)	-0.03 (0.03)
Christian	0.06 (0.14)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.02)	0.26*** (0.07)	-0.06*** (0.02)
Employed	0.21 (0.15)	-0.04 (0.05)	0.01 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.14* (0.07)	-0.02 (0.02)
Income	-0.04 (0.06)	0.02 (0.02)	0.04** (0.02)	-0.02** (0.01)	0.05* (0.03)	-0.01 (0.01)
Northeast	-0.30 (0.24)	-0.11 (0.07)	-0.07 (0.11)	0.07 (0.04)	-0.13 (0.13)	0.02 (0.04)
Midwest	-0.03 (0.22)	-0.07 (0.07)	0.10 (0.09)	0.07* (0.04)	0.08 (0.11)	0.02 (0.03)
South	0.17 (0.21)	-0.12* (0.06)	0.09 (0.08)	0.01 (0.03)	0.28*** (0.11)	-0.04 (0.03)
Constant	2.36	0.66	4.36	0.47	2.7	0.59
N	556	556	1405	1405	2056	2056
Day FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 based on two-sided p-values. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Full sample includes small group of democrats. "Rights" is coded 1 if reproductive rights were a top three issue and 0 otherwise. Bolded results correspond to results presented in Figure 2 in the main text.

G.2 Ad Average Treatment Effects

Table G.3 reports the average treatment effects of the campaign ad (H3–H4). Although these results are not central to our analysis of private preferences versus public expression, we report them for completeness. The index and component results for Trump support are directionally consistent with the hypotheses but statistically insignificant. The index (v2) and component results for Harris support are likewise directionally consistent but statistically insignificant.

Interestingly, the campaign ad appears to have increased the likelihood of supporting a third-party candidate by approximately one percentage point ($p = .093$) and the likelihood of supporting either Harris or a third-party candidate by approximately three percentage points ($p = .045$). Taken together, these findings provide suggestive evidence that the ad reduced support for Trump, even when that defection did not consistently translate into direct support for Harris.

Table G.3: Campaign Ad Average Treatment Effects

PANEL A: TRUMP SUPPORT					
	Index v1	Index v2	Favorability	Vote	Donate
Ad Effect	-0.04	-0.03	-0.05	-0.01	0.00
<i>s.e.</i>	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.01)
<i>pval</i>	[0.332]	[0.365]	[0.338]	[0.461]	[0.563]
Control Mean	0.02	0.02	3.86	0.71	0.03
PANEL B: HARRIS SUPPORT					
	Index v1	Index v2	Favorability	Vote	Donate
Ad Effect	-0.01	0.05	0.06	0.02	-0.01
<i>s.e.</i>	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.01)	(0.00)
<i>pval</i>	[0.735]	[0.179]	[0.216]	[0.230]	[0.135]
Control Mean	0.00	-0.03	1.96	0.16	0.02
PANEL C: ALTERNATIVE ELECTORAL RESPONSES					
	Vote 3rd	Vote Harris/3rd	Note Vote		
Ad Effect	0.01*	0.03**	-0.02		
<i>s.e.</i>	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)		
<i>pval</i>	[0.093]	[0.045]	[0.132]		
Control Mean	0.03	0.18	0.11		
N	2049	2049	2049	2049	2049
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Day FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 based on two-sided p-values. Each column and panel reports results from a separate regression, estimated following Equation 1. Index.v1 is a pre-registered standardized index combining favorability, vote intention, and donation outcomes. Index.v2 is a standardized index combining favorability and vote intention outcomes only. Favorability is measured on a five-point scale ranging from 1 = very unfavorable to 5 = very favorable. Vote and donation outcomes are binary indicators coded 1 = yes and 0 = no. Control means report means in the pure control condition (private condition, no ad treatment).

G.3 Ad Effects in Private vs. Public Conditions

Table G.4 reports treatment effects separately for the private and pooled public conditions, along with tests of differences across conditions (H6–H9). Consistent with the results discussed in the main text, the ad reduced private support for Trump but had no detectable effect on public expression, producing a significant divergence between private and public outcomes. Effects on Harris support were generally null, although the ad increased private support for third-party candidates and for either Harris or a third-party candidate. Finally, the Public indicator is statistically significant in some specifications, suggesting that assignment to a virtual enumerator affected expressed preferences even absent the ad treatment. We discuss these enumerator effects further in Appendix G.1.

Table G.4: Effect of Campaign Ad in Private vs. Public Conditions

	TRUMP SUPPORT				HARRIS SUPPORT				ALTERNATIVE ELECTORAL RESPONSES			
	Index	Favorability	Vote	Donate	Index	Favorability	Vote	Donate	Vote 3rd	Vote Harris/3rd	Vote Not	Donate Harris/3rd
Panel A: Regression results												
(1) Ad Effect (Private) (B1)	-0.10**	-0.16**	-0.04	0.00	0.06	0.06	0.03	-0.01	0.03**	0.05**	-0.01	-0.01
<i>s.e.</i>	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
<i>pval</i>	[0.044]	[0.033]	[0.102]	[0.852]	[0.256]	[0.398]	[0.217]	[0.200]	[0.019]	[0.017]	[0.454]	[0.436]
(2) Public (B2)	-0.07	-0.12*	-0.03		0.05	0.00	0.04*		0.02*	0.05**	-0.02	
<i>s.e.</i>	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.02)		(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.02)		(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	
<i>pval</i>	[0.128]	[0.091]	[0.241]		[0.378]	[0.962]	[0.076]		[0.081]	[0.012]	[0.151]	
(3) Ad x Public (B3)	0.13*	0.21**	0.05		-0.02	0.00	-0.01		-0.03	-0.04	-0.01	
<i>s.e.</i>	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.03)		(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.03)		(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	
<i>pval</i>	[0.059]	[0.047]	[0.122]		[0.824]	[0.968]	[0.609]		[0.119]	[0.190]	[0.713]	
Panel B: Calculated results												
(4) Ad Effect Public	0.03	0.05	0.01		0.04	0.06	0.01		0.00	0.01	-0.03	
<i>s.e.</i>	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.02)		(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.02)		(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	
<i>pval</i>	[0.512]	[0.492]	[0.589]		[0.428]	[0.365]	[0.611]		[0.926]	[0.593]	[0.131]	
Control Mean	0.07	3.94	0.72	0.03	-0.06	1.95	0.13	0.01	0.02	0.15	0.125	0.02
N	2049	2049	2049	2049	2049	2049	2049	2049	2049	2049	2049	2049
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Day FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 based on two-sided p-values. Each column reports results from a separate interaction regression of the ad treatment and public-condition assignment (virtual enumerator), estimated following Equation 4. “Ad Effect (Private)” captures the effect of the ad in the private condition; “Ad x Public” reports the interaction coefficient; “Public” captures the effect of assignment to a virtual enumerator in the no ad condition; and “Ad Effect | Public” is the calculated marginal effect of the ad in the public condition. The support indices are pre-registered standardized indices combining candidate favorability and vote intention. Favorability is measured on a five-point scale ranging from 1 = very unfavorable to 5 = very favorable. Vote intention is a binary indicator coded 1 = yes and 0 = no. Donate is a behavioral measure pre-registered to capture the effect of the ad on private donation behavior and is presented as a behavioral corollary to the effect of the ad on private preferences. Control means report means in the pure control condition (private condition, no ad treatment).

G.4 Ad Effects in Private vs. Public Female and Male Enumerator Conditions

Table G.5 reports the effects of the campaign ad in the private condition relative to the female and male public enumerator conditions, and Table G.6 shows results with all controls reported. We focus primarily on comparisons between the private and female public enumerator conditions, as these provide the most theoretically relevant test of differences between private preferences and public expression (H6–H7, H8_E, and H9_E). Results for the male enumerator condition are reported for comparison and completeness (H10–H11). Each column reports estimates from Equation 5. Bolded coefficients correspond to the main results presented in Figure 3.

Turning first to Trump support, the results provide stronger evidence of a private-public divergence than the pooled public analysis in Table G.4. The ad reduced Trump support in the private condition, whereas the estimated effects in the female public condition are close to zero and, in some cases, slightly positive. As shown in row 2, we observe a 0.17 standard deviation difference in treatment effects across conditions ($p = .049$), driven primarily by a 0.28-unit difference in favorability ratings ($p = .031$). We also observe a substantively meaningful 6 percentage point difference in likely vote choice, although this estimate does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance ($p = .128$). Together, these findings suggest that the ad shifted private preferences away from Trump without generating corresponding changes in publicly expressed support to a female enumerator. We likewise find no evidence that the ad affected publicly expressed support to a male enumerator, providing no support for H10 or H11 (row 8). This null finding is consistent with the broader pattern of results: because the ad did not meaningfully shift publicly expressed support in either public condition, there is little basis for expecting differences in treatment effects across the two enumerator conditions.

The results for Harris support mirror the main findings shown in Figure 3. Although the estimated effects in the private condition are generally positive, they are small and statistically imprecise. Similarly the interaction effects are in the predicted negative direction but also small and imprecise. However, as discussed above, the ad did increase private willingness to support either Harris or a third-party candidate. Taken together, these findings suggest that the ad induced some women to privately move away from Trump, but that these defections were divided between Harris and third-party candidates rather than consolidating behind Harris alone. The results in row 3 provide suggestive evidence that these asymmetric effects are significant in showing a five percentage point difference in support for either Harris or a third-party candidate between the private and female public enumerator conditions ($p = .078$).

Table G.5: Ad Effects on Candidate Support in Private vs. Public Female and Male Enumerator Conditions

	TRUMP SUPPORT				HARRIS SUPPORT				ALTERNATIVE OUTCOMES		
	Index	Favorability	Vote	Donate	Index	Favorability	Vote	Donate	Vote 3rd	Vote Harris or 3rd	Note Vote
Panel A: Regression Results											
(1) Ad Effect (Private) (B1)	-0.10**	-0.16**	-0.04	0.00	0.06	0.06	0.03	-0.01	0.03**	0.05**	-0.01
<i>s.e.</i>	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
<i>pval</i>	[0.044]	[0.034]	[0.102]	[0.851]	[0.258]	[0.401]	[0.219]	[0.198]	[0.019]	[0.018]	[0.458]
(2) Ad x Public (Female Enumerator) (B2)	0.17**	0.28**	0.06		-0.09	-0.07	-0.04		-0.02	-0.06	0.00
<i>s.e.</i>	(0.08)	(0.13)	(0.04)		(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.04)		(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)
<i>pval</i>	[0.049]	[0.031]	[0.128]		[0.347]	[0.569]	[0.215]		[0.401]	[0.112]	[0.983]
(3) Public (Female Enumerator) (B3)	-0.09	-0.17*	-0.03		0.06	0.01	0.04*		0.00	0.05*	-0.02
<i>s.e.</i>	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.03)		(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.03)		(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)
<i>pval</i>	[0.125]	[0.072]	[0.279]		[0.389]	[0.935]	[0.085]		[0.767]	[0.078]	[0.465]
(4) Ad x Public (Male Enumerator) (B4)	0.09	0.14	0.04		0.05	0.08	0.01		-0.03	-0.02	-0.02
<i>s.e.</i>	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.04)		(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.04)		(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)
<i>pval</i>	[0.258]	[0.277]	[0.312]		[0.559]	[0.517]	[0.703]		[0.110]	[0.593]	[0.508]
(5) Public (Male Enumerator) (B5)	-0.05	-0.08	-0.02		0.03	0.00	0.03		0.03**	0.06**	-0.04*
<i>s.e.</i>	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.03)		(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.02)		(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)
<i>pval</i>	[0.333]	[0.333]	[0.401]		[0.570]	[0.996]	[0.242]		[0.027]	[0.021]	[0.078]
Panel B: Calculated Effects											
(6) Ad Effect Public (Female Enum) (B1+B2)	0.07	0.13	0.02		-0.03	-0.01	-0.02		0.01	-0.01	-0.02
<i>s.e.</i>	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.03)		(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.03)		(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)
<i>pval</i>	[0.318]	[0.242]	[0.479]		[0.711]	[0.913]	[0.517]		[0.450]	[0.796]	[0.553]
(7) Ad Effect Public (Male Enum) (B1+B4)	0.00	-0.02	0.00		0.11	0.14	0.04		-0.01	0.03	-0.03
<i>s.e.</i>	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.03)		(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.03)		(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
<i>pval</i>	[0.949]	[0.826]	[0.951]		[0.135]	[0.161]	[0.184]		[0.672]	[0.304]	[0.123]
(8) Test: Ad Effect in Female vs. Male Public Conditions (B2-B4)	0.07	0.15	0.02		-0.14	-0.15	-0.06		0.02	-0.04	0.02
<i>s.e.</i>	(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.05)		(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.04)		(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)
<i>pval</i>	[0.444]	[0.312]	[0.643]		[0.192]	[0.294]	[0.163]		[0.419]	[0.363]	[0.579]
Control mean	0.07	3.94	0.72	0.03	-0.06	1.95	0.13	0.01	0.02	0.15	0.13
N	2049	2049	2049	2049	2049	2049	2049	2049	2049	2049	2049
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 based on two-sided p-values. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and two-sided p-values in brackets. Pre-registered one-sided p-values are not shown but are equal to one-half of the corresponding two-sided p-values for tests in the hypothesized direction. Each column reports results from a separate interaction regression estimated following Equation 5 with the corresponding coefficient estimates shown in parentheses. Bolded results correspond to those in Figure 3 in the main text. Index is a pre-registered standardized index combining candidate favorability and vote intention. Favorability is measured on a five-point scale ranging from 1 = very unfavorable to 5 = very favorable. Vote intention is a binary indicator coded 1 = yes and 0 = no. Donate is a behavioral measure pre-registered to capture the effect of the ad on private donation behavior and is presented as a behavioral corollary to the effect of the ad on private preferences. Control means report means in the pure control condition (private condition, no ad treatment). All models include pre-registered covariates and day fixed effects.

Table G.6: Ad Effects on Candidate Support in Private vs. Public Female and Male Enumerator Conditions, All Controls

	TRUMP SUPPORT			HARRIS SUPPORT			ALTERNATIVE RESPONSES		
	Index	Favorability	Vote	Index	Favorability	Vote	Vote 3rd	Vote Harris/3rd	Vote Not
Ad Effect (Private)	-0.10** (0.05)	-0.16** (0.07)	-0.04* (0.02)	0.06 (0.05)	0.06 (0.07)	0.02 (0.02)	0.03** (0.01)	0.05** (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)
Ad x Public (Fem Enum)	0.17** (0.08)	0.28** (0.13)	0.07* (0.04)	-0.09 (0.09)	-0.07 (0.13)	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.06 (0.04)	0.00 (0.03)
Public (Fem Enum)	-0.09 (0.06)	-0.17* (0.09)	-0.04 (0.03)	0.06 (0.07)	0.01 (0.09)	0.04* (0.03)	0.00 (0.01)	0.05* (0.03)	-0.02 (0.02)
Ad x Public (Male Enum)	0.09 (0.08)	0.14 (0.12)	0.05 (0.04)	0.05 (0.09)	0.08 (0.12)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.03)
Public (Male Enum)	-0.05 (0.06)	-0.08 (0.09)	-0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.06)	0.00 (0.08)	0.03 (0.02)	0.03** (0.01)	0.06** (0.03)	-0.04* (0.02)
Age in years	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.08*** (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.00 (0.02)	0.02*** (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)	0.02*** (0.01)	-0.01*** (0.00)
Married/partnered	0.11*** (0.04)	0.19*** (0.06)	0.04** (0.02)	-0.12*** (0.04)	-0.16*** (0.06)	-0.04** (0.02)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.04** (0.02)	0.00 (0.01)
College educated	-0.10** (0.05)	-0.25*** (0.07)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.10* (0.05)	0.08 (0.07)	0.05*** (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.05** (0.02)	-0.03** (0.01)
White, non-hispanic	0.24*** (0.05)	0.29*** (0.08)	0.12*** (0.02)	-0.24*** (0.06)	-0.40*** (0.08)	-0.05** (0.02)	-0.04** (0.01)	-0.09*** (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)
Christian	0.07* (0.04)	0.05 (0.06)	0.04** (0.02)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.05 (0.06)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.05*** (0.01)
Employed	0.04 (0.04)	0.07 (0.06)	0.01 (0.02)	0.07 (0.04)	0.07 (0.06)	0.03* (0.02)	0.00 (0.01)	0.03* (0.02)	-0.05*** (0.01)
Income	0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.02** (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.02*** (0.00)
Party (Republican coded high)	0.43*** (0.01)	0.64*** (0.02)	0.18*** (0.01)	-0.36*** (0.02)	-0.49*** (0.02)	-0.12*** (0.01)	-0.02*** (0.00)	-0.13*** (0.01)	-0.05*** (0.00)
Northeast	-0.13* (0.07)	-0.23** (0.11)	-0.05 (0.03)	0.19** (0.08)	0.29*** (0.11)	0.05* (0.03)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)
Midwest	-0.01 (0.06)	0.00 (0.09)	0.00 (0.03)	0.08 (0.07)	0.12 (0.09)	0.02 (0.03)	-0.03 (0.02)	0.00 (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)
South	0.05 (0.06)	0.10 (0.09)	0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.06)	0.01 (0.08)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.03* (0.02)	-0.02 (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)
Constant	-2.56	0.31	-0.44	2.03	4.98	0.72	0.15	0.87	0.58
N	2049	2049	2049	2049	2049	2049	2049	2049	2049
Day FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 based on two-sided p-values. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Each column reports results from a separate interaction regression estimated following Equation 5 and presents full regression results with controls corresponding to Figure G.5. Index is a pre-registered standardized index combining candidate favorability and vote intention. Favorability is measured on a five-point scale ranging from 1 = very unfavorable to 5 = very favorable. Vote intention is a binary indicator coded 1 = yes and 0 = no. All models include day fixed effects.

We next examine the effects of the ad across the private, female enumerator, and male enumerator conditions by respondent party identification, motivated by the descriptive evidence suggesting greater room for movement among Independents. For this analysis, we focus on Independents and Republicans, combining weak and leaning Republicans with strong Republicans to improve statistical power. We do not conduct comparable analyses for Democrats due to the small size of the Democratic subsample. Exploratory analyses of subgroup effects by party identification were pre-registered in the pre-analysis plan. The results in Panel A correspond to results reported in Figure 3.

Table G.7 provides evidence that the asymmetric effects on Trump support are driven primarily by Independents. In the private condition, the ad shifted preferences away from Trump, producing a 0.22 standard deviation reduction in the support index ($p = .049$). This effect is driven primarily by a 0.44 unit decline in favorability toward Trump ($p = .011$). We also find evidence for behavioral change: the

ad decreased private donations to Trump by three percentage points ($p = .033$). Again, however, we find no evidence of ad effects on public expression: the estimates for ad effects in the female enumerator condition in row six are directionally positive but statistically insignificant. Consequently, row two shows evidence of statistically significant asymmetric effects across private and public outcomes among Independents. In contrast, we find no comparable evidence of effects among Republicans, reinforcing the conclusion that the overall results are driven by Independents.

The Harris results in Table G.8 are more mixed. Among Independents, the ad produced positive but statistically insignificant effects on both the Harris support index and favorability in the private condition. At the same time, we observe a statistically significant 10 percentage point increase in support for either Harris or a third-party candidate in the private condition ($p = .051$). Taken together with the Trump results, this pattern suggests that the ad may have decreased Independents' support for Trump, shifting support toward Harris or third party candidates. We again find no evidence that these shifts translated into public expression in the female enumerator condition. The interaction terms are generally directionally consistent with asymmetric private-public effects—suggesting bigger effects in private than public—but the estimates are imprecise and statistically insignificant. Among Republicans, the Harris results are uniformly small and statistically insignificant across both the private and public conditions, providing no evidence of meaningful treatment effects in this subgroup.

We also observe that assignment to a virtual enumerator affected expressed preferences even in the absence of the ad treatment. In particular, among Independents, assignment to a female enumerator reduced expressed Trump support and suggestively increased expressed Harris support even in the no-ad condition. This pattern is consistent with the pre ad treatment results reported in the main text and Appendix G.1, which show elevated opposition to Trump when Independent women reported their preferences to a female virtual enumerator.

One potentially puzzling pattern is that, among Independent women, the estimated positive effects of the ad on Harris support appear larger in the male than in the female enumerator conditions (Table G.8, row 6), contrary to H10 and H11. One possible explanation, which finds support in Appendix G.1, is that assignment to the female enumerator increased expressed support for Harris or a third-party candidate even in the absence of the ad, thereby elevating baseline levels of publicly expressed opposition to Trump.

Table G.7: Ad Effects on **Trump Support** in Private vs. Public Female (and Male) Enumerator Conditions, By Respondent Party

	Independents				Republicans			
	Index	Favorability	Vote	Donate	Index	Favorability	Vote	Donate
Panel A: Regression Results								
(1) Ad Effect (Private) (B1)	-0.22**	-0.44**	-0.07	-0.03**	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	0.01
<i>s.e.</i>	(0.11)	(0.17)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.02)	(0.02)
<i>pval</i>	[0.049]	[0.011]	[0.215]	[0.033]	[0.540]	[0.812]	[0.402]	[0.418]
(2) Ad x Public (Female Enumerator) (B2)	0.37*	0.73**	0.11		0.11	0.15	0.05	
<i>s.e.</i>	(0.21)	(0.32)	(0.10)		(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.04)	
<i>pval</i>	[0.074]	[0.022]	[0.261]		[0.194]	[0.292]	[0.196]	
(3) Public (Female Enumerator) (B3)	-0.30**	-0.54**	-0.10		-0.07	-0.11	-0.03	
<i>s.e.</i>	(0.14)	(0.22)	(0.07)		(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.03)	
<i>pval</i>	[0.042]	[0.016]	[0.144]		[0.241]	[0.265]	[0.300]	
(4) Ad x Public (Male Enumerator) (B4)	0.21	0.23	0.10		0.05	0.08	0.02	
<i>s.e.</i>	(0.21)	(0.31)	(0.10)		(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.04)	
<i>pval</i>	[0.320]	[0.460]	[0.291]		[0.557]	[0.565]	[0.603]	
(5) Public (Male Enumerator) (B5)	-0.11	-0.18	-0.04		-0.06	-0.06	-0.03	
<i>s.e.</i>	(0.14)	(0.22)	(0.07)		(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.03)	
<i>pval</i>	[0.418]	[0.404]	[0.514]		[0.319]	[0.498]	[0.255]	
Panel B: Calculated Effects								
(6) Ad Effect Public (Female Enum) (B1+B2)	0.15	0.29	0.04		0.08	0.13	0.03	
<i>s.e.</i>	(0.17)	(0.27)	(0.08)		(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.03)	
<i>pval</i>	[0.402]	[0.277]	[0.602]		[0.244]	[0.257]	[0.322]	
(7) Ad Effect Public (Male Enum) (B1+B4)	-0.02	-0.20	0.04		0.02	0.06	0.00	
<i>s.e.</i>	(0.17)	(0.26)	(0.08)		(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.03)	
<i>pval</i>	[0.926]	[0.438]	[0.660]		[0.781]	[0.589]	[0.967]	
(8) Test: Ad Effect in Female vs. Male Public Conditions (B2-B4)	0.16	0.50	0.01		0.06	0.07	0.03	
<i>s.e.</i>	(0.25)	(0.38)	(0.12)		(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.05)	
<i>pval</i>	[0.510]	[0.186]	[0.956]		[0.535]	[0.656]	[0.508]	
Control mean	-0.69	2.97	0.37	0.03	0.46	4.45	0.90	0.04
N	555	555	555	555	1399	1399	1399	1399
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 based on two-sided p-values. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and two-sided p-values in brackets. Each column reports results from a separate interaction regression estimated using Equation 5, with the corresponding coefficient estimates shown in parentheses. Results are reported separately for Independent and Republican respondents. Bolded results correspond to those in Figure 3 in the main text. Index is a pre-registered standardized index combining candidate favorability and vote intention. Favorability is measured on a five-point scale ranging from 1 = very unfavorable to 5 = very favorable. Vote intention is a binary indicator coded 1 = yes and 0 = no. Donate is a behavioral measure pre-registered to capture the effect of the ad on private donation behavior and is presented as a behavioral corollary to the effect of the ad on private preferences. Control means report means in the pure control condition (private condition, no ad treatment). All models include pre-registered covariates and day fixed effects.

Table G.8: Ad Effects on **Harris Support** in Private vs. Public Female (and Male) Enumerator Conditions, By Respondent Party


	Independents					Republicans				
	Index	Favorability	Vote Harris	Vote Harris/3rd	Donate	Index	Favorability	Vote Harris	Vote Harris/3rd	Donate
Panel A: Regression Results										
(1) Ad Effect (Private) (B1)	0.10	0.09	0.05	0.10*	-0.02	0.04	0.08	0.01	0.02	0.00
<i>s.e.</i>	(0.12)	(0.16)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.00)
<i>pval</i>	[0.392]	[0.595]	[0.295]	[0.051]	[0.113]	[0.411]	[0.357]	[0.652]	[0.241]	[0.826]
(2) Ad x Public (Female Enumerator) (B2)	-0.04	0.05	-0.05	-0.10		-0.11	-0.15	-0.03	-0.05	
<i>s.e.</i>	(0.24)	(0.31)	(0.10)	(0.10)		(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.03)	(0.03)	
<i>pval</i>	[0.881]	[0.869]	[0.621]	[0.330]		[0.206]	[0.239]	[0.269]	[0.163]	
(3) Public (Female Enumerator) (B3)	0.22	0.11	0.14**	0.13*		0.02	0.03	0.01	0.02	
<i>s.e.</i>	(0.17)	(0.22)	(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.02)	(0.02)	
<i>pval</i>	[0.193]	[0.615]	[0.046]	[0.060]		[0.705]	[0.764]	[0.672]	[0.392]	
(4) Ad x Public (Male Enumerator) (B4)	0.25	0.25	0.11	0.01		-0.05	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	
<i>s.e.</i>	(0.24)	(0.31)	(0.10)	(0.10)		(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.03)	(0.04)	
<i>pval</i>	[0.301]	[0.415]	[0.260]	[0.940]		[0.547]	[0.803]	[0.305]	[0.347]	
(5) Public (Male Enumerator) (B5)	0.08	-0.07	0.09	0.15**		0.05	0.06	0.02	0.03	
<i>s.e.</i>	(0.16)	(0.21)	(0.07)	(0.07)		(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.02)	(0.02)	
<i>pval</i>	[0.610]	[0.743]	[0.167]	[0.028]		[0.459]	[0.508]	[0.481]	[0.206]	
Panel B: Calculated Effects										
(6) Ad Effect Public (Female Enum) (B1+B2)	0.07	0.14	0.00	0.00		-0.07	-0.08	-0.02	-0.02	
<i>s.e.</i>	(0.21)	(0.27)	(0.09)	(0.09)		(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.02)	(0.03)	
<i>pval</i>	[0.754]	[0.615]	[0.964]	[0.960]		[0.340]	[0.444]	[0.297]	[0.394]	
(7) Ad Effect Public (Male Enum) (B1+B4)	0.36*	0.34	0.17*	0.11		-0.01	0.04	-0.02	-0.01	
<i>s.e.</i>	(0.21)	(0.26)	(0.09)	(0.09)		(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.02)	(0.03)	
<i>pval</i>	[0.095]	[0.200]	[0.058]	[0.197]		[0.895]	[0.697]	[0.343]	[0.750]	
(8) Test: Ad Effect in Female vs. Male Public Conditions (B2-B4)	-0.29	-0.20	-0.16	-0.11		-0.06	-0.12	0.00	-0.01	
<i>s.e.</i>	(0.30)	(0.38)	(0.12)	(0.12)		(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.03)	(0.04)	
<i>pval</i>	[0.336]	[0.598]	[0.184]	[0.382]		[0.570]	[0.420]	[0.959]	[0.724]	
Control mean	0.44	2.77	0.23	0.29	0.03	-0.36	1.48	0.06	0.06	0.00
N	555	555	555	555	555	1399	1399	1399	1399	1399
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 based on two-sided p-values. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and two-sided p-values in brackets. Each column reports results from a separate interaction regression estimated using Equation 5, with the corresponding coefficient estimates shown in parentheses. Results are reported separately for Independent and Republican respondents. Bolded results correspond to those in Figure 3 in the main text. Index is a pre-registered standardized index combining candidate favorability and vote intention. Favorability is measured on a five-point scale ranging from 1 = very unfavorable to 5 = very favorable. Vote intention is a binary indicator coded 1 = yes and 0 = no. Donate is a behavioral measure pre-registered to capture the effect of the ad on private donation behavior and is presented as a behavioral corollary to the effect of the ad on private preferences. Control means report means in the pure control condition (private condition, no ad treatment). All models include pre-registered covariates and day fixed effects.

One potential concern with the results reported above is that big effects on Independent women are driven by unusual distributional features or isolated outliers. Figure G.1 zooms in on Independent women using kernel density estimates across the four experimental conditions and suggests that the subgroup results are not driven by unusual distributional features or isolated outliers.


Relative to the private-control condition, the private ad-treatment distribution exhibits greater density at lower levels of Trump support and reduced density at higher levels of Trump support, while differences in the middle of the distribution are comparatively limited. Because both conditions involve anonymous reporting, this pattern is less likely to reflect social desirability pressures induced by the virtual enumerator and instead provides evidence consistent with genuine persuasion effects of the ad. The female-enumerator control distribution is likewise shifted toward lower levels of Trump support relative to the private-control condition even absent treatment, particularly through reduced density in the higher-support region of the index. Notably, the female-enumerator ad-treatment distribution lies close to both the private ad-treatment and female-enumerator control distributions, suggesting that the ad and the female-enumerator condition shifted expressed Trump support in the same direction, thereby attenuating the incremental treatment contrast within the public condition. Boxplots in Figure G.2 similarly suggest that these differences reflect broader shifts in expressed Trump support rather than isolated outliers or unusual dispersion across cells.

Figure G.1: Kernel Density Plot



Note: Figure plots kernel density estimates for the standardized Trump support index among Independent women.

Figure G.2: Box Plot



G.5 Evidence for Social Norms Change

We also evaluate the pre-registered prediction that the ad could have worked by shifting perceived social norms, thereby lowering the social costs (increasing the social benefits) of public expression to co-partisan women.

As discussed in the main text, the results in Table G.9 show little evidence that the ad shifted perceived social norms among Republican women in the sample. However, we find evidence that the ad shifted perceived descriptive norms among Independent women. In the private condition, the ad increased by 10 percentage points the likelihood of reporting that a majority of Independent women would vote for Harris ($p = .054$) (columns 1). However, we again find no corresponding treatment effect on publicly expressed descriptive norms. As with the preference outcomes, this appears to reflect a substantial baseline shift induced by the female enumerator itself. Relative to the private condition, Independent women assigned to the female enumerator were 19 percentage points more likely to report that a majority of Independent women would support Harris ($p = .005$). Notably, the treatment effects on descriptive norms were highly specific. Among Independent women, the ad increased perceptions that a majority of other Independent women would support Harris, but it did not change perceptions of Republican women’s support for Harris or the share of Independent men expected to support Harris.

Figure G.3 illustrates this graphically, presenting the raw means and showing a similar pattern to Figure 4 in the main text. Overall, these results suggest that the ad may have shifted perceptions of the descriptive norm, but they also indicate that publicly expressed perceptions of the norm were already elevated in the female-enumerator condition prior to treatment. Independent women assigned to the female enumerator in the control group were substantially more likely to report that a majority of Independent women would support Harris than those in the private condition. This pattern implies that the female-enumerator manipulation itself encouraged socially desirable anti-Trump and pro-Harris expression. Under this interpretation, the null public treatment effect reflects limited room for further movement in a condition where publicly expressed attitudes and descriptive norms were already shifted in the same direction. Consequently, the evidence is more consistent with baseline social benefits driving the null public treatment effect than with an absence of norm change following treatment.

Finally, for completeness with the pre-analysis plan, Table G.10 reports the average treatment effect of the ad on perceived descriptive norms (testing H5a and H5b). Overall, in the full sample the ad caused a .08 standard deviation increase ($p = .073$) in the Index capturing perceived support for Harris among Independent, Republican and Democratic women. Interestingly, we also see evidence that it increased the perceived share of Independent men who would be voting for Harris.

Table G.9: Ad and Enumerator Effects on Perceived Social Norms by Respondent Party

	INDEPENDENT WOMEN SAMPLE			REPUBLICAN WOMEN SAMPLE		
	Perceived Harris Support Among [...]			Perceived Harris Support Among [...]		
	Independent	Republican	Independent	Republican	Independent	Republican
	Women	Women	Men (Placebo)	Women	Women	Men (Placebo)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Regression Results						
(1) Ad Effect (Private) (B1)	0.10*	-0.05	0.05	0.01	0.06**	0.01
<i>s.e.</i>	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
<i>pval</i>	[0.054]	[0.296]	[0.258]	[0.810]	[0.028]	[0.696]
(2) Ad x Public (Female Enumerator) (B2)	-0.23**	0.12	0.00	0.01	-0.06	-0.03
<i>s.e.</i>	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)
<i>pval</i>	[0.020]	[0.138]	[0.994]	[0.776]	[0.201]	[0.348]
(3) Public (Female Enumerator) (B3)	0.19***	-0.03	0.04	-0.03	0.06*	0.01
<i>s.e.</i>	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
<i>pval</i>	[0.005]	[0.602]	[0.423]	[0.270]	[0.072]	[0.743]
(4) Ad x Public (Male Enumerator) (B4)	0.00	0.03	-0.03	-0.02	-0.10*	-0.04
<i>s.e.</i>	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)
<i>pval</i>	[0.973]	[0.720]	[0.686]	[0.626]	[0.052]	[0.302]
(5) Public (Male Enumerator) (B5)	0.07	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.09***	0.03
<i>s.e.</i>	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
<i>pval</i>	[0.315]	[0.996]	[0.674]	[0.384]	[0.006]	[0.295]
Panel B: Calculated Effects						
(6) Ad Effect Public (Female Enum) (B1+B2)	-0.13	0.08	0.05	0.02	0.00	-0.02
<i>s.e.</i>	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
<i>pval</i>	[0.131]	[0.281]	[0.487]	[0.569]	[0.972]	[0.379]
(7) Ad Effect Public (Male Enum) (B1+B4)	0.10	-0.02	0.02	-0.01	-0.04	-0.03
<i>s.e.</i>	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
<i>pval</i>	[0.246]	[0.804]	[0.803]	[0.669]	[0.388]	[0.320]
Control mean	0.25	0.18	0.14	0.10	0.12	0.08
N	555	555	555	1399	1399	1399
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes


Notes: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 based on two-sided p-values. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and two-sided p-values in brackets. Full sample includes small group of democrats. "Rights" is coded 1 if reproductive rights were a top three issue and 0 otherwise.

Table G.10: Ad Effect on Perceived Descriptive Norms (ATE)

	Perceived Harris Support Among Women			Perceived Harris Support Among Men		
	Index	Independent	Republican	Index	Independent	Republican
		women	women		men	men
Ad Effect	0.08*	0.14**	0.08	0.05	0.12**	0.00
<i>s.e.</i>	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.07)
<i>pval</i>	[0.073]	[0.047]	[0.257]	[0.250]	[0.048]	[0.992]
Control Mean	-0.04	3.34	2.58	-0.02	2.78	2.30
N	2049	2049	2049	2049	2049	2049
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Day FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 based on two-sided p-values. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and two-sided p-values in brackets. Full sample includes small group of democrats.

Figure G.3: Ad and Public Female Enumerator Effects on Perceived Social Norms, Independent Sample



Notes: Figure shows raw means. P-values are from regressions.

G.6 Alternative Explanations

We consider a few additional explanations for the null results on public expression: a generalized privacy message, virtual enumerator distraction, and race effects.

Generalized privacy. We consider one possible explanation for the null results in the public condition: women internalized the ad’s general privacy of ballot message and generalized it to all forms of public expression. To address this, we can test whether the campaign ad shifted privacy expectations using a question that was asked only of partnered respondents: “How likely or unlikely is it that people close to you will learn who you vote for?” The ad had no detectable effects on responses to this question (private condition: $b = .02$, $p = .833$; public condition: $b = .11$, $p = .195$, interaction: $b = .09$, $p = .443$), suggesting this alternative explanation is unlikely.

Virtual enumerator distraction. We also check whether the enumerator treatment distracted respondents from the ad treatment, which could have caused the null results in the public condition. If the enumerator caused distraction from the ad, we would expect lower correctness in the enumerator condition(s). The ad treatment check asked respondents how many women appeared in the video. We evaluate this measure in two ways. In the first coding, “I didn’t watch a video” is coded as correct for control respondents and “2 women” as correct for treated respondents. Under this coding, correctness appears somewhat lower in the female-enumerator condition, which could suggest distraction. However, in the second coding, we allow “1 woman” to be considered correct for respondents in the ad-control condition or in the female enumerator condition, to account for the possibility that respondents were referring to the single woman shown in the enumerator image rather than the video. Using this coding, which we believe is reasonable, we find no differences in correctness across conditions.

We also find no evidence that the public condition reduced engagement. Respondents assigned to the female enumerator condition spent slightly more time on the survey—0.77 minutes (about 46 seconds)

longer on average—but this difference is small and statistically indistinguishable from the private condition ($p = 0.201$). Taken together, these results indicate that distraction from the enumerator is unlikely to explain the null effect on public expression.


Virtual enumerator race. We also examine whether responses to the virtual female enumerator vary by respondent race. This analysis is important because all virtual enumerators were white. We made this design choice anticipating that our sample—Republican and Independent women—would be predominantly white, which the data confirm. Of 2,049 respondents, 82 percent identify as white (non-Hispanic), 5 percent as Black, 5 percent as Latina, and the remaining 7 percent as other racial or ethnic minorities.

Although the number of non-white respondents is relatively small, this analysis helps assess an alternative interpretation of the null results in public expression. Specifically, if non-white respondents identified less strongly with the white enumerators, weaker treatment effects in the public condition could reflect reduced identification with the messenger rather than a broader divergence between private attitudes and public expression. Conversely, if gender identification dominates racial identification, or if even limited social visibility is sufficient to shape public expression across groups, we would expect similar patterns among white and non-white respondents.

As shown in Figure G.4, the results exhibit strikingly similar patterns across racial groups. In the private conditions, both non-white (Panel A) and white (Panel D) respondents show reduced support for Trump in response to the treatment. In contrast, under the public female enumerator condition, coefficients are positive for both non-white (Panel B) and white (Panel E) respondents, yielding a similar interaction pattern across groups. These results suggest that the null results in public expression are unlikely to be driven primarily by the racial identity of the enumerator. If weaker identification with the white enumerator among non-white respondents explained the null public effects, we would expect substantially different interaction patterns across racial groups. Instead, the divergence between private and public outcomes appears in both groups.

The analysis also sheds light on whether the campaign ad itself—featuring two white women—resonated differently across racial groups. If non-white women failed to identify with the characters in the ad, we would expect weaker treatment effects on their private attitudes and behavioral intentions. However, Panels A and D suggest otherwise. The reduction in private support for Trump is similar across white and non-white respondents, and the increase in support for Harris is, if anything, suggestively larger among non-white women. This pattern indicates that the ad’s persuasive effects on private attitudes were not confined to white respondents despite the racial composition of the ad’s protagonists.

Figure G.4: Effect of campaign ad in ‘private’ vs. ‘public’ female enumerator conditions by respondent race



H Multiple Hypothesis Correction

This appendix reports multiple hypothesis corrections using sharpened false discovery rate (FDR) q-values following [Anderson \(2008\)](#). Because the manuscript examines several distinct theoretical questions, we apply corrections within conceptually related families of tests rather than across all analyses in the paper.

Table [H.1](#) reports corrections for the baseline divergence analyses among Independent women. These analyses examine whether political preferences differed between the private condition and the public female-enumerator condition prior to exposure to the ad. Although the private versus female-enumerator comparison was not explicitly pre-registered and is therefore exploratory, it plays a central role in the revised manuscript’s argument about the baseline relationship between private preferences and public expression. We therefore report multiple-hypothesis corrections for these analyses as a robustness check on the primary substantive inferences drawn from the data. Columns 1–2 apply corrections to the two main pre-registered outcomes in *H1*: support for Trump and certainty about vote choice. Columns 3–4 apply a more conservative correction that additionally includes reproductive-rights salience and likelihood of voting, which are also discussed in the text.

Table H.1: Multiple Hypothesis Correction for Baseline Divergence Results (Independent Sample Only)

	Pre-registered		Full	
	pval	qval	pval	qval
Vote Trump	0.028	0.060	0.028	0.122
Certain Vote	0.081	0.060	0.081	0.122
Rights			0.060	0.122
Likely Vote			0.930	0.303

Notes: Table reports sharpened false discovery rate (FDR) q-values following Anderson (2008) for exploratory analyses of baseline divergence among Independent women. Estimates compare respondents assigned to the private condition with respondents assigned to the public female-enumerator condition prior to treatment. Columns (1)–(2) correct across the two pre-registered outcomes: support for Trump and vote certainty. Columns (3)–(4) report a more conservative correction that additionally includes reproductive-rights salience and likelihood of voting. All p-values are two-sided.

Table [H.2](#) reports corrections for the main analyses of campaign persuasion. These analyses focus on the comparison between the private condition and the public female-enumerator condition, which is central to the paper’s argument about private preferences and public expression but was not explicitly pre-registered. Although exploratory, these analyses constitute the primary empirical tests of the paper’s theoretical argument and therefore warrant adjustment for multiple comparisons. Panel A reports results for the full sample; Panel B for Independent women, the subgroup in which treatment effects are concentrated. Within each table, corrections are applied separately for the effect of the ad in the private condition and the differential effect of the ad between the private and public female-enumerator conditions. For each estimand, corrections are applied across the two primary pre-registered outcome measures: the Trump support index and the Harris support index.

We do not apply corrections across additional outcomes reported in the manuscript. Secondary outcomes, including donation behavior, support for third-party candidates, and perceived social norms, are conceptually distinct from the primary candidate-support indices and are presented as supporting or exploratory evidence. Similarly, as pre-registered, we do not pool baseline divergence analyses and treatment-effect analyses into a common correction family because they address different theoretical

Table H.2: Multiple Hypothesis Correction for Private vs. Public (Female Enumerator) Results

	Ad Effect (Private)				Ad*Public (Female Enumerator)			
	two-sided		one-sided		two-sided		one-sided	
	pval	qval	pval	qval	pval	qval	pval	qval
Panel A: Full Sample								
Trump support index	0.044	0.097	0.022	0.047	0.049	0.109	0.025	0.052
Harris support index	0.258	0.149	0.129	0.069	0.347	0.210	0.174	0.095
Panel B Independents Only								
Trump support index	0.049	0.109	0.025	0.053	0.074	0.174	0.037	0.080
Harris support index	0.392	0.244	0.196	0.109	0.881	0.788	0.441	0.283

Notes: Table reports sharpened false discovery rate (FDR) q-values following Anderson (2008) for the manuscript’s primary analyses of campaign persuasion. Corrections are applied separately within each estimand (Ad Effect in Private; Ad $\times$ Public Female Enumerator) across the two primary outcome measures: the Trump support index and Harris support index. Panel A reports results for the full sample; Panel B reports exploratory subgroup treatment effects for Independent women. One-sided tests follow the directional-hypothesis testing convention specified in the pre-analysis plan. Directional hypotheses for the Ad Effect ($H6-H7$) were pre-registered; directional hypotheses for the Ad $\times$ Public interaction ($H8_E$) and ($H9_E$) were specified post-registration and are treated as exploratory.

questions. As a result, the reported q-values should be interpreted as controlling the false discovery rate within each theoretically defined family of tests rather than across the manuscript as a whole.

I Research Ethics and IRB

The research design is consistent with the American Political Science Association’s *Principles and Guidance for Human Subjects Research* and the ethical principles outlined in the Belmont Report, including respect for persons, beneficence, and justice. Participants provided informed consent, were free to withdraw at any time, and were debriefed at the conclusion of the study. The study posed minimal risk, protected participant confidentiality, and compensated participants at standard survey platform rates.

This study was reviewed and approved by the Institutional Review Board at XXX University. All participants provided informed consent prior to participating in the study (see consent script below) and were informed that participation was voluntary and that they could withdraw at any time. Participants were compensated for completing the survey through the Cloud Research Connect platform.

To avoid potential demand effects, the study was described to participants as being conducted by researchers affiliated with the Media Research Project rather than identifying the university affiliation of the investigators. At the conclusion of the survey, participants were debriefed and provided with contact information for the research team at XXX University. Participants were also given the opportunity to withdraw their responses following the debriefing.

The study posed minimal risk to participants. Responses were collected anonymously and stored on secure servers accessible only to the research team. Data were analyzed and reported only in aggregate form, and no information identifying individual respondents is included in the dataset or publications resulting from this research.

Election context. Because the study involved exposure to a political campaign ad during an ongoing election, we considered the potential ethical implications of influencing vote preferences. As mentioned in the main text, the campaign ad used in the study had already been publicly released and widely

discussed in national media at the time the study was conducted. Also, given the study’s modest scale and nationwide recruitment, it is unlikely that participation meaningfully influenced electoral outcomes.

Consent script:

Please read the following information closely. At the end you will be asked if you consent to participate.

This study is being conducted by researchers affiliated with The Media Research Project. The goal of the study is to better understand how voters are thinking about the upcoming 2024 presidential election.

Your participation has several benefits. Your responses will help to improve understanding of how people are voting in the 2024 presidential election. You will also receive compensation if you complete the survey.

There are minimal risks to participating. Your participation is completely voluntary. You can choose to withdraw from the study at any time. If you choose to participate, your responses will be kept confidential, combined with those from other participants, and published in the form of generalizations about responses as a whole. All data will be stored in a secure location accessible only to the research team. The research team retains the right to use and publish data that contains no information that would reveal the identity of respondents.

Consent. *I have read this consent form and understand what is being requested of me as a participant in this study. I have been given satisfactory answers to my questions. I certify that I am at least 18 years of age.*

J Pre-Registration and Reporting Table

We pre-registered our study at OSF on October 31, 2025 and updated the PAP on November 3, 2025. The anonymized pre-registration document is available at <https://drive.google.com/file/d/1DzEYcm2LpwlUc2psYDkQcZrqTiBEvoEF/view?usp=sharing>.

The manuscript closely follows the pre-analysis plan with Table J.1 provides full details on deviations between the PAP and the manuscript. The main deviation is that while we pre-registered comparisons between private (no enumerator) and public (pooling female and male enumerator) conditions, we report exploratory comparisons between the private (no enumerator) and public (female enumerator) conditions in the manuscript. This is theoretically motivated: we view the female enumerator as the most relevant operationalization of public expression in this setting because the ad was directed at women and centered on women signaling support for Harris and opposition to Trump to one another. All pre-specified comparisons of private vs. public (pooling female and male enumerators) and pre-specified comparisons of male vs. female enumerators are reported in the Appendix.

Table J.1: Pre-Registration Reporting Table

Item	Relevant Table/Figure	Note on Deviation
Sample		
Sampling		Sampling frame expanded mid-field to include Independent and weak/leaning Democratic women to better align with the campaign ad's target audience and reduce the share of strong Republican respondents, who might be least responsive to ad treatment. Updated PAP (OSF, Nov. 3, 2024).
Empirical Tests (<i>Column 1 reproduces pre-specified hypotheses as written in PAP</i>)		
Hypothesis 1: Respondents will be more uncertain about who to vote for and less likely to support Trump in the private condition (the virtual enumerator control) than in the public condition (the virtual enumerator treatment condition).	Manuscript Figure 2; Appendix Table G.1	In addition to “certainty about vote choice and support for Trump”, we report results for two other variables measured before exposure to the ad treatment: (1) importance of reproductive rights as an issue; and (2) likelihood of voting. Manuscript Figure 2 reports results on the exploratory comparison between the private and public (female enumerator only) condition. Manuscript Figure 2 and Appendix Table G.1 report subgroup effects by PartyID.
Hypothesis 2: At baseline, certainty about vote choice and support for Trump will be lower in the female versus male enumerator conditions.	Appendix Table G.1	In addition to “certainty about vote choice and support for Trump”, we report results for two other variables measured before exposure to the ad treatment: (1) importance of reproductive rights as an issue; and (2) likelihood of voting. Appendix Table G.1 reports subgroup results by PartyID.
Hypothesis 3: The video will increase respondents' support (favorability, stated voting intention, and/or willingness to donate) for Harris.	Appendix Table G.3; Appendix Table G.4	Average treatment effects of ad reported in appendix, not main paper, since paper focuses on differences in effects in public and private conditions. Appendix Table G.4 reports subgroup effects by PartyID.
Hypothesis 4: The video will reduce respondents' support (favorability, stated voting intention, and/or willingness to donate) for Trump.	Appendix Table G.3; Appendix Table G.4	Average treatment effects of ad reported in appendix, not main paper, since paper focuses on differences in effects in public and private conditions. Appendix Table G.4 reports subgroup effects by PartyID.
Hypothesis 5a: The video will increase respondents' estimates of proportions of Republican, Independent, and Democratic women who will vote for Harris.	Appendix Table G.10; Appendix Table G.9	Hypothesis modified to include perceptions of Democratic voters after sample expansion. Updated PAP (OSF, Nov. 3, 2024). Appendix Table G.10 reports pre-specified average treatment effects of the ad. Appendix Table G.9 reports exploratory comparison between the ad effect in private vs. public (female enumerator) condition and subgroup effects by PartyID.
Hypothesis 5b: The video will not change respondents' estimates of proportions of Republican, Independent, and Democratic men who will vote for Harris.	Appendix Table G.10; Appendix Table G.9	Hypothesis modified to include perceptions of Democratic voters after sample expansion. Updated PAP (OSF, Nov. 3, 2024). Appendix Table G.10 reports pre-specified average treatment effects of the ad. Appendix Table G.9 reports exploratory comparison between the ad effect in private vs. public (female enumerator) condition and subgroup effects by PartyID.

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Item	Relevant Table/Figure	Note on Deviation
Hypothesis 6: The treatment video will increase respondents' favorability rating and intent to vote for Harris in the private condition.	Manuscript Figure 3; Appendix Table G.4	N/A
Hypothesis 7: The treatment video will reduce respondents' favorability rating and intent to vote for Trump in the private condition.	Manuscript Figure 3; Appendix Table G.4	N/A
Hypothesis 8: The treatment video will have a bigger effect on increasing respondents' favorability rating and intent to vote for Harris in the private condition relative to the public condition.	Manuscript Figure 3; Appendix Table G.4; Appendix Table G.8	Appendix Table G.4 reports the pre-specified private vs. public (female and male enumerator condition pooled) comparison. Manuscript Figure 3 and Appendix Table G.4 report the exploratory comparison between the private and public (female enumerator only) condition, and subgroup effects by Party ID. Appendix Table G.8 reports results by Party ID.
Hypothesis 9: The treatment video will have a bigger effect on reducing respondents' favorability rating and intent to vote for Trump in the private condition relative to the public condition.	Manuscript Figure 3; Appendix Table G.4; Appendix Table G.7	Appendix Table G.4 reports the pre-specified private vs. public (female and male enumerator condition pooled) comparison. Manuscript Figure 3 and Appendix Table G.4 report the exploratory comparison between the private and public (female enumerator only) condition, and subgroup effects by Party ID. Appendix Table G.7 reports results by Party ID.
Hypothesis 10: The treatment video will increase respondents' favorability rating and intent to vote for Harris by a larger amount in the public female enumerator condition relative to the public male enumerator condition.	Appendix Table G.5; Appendix Table G.8	Appendix Table G.8 reports results by Party ID.
Hypothesis 11: The treatment video will reduce respondents' favorability rating and intent to vote for Trump by a larger amount in the public female enumerator condition relative to the public male enumerator condition.	Appendix Table G.5; Appendix Table G.7	Appendix Table G.7 reports results by Party ID.
Heterogeneous Effects (<i>Column 1 reproduces language from PAP</i>)		

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Item	Relevant Table/Figure	Note on Deviation
We expect the treatment will have a bigger effect on women who have weaker support for Trump, are more undecided, or have weaker Republican party ID. We will also investigate whether the video has bigger effects on women who face higher social costs for supporting Harris (as captured by treatment questions asking how friends, family, and partners are voting and self-reported fear of social sanctioning). Given that we expanded the sample to include weak/leaning Democrats and Independents, we will also look at heterogeneous effects by party ID, especially for women who report that their husbands are likely to vote for Trump.	Several	We do not explore the full battery of pre-specified heterogeneous effects in this paper. We report subgroup effects by PartyID (pre-specified as a heterogeneous effect in PAP modification, OSF, Nov. 3, 2024) corresponding to the pre-specified hypotheses as detailed above. We report subgroup effects by race (not pre-specified as a heterogeneous effect) corresponding to Hypotheses 8 and 9 to assess whether treatment effects vary by enumerator–respondent race match in Appendix Figure G.4.
Outcome Measures		
Time to Complete Survey	Appendix G.6	Not pre-specified as outcome. Recorded during implementation and reported to assess whether the enumerator treatment affected respondent engagement with survey.
Likelihood of others close to you learning who you vote for	Appendix G.6	Not pre-specified as outcome. Reported as part of exploratory analysis of alternate explanations for treatment effects.
Importance of reproductive rights as an issue	Manuscript Figure 2; Appendix Table G.1	Not pre-specified as outcome. Analyzed as an additional outcome for Hypotheses 1 and 2.
Likelihood of voting	Manuscript Figure 2; Appendix Table G.1	Not pre-specified as outcome. Analyzed as an additional outcome for Hypotheses 1 and 2.